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Abstract 
 
 
My PhD thesis studies the rise of modern education in China and its underlying 
driving forces from the turn of the 20th century. It is motivated by one sweeping 
educational movement in Chinese history: the traditional Confucius teaching came to 
an abrupt end, and was replaced by a modern and national education model at the 
turn of the 20th century. This thesis provides the first systematic quantitative studies 
that examine the rise of education through the initial stage of its development.  
 
It mainly contains three analytical parts. The first one sets out the jourey toward the 
birth of the first modern education system, and generalized the main virtues and 
progresses it brought to China. The second section provides long-term estimates on 
how much education progressed through 20th century based on a rich variety of 
indicators: literacy rate, enrolment ratio, and more importantly -- human capital 
stock (average years of schooling). This exercise allows putting Chinese 
accomplishments in education into international perspective. The last Chapter of this 
thesis tackles one hotly debated question that ‘what factors drove the rise of mass 
schooling (primary education)?’ Given its political turmoil and economic 
backwardness, the expansion of modern primary schooling that was mainly driven 
by increasing public efforts seems puzzling. What contributed to mass education’s 
noteworthy diffusion in China? Based on a dataset that covers more than one 
thousand counties, we find that economic factors have little power in explaining the 
variations in educational outcomes. In contrast, both informal practice of governance 
imposed by gentry (one important social group in Chinese history) and regional 
political stability presented their critical importance. The findings of this section not 
only contribute to pin down determinants of education expansion, but also shed 
lights on a growing literature stressing the importance of informal institution in 
providing public goods in non-democratic societies.  
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1 
Introduction  
 
On a freezing afternoon in late January, 1913, my great grandfather assembled the 
Gao family in the grand hall of his courtyard home. He was about to tell the whole 
family that the Sishu 1 , which he had run for decades in Qi County of Shanxi 
province and which people travelled far to attend, had to be closed. The future was 
as unimaginable as the past. He had reasons to be worried: the world he used to live 
in, understand and be good at had been turned up-side down. The Emperor was gone; 
the queue hanging behind men’s backs for more than 200 years had been cut off,2 
and he was deluged with new terms, such as ‘democracy’, ‘republic’ and ‘science’. 
The same day, my great grandfather, the last gentry member of the Gao family, who 
had obtained the title of Gongsheng3 and had long been one of the most respected 
persons in the county, walked for about an hour along the dusty road to the county 
seat. A little reluctant and probably terrified, he knew that a new era was coming, 
and he refused to not be part of it. From then on, he became a teacher and one 
member of the school board of the first modern secondary school in this remote 
county.  
 
This thesis is indeed not about one person or one family’s vicissitudes. Since the last 
decades of the crisis-ridden late Qing era, China as a whole was under 
unprecedentedly far-reaching and comprehensive transformations. The old order was 
abandoned, and great emphasis was placed on intellectual, economic and social 
Westernization; the advent of a modern educational system consisted in great part of 
this. Traditional Confucian teaching was practised in China for more than a thousand 
years. It was abruptly discontinued in 1905, and was replaced by a modern national 
                                                 
1 Sishu is the Chinese traditional educational institute, where people attend to receive basic education 
and prepare for the civil service examination. We will elaborate on the function of Sishu in later 
chapters.   
2 The queue was the compulsory hairstyle for all males in the Qing era (1644- 1912). In the early 
1910s, after the fall of the Qing dynasty, the Chinese no longer had to wear it, and most of them 
abandoned it after the last Emperor, Xuantong (1909-1912), cut his queue in 1922. 
3 The so-called Gongsheng (贡生) especially designates scholars who had passed the first level of the 
civil service examination, and were then recommended for a place in the Imperial Academy; they 
were eligible to hold a government post and become an official bureaucrat. They constituted members 
of the higher tier of degree holders (or gentry class) under the traditional education system. Regarding 
the details of the structure of degree holders (gentry) in traditional education, please refer to Figure 
4.2 in Chapter 4.  
  
2 
education system that approximated to a Western education model. Such an 
educational movement completely altered the why, how and what of education that 
Chinese people received.  
 
Systematic study on the Chinese experience with modern education remains 
wanting. How quickly and widely did the new education system spread? Did the 
birth of the new education model increase the level of human capital level in the 
country? Was solely the state promoted, contributed and responsible for the progress 
of modern schooling through this period? Among different vested interest groups, 
who actually implemented the reforms and carried them out? Who benefited from 
the educational reform and who lost out? How did the increasing demand for modern 
education generated by economic development fit into this story? Unfortunately, the 
existing literature provides too few answers to too many questions, and this thesis 
therefore aims to study the origin of the modern education system in China, measure 
its progress and assess its underlying driving forces.  
 
This thesis is largely motivated by two puzzling observations. First, a new education 
model, which emphasised government intervention, usually results from the 
aspiration of a strong modern state. How did the withering Qing Court, which was 
struggling to deal with internal turmoil and foreign penetration, initiate the birth of 
this new education system days before its collapse? In the same vein, why was this 
educational reform carried out consecutively by successive regimes in a period of 
political chaos? Second, the conventional wisdom points to one simple fact: that a 
public schooling system requires an economically strong state to implement it. We 
should expect to observe that wealthy regions tended to have better education, while 
poor areas would be more likely to provide less. However, what strikes us at first 
glance is that the prominent regional frontrunners in terms of economic prosperity, 
such as the Lower Yangtze Delta, did not notably outperform in schooling; implying 
that economic factors may not be the main predicator when it comes to modern 
educational expansion. If this is so, what socioeconomic factors accounted for the 
rise of modern schooling in China?  
 
  
3 
Before addressing these puzzles, the phrase ‘modern education system’ in this study 
requires clear definition. The purpose of the term ‘modern education system’ is to 
contrast with the traditional and indigenous system that provided classic education in 
Imperial China (221BC – AD1911). From historical accounts, the formation of a 
system of formal schooling at least partly funded and supervised by the state which 
provided universal education for all children of school age in Europe and North 
America from the early 19th century onward marks the beginning of global modern 
education It is sometimes also referred to as a ‘national education system’ (Green, 
1990, p. 297). 4 Two major achievements emerged regarding this global education 
model. For one, schooling is at least partly provided, and funded by the state 
(Goldin, 2015; Goldin & Katz, 2008; Green, 1990; Lindert, 2004a; Mitch, 2013; 
Remick, 2004). It is true that in the history of education, there are times when the 
private sector has delivered more than at present,  but public schooling has 
apparently increased in relative importance as the private sector has shrunk. 
Additionally, another critical feature consists in the emphasis of the education 
system on secular, practical and academic areas of learning (Goldin & Katz, 2008, 
pp. 149-152; Green, 1990). Thus, the phrase ‘modern education system’ in the 
following chapters can be understood as the Chinese version of the school systems 
developed in Europe, the US and Japan from the early 19th century onwards. These 
education systems are distinct in many ways, but fundamentally they are similar with 
several core characteristics: they are universal, mandatory,5 secular and academic, 
providing what is widely considered to be an institutionalised model of national 
development around the globe. In a nutshell, the ‘modern education system’ in this 
study refers to an education system which possesses the above critical features.  
 
To describe the journey towards the modern education system and uncover the 
determinants of its expansion, this thesis is laid out in four parts. Chapter One sets 
the historical, political and economic foundation for the advent of the modern 
education system in China. Then, Chapter Two provides a general roadmap for this 
modern education system, revealing its origins, structure, evolution and virtues. The 
                                                 
4 There were numerous attempts at a blueprint for a modern education system from the late 17th 
century and 18th century pioneered by monarchs in Europe. Unfortunately, due to lack of resources, 
such attempts were not implemented effectively  until the early 19th century.  
5 The mandatory features of education apply only to basic education. The coverage of compulsory 
education usually starts in the primary years and goes on until the secondary stage. The timing of 
change is largely different across countries, but the pattern and trend remain similar. 
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third chapter provides long-term estimates on how far education progressed through 
the 20th century based on a rich variety of indicators: literacy rates, enrolment ratios 
and, more importantly, the stock of human capital (average years of schooling). This 
exercise allows Chinese accomplishments in education to be put into international 
perspective. Furthermore, the fourth chapter, one of the core sections of this thesis, 
tackles one hotly debated question; ‘what factors drove the rise of mass schooling 
(primary education)?’ Given its political turmoil and economic backwardness, the 
expansion of modern primary schooling in China which was mainly driven by 
increasing public efforts seems puzzling. What contributed to the noteworthy 
diffusion off mass education in China? Based on a dataset that covers more than one 
thousand counties, we find that economic factors have little power to explain the 
variations in educational outcomes. In contrast, both the informal practice of 
governance imposed by the gentry (one important social group in Chinese history) 
and regional political stability are presented in all their critical importance.  
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Chapter 1 : Setting the scene: political and economic background of a 
modern education system  
 
The purpose of this research is to study the rise of modern education in China and its 
underlying driving forces. To be sure, these cannot be understood without context; for 
example, what was the political environment where the new education system was 
implemented? What kind of economic foundation generated the increasing demand, if any, 
for modern education? The first chapter provides a general answer to these essential 
questions, and sets the scene for subsequent analytical chapters. Not only will the history of 
modern Chinese education since the late 19th century be told, but the chapter will also set out 
the economic and political foundations of educational reform.  
 
At the dawn of the 20th century, China experienced one startlingly sweeping educational 
movement: the traditional education model came to an abrupt end, and was replaced by a 
brand new system. In order to provide a clear roadmap for the journey of transforming a 
long-lasting traditional education system, this chapter will be organised as follows. First, the 
literature on why states intend to intervene and support education will be summarised. Then, 
the political and economic conditions in China at the time, which provide a historical context 
to the rise of modern education, are analysed separately.  
 
1. Starting Point: why does the state support schooling? 
 
The main focus of this chapter is to lay the foundation for later discussions; hence, we start 
our analysis with the origin of modern education systems and try to answer one basic 
question which has yet to be confronted: why does government become involved, invest in 
and support education?6 
 
The principal reason why a government provides schooling is because increasingly, people 
consider education as an overall benefit to a society as a whole (Freire, 1976; West, 1965; 
                                                 
6 Individuals tend to invest in education for many reasons; these have been thoroughly studied by labour 
economists. To summarise briefly, a person’s final educational outcome is largely associated with household 
decisions, including household income and parental educational background, etc. However, this individual 
perspective on the reasons for investing in education is not the focus of the present research and will not be 
discussed here. This thesis is concerned more about public choices regarding education; specifically, why and 
how governments or communities come to a decision to expand schooling. 
  
6 
Wiseman & Peacock, 1962, pp. 29-39). As the broad range of positive external effects of 
education is proved by scholars, the intrinsic tension over whether governments should 
provide education or leave it to the private sector lies between the private demand for 
education and externalities brought about by the accumulation of human capital (Mitch, 
2013).  
 
An education system reflects a nation’s values, customs, languages and collective priorities.  
The foremost among many purposes of education include: transmitting knowledge and 
cultivating common values between people and across generations. As education generates 
positive externalities of many types for a society, in the following section, various 
externalities of education will be discussed under one or other of the two chief purposes of 
education.  
 
To begin with, regarding the principal function of education – the transmission of knowledge, 
the government intervenes and encourages education to create a literate, skilled and educated 
populace, which is widely believed to contribute  positive effects to the economy, political 
institutions (in democratic countries in particular) and social utilities. The first obvious 
positive externality of higher human capital in the population is apparent from the economic 
perspective. The public provision of education, which prominently reduces the cost of 
education, allows knowledge to spread to more people to match the rich variety of needs of a 
prosperous economy (Lange, 2006; West, 1965, pp. 87-110). Politically speaking, as 
suggested by Lipset, education leads to more informed and engaged citizens. This is 
exceptionally important for societies which grant political participation to the population; 
because mass education stands as a basic and essential requirement to keep the election 
procedure functioning, to encourage the poor to be more politically active and to enhance the 
capacity of citizens to make good ‘electoral decisions’ (Castelló-Climent, 2008; Freire, 1976; 
Gallego, 2010; Lindert & Go, 2010, pp. 40-49; West, 1965, pp. 40-49).7 Last, from a social 
point of view, education can generate for society a handful of further positive externalities; 
for instance, a lower crime rate and lower mortality (Goldin, 2015; Lange, 2006; West, 1965, 
pp. 70-86). In the scenario seen in China through the early 20th century, the principal impetus 
                                                 
7 Empirically, the correlation between democracy and education has long proved to be positive, but to establish 
the causality requires more solid empirical studies. There is no solid evidence to prove that democratic societies 
tend to provide more education than non-democratic countries for the period before the early 20th century. The 
pattern emerges only after the second half of the 20th century (Lance, 2011). 
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for the state to establish a new national educational system consisted more in its urgent 
ambition to become an economically strong nation, and less in the pursuit of social and 
political objectives. 
 
Furthermore, a government’s involvement in education is intended not only to encourage 
quantity in schooling; in many cases, it is an action to ensure that the ‘right’ quality of 
knowledge and skills will be transferred to the population. Different types of educational 
content may lead to very different economic developments, political institutions and state 
capacity in any given country. Therefore, the state has a large stake in guiding the design of 
the content of schooling (Jones, 2008; Yuchtman & Cantoni, 2013). For instance, in a small 
country with limited natural resources, Singapore’s government regarded the economy as 
driven by high technology, and as underpinning the right national development strategy; 
consequently, education in science and technology has long been vigorously promoted and 
encouraged in Singapore as the ‘right’ kind of knowledge. In short, only the government 
could take the initiative in shaping the incentives to acquire different forms of human capital, 
because the cost of changing incentives and moving towards a new type of education is 
simply too great for any individual to bear. Going back to China specifically, the introduction 
of Western subjects, or what was called ‘useful knowledge’ in the modern education system 
in place of the long-standing classic Confucian teaching at the dawn of the 20th century 
clearly demonstrates the single-minded ambition of the Qing Court to deliver the new type of 
education to its population as a national survival strategy.  
 
In addition,  education not only transmits knowledge; another of its primary functions is to 
cultivate a set of common values to shape people’s beliefs, preferences and ideology (West, 
1965, pp. 70-86). Therefore, a state's compelling interests in education also lie in its urge to 
forge a indoctrinatory, political, or religious uniformity as a modern state and to cement 
ideological hegemony (Green, 1990, p. 298; Lott, 1990b; Melton, 1988; Ramirez, O, & Boli, 
1987).8 Education has a long history of engaging in the process of state-building, or in some 
particular cases, of specifically enhancing a regional, tribal, ethnic or religious identity and 
set of values. From historical accounts, the formation of a national education system began 
across Europe in the 19th century, initiated by thriving ‘national sentiment’ (F. O. Ramirez & 
                                                 
8  In Europe, religious and philosophical groups had long been predominant in education. It is clear that 
government intervention in education starting from the 19th century was an endeavour to establish a national 
education, which could monopolise not only educational resources, but also rising nationalism.  
  
8 
Boli, 1987). Later, the mass education movement in American between the 19th and 20th 
centuries is also argued to have been largely a political outcome of the surge of independence 
and democracy (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Dewey, 1916). Similarly, the Communist and 
Socialist educational ‘brainwashing’ in the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc and later China 
between the 1950s and 1980s, is said to have pursued one single goal – forging the 
communist indoctrination of the populace (John R. Lott, 1999). Accordingly, the birth of an 
education  system was securely incorporated within the compacted process of state-building 
in the global context, and three historical factors have been proved to be largely relevant: 
external military threats, internal revolution and programmes seeking to escape economic 
underdevelopment (Green, 1990).9 At the turn of the 20th century, China possessed all three 
of the above factors, which was why the state-led educational reform was rigorously pursued 
at the time,. Through it, both Western subjects and certain new doctrines, such as the “Three 
Principles of the People”, namely nationalism, democracy, and livelihood, were generally 
emphasised and promoted. 10 
 
However, this does not mean that the education system is solely a product of government that 
can only be imposed from top-down. On the contrary, significant educational progress in 
human history has often been initiated by increasing demands from civil societies. 11 
However, this scenario is more likely to be witnessed in democratic nations or societies with 
good political institutions through which demands from the masses can be heard, and their 
needs considered, by the government. To tell the truth, the rise of modern education in China 
was not like this.  
 
In conclusion, historical and global experiences suggest that the formation of a modern 
education system is deeply integrated with both the political environment and economic 
development; and the fundamental impetus for the government to establish a national 
education system comes from the economic and political externalities generated by 
education. Therefore, in the following sections, these two aspects of the Chinese context will 
be further explored.  
                                                 
9 This study has no intention of discussing the difference between state-building and nation-building. 
10 The ‘Three Principles of the People’ is a political philosophy developed by the founder of the Republic of 
China – Sun Yat-Sen. These three principles are often translated and summarised as nationalism, democracy, 
and economic security (民主，民生， 民权)(Lary, 2007, p. 21). 
11 For instance, compulsory education in the USA came later given the fact that many states had already 
spontaneously provided compulsory secondary schooling for their citizens (Goldin & Katz, 2011). 
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2. Economic and political foundation of educational development in the 
early 20th century 
 
The advent of the modern education system in China occurred during the final days of the 
19th century. Summarising this historical course is beyond the possible; as Fairbank remarks: 
‘The history of modern China 12  cannot be characterised in a few words, however well 
chosen’ (Rankin, Fairbank, & Feuerwerker, 1986). Too many events occurred; too many 
hopes soared; too many wars were fought; too many reforms were explored; and the outcome 
can only be described as mixed. Seeking to understand the establishment of the modern 
education system, which took place through such a transformative, dynamic and turbulent 
time, this section focuses on its origin, and reveals the economic and political foundation on 
which was built the educational transformation; this altered the trajectory of Chinese 
development in the remaining decades of the 20th century. 
 
2.1 Historical Background: The awakening Empire 
China's modern history began with one great and dramatic event, namely the confrontation 
between the persistent and agrarian-bureaucratic Chinese civilisation, and the expanding, if 
not aggressive, Western powers (Fairbank, 1978). From the middle of the 19th century, facing 
both the urge for openness from European Imperialism and the internal appeal for 
modernisation, the Qing throne (AD 1644 – 1911) adopted a defensive posture, leading to a 
series of enormous humiliations suffered on the battlefield, with consequent loss of 
sovereignty.  
 
The Qing state did not await its downfall without exploring resolutions, and an this ancient 
country did to an extent awaken. The first initiative by the Qing Court was referred to as the 
Self-strengthening Movement.13 In order to encourage the adoption of Western technology, 
arsenals, shipyards and military schools were built, translators were trained in universities, 
and young talent were sent abroad under the rubric of ‘Chinese learning is for the sake of the  
                                                 
12 This outbreak of the First Opium War in 1839 is considered by many historians the beginning of modern 
Chinese history, suggesting its profound influence on Chinese society. 
13The Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1895) represented a period of institutional reforms initiated during 
the late Qing dynasty following a series of military defeats. Some high-ranking Imperial officials believed that 
in order to strengthen Chinese military might, it was necessary to adopt Western military technology and 
armaments. Throughout this period, a number of military arsenals and shipbuilding dockyards were constructed 
to strengthen the Chinese navy, and the first group of Chinese students was sent to the United States sponsored 
by the Qing State. The Self-strengthening Movement was a highly Western-influenced reform, but due to the 
conflict between conservatives and pragmatists, the reform did not extend much further than the scope of 
military modernisation. 
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essence, Western learning is for the sake of utility’ (中学为体，西学为用) (Lary, 2007, pp. 
15-16). Unfortunately, such efforts were too little and too late. The last straw on the Qing 
dynasty’s back was the bitter blow of the battles in the first Sino-Japanese War,14 where a 
disastrous defeat clearly revealed the weakness of the Qing state, and the perception of China 
was sweepingly altered, leading to the extensive diffusion of anti-Qing sentiment within 
society. In the immediate aftermath, the Empress Dowager Cixi finally agreed to full-scale 
political reforms in 1901 as an inevitable development,15  which included experiments in 
constitutional practice at the national level, as well as representative governments at the local 
level (Chien, 1950, pp. 52-55; Ichiko, 1980). Such drastic political and bureaucratic reforms 
required brand new talents and ideologies to support them, which paved the way for the 
educational movement of 1905. Ironically, the late Qing reform, which was originally 
designed to save this ancient empire, partly contributed to its downfall in 1911. Fortunately, 
through the following chaotic and turbulent ages, the great aspiration of forming  a new and 
modern China was shared by successive regimes. Therefore, reforms aimed at modernising 
China, including an expanded modern education system, continued through the years of the 
Republic.  
Table 1.1: Timeline of Chinese history & educational progress 
Timeline Major consequence  
Late Qing ( 1840 -1911)   
  The first Opium war (1840) Forced opening-up of China: Western influence flourished 
  Self-strengthening Movement(1861-1895) A wave of adoption of Western military technology  
  The first Sino-Japanese war (1895) The weakness of the Qing was revealed anti-Qing sentiment 
  Late-Qing Reform (1901-1911) Full-scale reforms the abolition of the civil service exam  
Republic of China (1912 – 1949)   
   Early Republican (1912-1916) Reform and modernisation of the  education system continued  
   Warlord Era (1916-1928)  Central power was largely undermined by ‘regional regimes’ 
   Nanjing Decade (1928-1937) Attempts to nationalize everything including education 
 
                                                 
14 In 1895, Japan triumphed in the first Sino-Japanese war, and China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki. 
Although Qing China had been defeated by European powers in the 19th century, defeat at the hands of an 
Asian power and a former political and cultural subordinate was a bitter blow.  
15 The throne issued an imperial edict in 1901 calling for reform proposals, and initiated the era of the dynasty's 
‘New Policy’, also known as the ‘Late Qing Reform’.  
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2.2 Understanding the political domain  
As discussed, the formation of a new national education system  was inherently political and 
therefore required extensive cooperation and coordination among various tiers of 
government. In order to understand how the spread of modern schooling can be executed, this 
section looks at the political environment where the new education system would function. 
To do so, we introduce the formal political and administrative institutions – the nominal 
government structure throughout this historical course. Equally important, the underlying 
tensions in the landscape of politics are further uncovered, which probably played an even 
more definitive role in the way in which China was ruled in practice. 
 
Map 1.1: Map of China 
 
 
*Note: The shaded regions refer to the area of China Proper16 
                                                 
16 China proper is a term usually used to express a distinction between the core and frontier regions of China. 
More explicitly defined, China proper covers 18 provinces as marked on this map, and this study focuses largely 
on China proper, given that it accommodated more than 80% of the population (measured by late Qing 
population data). The provinces are Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Guizhou, Shannxi, Shanxi, Shandong, Sichuan, Yunnan, Zhejiang, and Zhili. The scope of this study 
is mainly limited to China proper.  
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2.2.1 Formal government structure 
How central and local governments are structured within a political framework is vital for our 
understanding of the way that responsibility for promoting modern education was allocated to 
various tiers of government. Hence, this section sets out the general government structure of 
China, and briefly outlines the corresponding responsibilities.  
 
Table 1.2: The formal government structure of China (both late Qing and Republican) 
Unit  
chief 
administrators 
Number 
Size (𝑘𝑚2) 
Average Population 17 
Late Qing18 Republic19 Late Qing Republic 
Era Province governor 22 28 1.40E+07 18990338 
 
23384838 
 
Prefecture prefect 302 319 14279 1308720   1422432 
County Magistrate 1303 212220 2297 251733  260598 
Village  Village head 8658 - - - - 
*Sources:  
(i). The number of administrative units: for the late Qing period: (Qu, 2003, p. 43); for the Republican period: 
(Chien, 1950, p. 418); specifically for China proper: (Bol & Ge, 2007) 
(ii). Territory size: (Bol & Ge, 2007) 
(iii). Population: (Hou, 2001; Stauffer, 1922) 
  
Overall, both  the central state and local government in Chinese history strove to restrain the 
scope of their responsibility in most of the public sector and presented very limited functions 
in terms of governance.21 Owing to the limited size of the bureaucracy, 22 a large population 
and the sheer scale of the territory, one essential challenge of the Chinese state lay in the 
extraordinary high agency cost of its administration (Brandt, Ma, & Rawski, 2014; K. G. 
Deng, 2011, pp. 25-36; Remick, 2004, pp. 29-39; Sng, 2014). Such an institutional set-up 
                                                 
17 Due to lack of data on the population of peripheral provinces, the population numbers only cover China 
proper.  
18 The number presented in Table 1.2 for the late Qing period draws data from records under the Guangxu 
Emperor (1871 – 1908). 
19 The number presented in Table 1.2 for the Republican era derives from the Ministry of the Interior under the 
Nationalist government in 1947.  
20 The number 2122 includes 100 municipalities sharing the same administrative rank as the counties. 
21 From the 8th century, bureaucratic recruitment became standardized and impersonal. Officials were selected 
from a small amount of successful candidate of civil service examination. For these degree holders (gentry), 
their prestigious status as social elites and the chances to be chosen as bureaucrats  were all tightly connected to 
the Imperial regime(B. A. Elman, 2013). The structure and social functions of degree holders will be further 
explained in Chapter Four. 
22 The size of bureaucracy in Imperial China was extremely small. Under the rule of Qing, there were fewer than 
30000 bureaucrats on its payroll, and 2546 of which filled the key positions in central government. It meant that 
about 24000 officials need to cover 11 minion 𝑘𝑚2 territories, about 2000 counties and more than 400 million 
population (K. G. Deng, 2011, p. 25)  
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caused the Imperial Chinese state to voluntarily withdraw from many of its public duties, 
resulting in low formal taxation and also limited state activities (Brandt et al., 2014; K. G. 
Deng, 2011, p. 36).  
 
The structure of government had considerable continuity in terms of administrative 
organizations and functions. As presented in Table 1.2, the Qing Empire inherited from its 
predecessors a four-tier government structure comprising provinces (sheng 省), circuits (dao 
道 ), prefectures (fu 府 ), and counties (xian 县 ), i.e. four tiers beneath that of central 
government. Even though some revisions were proposed and undertaken after 1911, the core 
of the government structure stayed intact. In theory, all levels of local government acted only 
as agents of the central administration within a strict hierarchical structure, where the chief 
administrators formed a political ladder, and were responsible to the grade immediately 
above and for the grade immediately below (S. Cheng, 1919, pp. 136-138; Chien, 1950, pp. 
43-44).  
 
The province (sheng 省) was the largest administrative unit, and was administered by a 
governor (xunfu 巡撫), who possessed the main administrative power within his territory; 23 
while as a power balance, the provincial governor was subordinate to a viceroy (zongdu 总), 
who was especially entrusted with military tasks throughout one of the nine macro-regions 
(Qu, 2003, p. 13).24 However, in many cases through the Republican era, the provincial 
governors were also the viceroys who controlled all provincial affairs, both civil and military, 
making them extraordinarily powerful regional leaders. 25  Politically, the provincial 
government was directly subject to the central government, and the appointment and 
evaluation of provincial governors was strictly controlled by central government (S. Cheng, 
1919, pp. 136-137). Nonetheless, economically speaking, given that even the smallest 
province in China, Zhejiang, was larger than Portugal; with limited access to modern 
                                                 
23 For the governor of a province, his power varied significantly, depending upon circumstances.  
24 Under the rule of Qing, there were nine viceroys in total: the Viceroy of Zhili, Viceroy of Liangjiang, Viceroy 
of Min-Zhe, Viceroy of Huguang, Viceroy of Shaan-Gan, Viceroy of Liangguang, Viceroy of Yun-Gui, Viceroy 
of Sichuan, and Viceroy of Northeast provinces. Exceptionally,Shanxi, Shandong and Henan were not included 
in any of the nine regions; therefore, they were not governed by any regional viceroys. Historians usually rank 
the viceroyalty of Zhili as the most powerful post; Yuan Shikai, the first president of the Republic of China, was 
the last Viceroy of Zhili in the late Qing period.  
25 In the early days of the Republic, the political leadership in most provinces was drawn from the army, where 
12 out of 17 provinces in China proper had military men as governors in the middle of summer 1912 (Young, 
1983).  
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transport and communications, most provinces were self-sustaining and independent (Chi, 
1936, p. 4).  
 
Regarding the two intermediate layers of local government – the circuit (dao 道) and the 
prefecture (fu 府), they were not administrative units and held very restricted functions.26 The 
circuit was administered by circuit intendants (daotai 道臺), who were specially responsible 
for transportation issues, for instance, waterways and food transportation (C. S. Li, 1922, pp. 
33-34); while prefectures, which were governed by prefects (zhifu 知府), functioned largely 
as a channel of communication between province and county (C. S. Li, 1922, p. 34). The 
average size of a prefecture was about that of Belgium; hence, daily administration was too 
challenging to carry out effectively; consequently, it was later divided into counties. 
 
The single most vital unit of Chinese local government was the county (Xian 县). The county 
government was responsible for an exceedingly rich variety of duties: legislative, judicial, 
executive and tax-collecting functions were all in the hands of its magistrate (zhixian 知县) 
(S.-G. Cheng, 1919., pp. 135-136; C. S. Li, 1922, p. 34; Qu, 2003, pp. 29-34; Zhong, 2003, 
pp. 18-26). Interestingly, except for a few very basic and vague regulations on its standard 
responsibilities, there were no further protocols to specify the activities that a county 
magistrate should undertake; therefore  the county magistrate could go as far in these local 
affairs as his interests led him (Chien, 1950, pp. 43-45; Qu, 2003, pp. 29-34). Such a high 
level of flexibility in the scope of the county government’s functions was propitious for self-
government at the level of the local community.  
 
In the end, since direct state administration stopped at county level, the county in theory was 
the lowest state organ under both the Qing Empire and the later Republican rule (K. G. Deng, 
2011, p. 26). However, with an average county population of 250,000, the county unit was 
always further divided into townships and villages.27 Even though these numberless grass- 
                                                 
26 To streamline the levels of Chinese administration, the circuit and prefecture were abolished as distinctive 
units of local government in a row after the founding of the Republic of China in 1911 (S. Cheng, 1919, p. 138). 
This change resulted in the corresponding provincial governor’s direct supervision of the county magistrates. 
However, it was soon realised that it was not feasible for the provincial government to directly manage dozens 
of counties; as a result, the prefectural layer was restored between province and county (S.-G. Cheng, 1919., pp. 
135-146).  
27 At grass-roots level, the two systems coexisted. Besides the natural division of county into villages, for the 
purpose of control in the rural areas, the Qing Court instituted a police control system – Bao Jia and Li Jia. 
However, this sub-administrative system was superimposed upon, without replacing, the natural division 
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roots governing organs did not obtain legitimate status as administrative sub-divisions, their 
daily governance was carried on by various state agents via non-bureaucratic means (Hsiao, 
1960, p. 5).28 In the same vein, village chiefs were not government officials either; instead, 
they were respectable native gentry,29 who were selected by the residents of the locality (C. S. 
Li, 1922, p. 37; Qu, 2003, p. 41). 30 In a nutshell, direct state control never penetrated below 
the county level; on the contrary, the management of local communities rested upon informal 
institutions, including guild, gentry, clan and lineage (S. Cheng, 1919, pp. 8-12; Duara, 1988; 
Schoppa, 1982).31 As a bridge between state and populace, the grass-roots governing bodies 
served two major duties. Village self-governance issues were their foremost responsibility, 
including the provision of public goods, mediating disputes and maintaining public order. At 
the same time, sub-county governing bodies were made subject to the control of the county 
magistrate; consequently they were also subject to the obligation to carry out state policies. 
 
In summary, the political-administrative environment in China was formulated in a four-layer 
structure: the hierarchical division of central government, provincial, county, and the self-
governing local community. In the following sections, the term ‘local government’ refers to 
both county and sub-county governing bodies.  
 
2.2.2 Underlying tensions in the political landscape  
Aside from the key political institutions and formal political-administrative structure, there 
were several critical themes in the realm of polity that probably played a more influential role 
in the ruling of China from the late 19th century to the early decades of the 20th century. 
Traditionally, state power under Imperial China was largely monopolised by the emperor, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
mentioned previously. This police control system is beyond the scope of this study, and is not included in the 
following analysis.  
28 The administrative township and village (Xiang 乡) had its origins in earl imperial time, By the Qing, it 
developed from a formal administrative unit to extra-bureaucratic status(Hsiao, 1960, p. 12)..  
29 The term ‘gentry’ (士绅 or 缙绅) has no complete equivalent in English. It possesses a distinct meaning 
unlike that in a European context. The gentry in Europe are usually associated with substantial land-holding and 
the aristocracy, both of which are inheritable. In China, the scope of the term is vaguer. It refers to people who 
have obtained high prestige via success in the imperial examination system, and are therefore office-holders, but 
this role cannot be inherited. The role of gentry in modern education development in China will be analysed in 
greater depth in Chapter 4. 
30 The first attempt to extend political administration beyond the county level was in 1928, when the Nationalist 
government tried to establish official township government. (Chauncey, 1992, p. 42) 
31 After entering the Republican period, the government made some attempts to transform the power of the local 
elites into the official sphere. All types of social institution at grass-roots level, including chambers of 
commerce, education associations, agricultural associations, and militia organisations, were established. 
However, the local elites still dominated these institutions and in practice ruled rural China.  
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literati-bureaucrats and the local gentry (Yamada, 1987b, p. 187). After the 1840s, the old 
equilibrium of power structures was destroyed, leading to many new developments and 
changing order in the political landscape. The foremost changes were in three areas, namely: 
(i) a decline in central control; (ii).fierce tension, if not conflict, among provincial regimes; 
and (iii).a power vacuum at the local level.  
 
The withering Central state and regional devolution 
At the outset, the single most important change in politics after the late 19th century was that 
central control was evidently undermined by provincial powers, most of which carried strong 
elements of military government. 
 
The Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), which was crushed by provincial armies and not the 
Imperial Army, not only severely diminished the capacity of the Qing court, but more 
importantly, gave the power to train personal armies paid from provincial revenues to the 
increasingly powerful regional forces (S. Cheng, 1919, pp. 121-135; H. Chi, 1976, pp. 10-33; 
K. G. Deng, 2011, p. 70).32 In the same vein, the 1911 revolution was also led by provincial 
governments under the control of military viceroys. The historical legacy of these events 
paved the way in the next few decades for a weak central government to oppose powerful 
provincial powers under the new Republican regime (H. Chi, 1976, pp. 10-35; Chien, 1950, 
pp. 178-181; Mccord, 1993). The weakness of the central state persisted even after Chiang 
Kai-Shek reconciled the regional warlords and re-unified China in 1927;33 the new central 
government seated in Nanjing still struggled to keep its allies under its control (Eastman, 
Fairbank, & Feuerwerker, 1986; Yamada, 1987a).34  
 
                                                 
32 The irreplaceable contribution to suppressing the Taiping Rebellion was mad by a provincial army, the Xiang 
Army (its soldiers were all from Hunan province), led by a provincial leader, Guofan Zeng. The Army was 
financed through local revenues and support from local gentry, it therefore was firmly based on personal and 
regional loyalties (S. Cheng, 1919, p. 123). Another important provincial military force was the Huai Army 
(named after the Huai River and mainly based in Anhui province), led by Hongzhang Li; it later became the  
Beiyang Army. This devolution of centralized military control contributed to the eventual downfall of the 
Qing and the emergence of the ‘warlord era’ in China. 
33 From 1926 to 1928, the Kuomingtong (KMT) launched a massive military campaign, led by Chiang Kai-shek 
to unify China under its own control. The KMT successfully reconciled a number of regional warlords under its 
control, and therefore started to form an effective central government based in Nanjing.  
34 The new state tried many times to undermine the powers of previous regional regimes, but with limited 
success. Such attempts were fraught with difficulty, because the provincial warlords had not been defeated in 
battle but rather had been co-opted into the Northern Expedition movement. Here, the Nanjing Government had 
to tolerate a certain degree of independence among the provincial militarists who had voluntarily committed 
themselves to unification.  
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The decline of central control can be observed in many military, fiscal and personnel areas. 
Taking tax revenue as an example, provincial governments appropriated most of the revenue 
without remitting any to the central budget; especially intent on doing so when money was 
needed for provincial military expenses (C. S. Li, 1922, pp. 83-84).35 In fact, from the late 
Qing to the early Republican period, the few guaranteed tax revenues for the central treasury 
were the Maritime Customs tax and the Salt Tax; ironically, they were exempt only because 
they were collected by international organisations (Remick, 2004, pp. 37-39; Sheridan, 1977, 
p. 199).36  
 
In a nutshell, civilian elites normally acquiesced to military government as a wartime 
necessity (Lary, 2007, pp. 39-40; Mccord, 1993, pp. 81-118). 37 The seizure of power from 
the central state by military provincial forces occurred during the final stages of the Qing 
dynasty; it led to a weakening of central government, and the withering of central control, as 
a result of more powerful provincial ‘regimes’, in a self-intensifying vicious circle.  
 
Political and military tensions among regional powers 
As eloquently portrayed in many historical narratives, the decline of central control plus the 
rise of provincial military powers naturally created between the various regional military 
cliques a state of political and military tension, which led to mushrooming regional conflicts. 
By some calculations, in a period of merely 16 years (1912-1928), often referred to as the 
warlord era, over 140 militarists fought more than 1,300 provincial and inter-provincial wars 
(Billingsley, 1988, p. 24; J. Chen, 1968).38 In the same vein, it was wildly belived that at least 
1.4 millions solders or armed men serving in military unites(Lary, 2007, pp. 61-62). The 
exact figure depends on the definition of an ‘independent warlord’; however, these estimates 
provide a general picture of the fierce tensions between the  provincial powers.  
 
                                                 
35 In the late Qing, around 20%-30% of the total tax revenue collected at provincial level would be sent to the 
Imperial Treasury in the capital, known as the ‘capital revenue’, while the rest remained in the provinces for 
local use(Shi, 2009, pp. 25-33). The situation became much worse after the Republican era: many provinces 
refused to remit the tax revenue to the central authority.  
36 The Maritime Customs House was managed and supervised under the control of the British, while the salt tax 
was collected by the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate(Remick, 2004, pp. 37-39). 
37 Consequently, the top provincial executive changed from being a civil official, with a certain degree of 
supervisory authority over military forces, to a military official with even greater control over both military and 
civil administrations, usually documented as a warlord in Chinese history. 
38One thing worth stressing is that even though so many regional wars were documented in history, it is widely 
believed that no large-scale fighting took place. In the same vein, according to demographic records, no 
widespread casualties occurred either. 
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Map 1.2: Regional political and military tensions (1911-1928) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Source: (Billingsley, 1988; H. Chi, 1976) 
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One point that should be borne in mind when interpreting this historical course is that not all 
regions experienced chaos to the same extent. As displayed in Graph 1.2, some regions were 
ruled with an iron fist by either a single military strong man or a single military clique. In 
these cases, warlords could hold on to power for some considerable time, and these regions 
thus enjoyed a certain level of political stability. 39 In contrast, other regions, owing to their 
strategically important location, became hotly contested areas for different warlords. 
 
The cliques fighting against each other during this period were very complicated and changed 
over time. However, put simply, the country could be roughly divided into two major parts, 
North and South. As illustrated in Graph 1.2, the warfare zone was the buffer belt, which 
truly divided north from south, running from Shaanxi, Sichuan, West Hubei, north Hunan, 
Jiangxi to Fujian (J. Chen, 1968). 40 This area suffered from endless battles between northern 
and southern forces, leading to frequent changes of military control, and the exploitation of 
tax revenues from the local economy. Besides strategic considerations, military conflicts 
were also centred on key economic areas, such as the Canton Delta, the Chengdu Plain in 
Sichuan, and the Lower Yangtze Delta (J. Chen, 1968). The infamous example of Sichuan 
province as the most chaotic and turbulent region through this period may be cited.41 In 1916, 
the regular armies in Sichuan numbered around 8 divisions, rising to more than 24 between 
1920 and 1929. Xin claims that  467 wars were fought (Xin, 1932). While this figure may not 
                                                 
39 In fact, there were several autonomous provinces, legitimized the regional dominance of the major warlord 
groupings. Yuhsiang Feng controlled Gansu, Shanxi, and Henan. Xishan Yan controlled Shanxi. The so-called 
Guangxi clique dominated the councils at Hankou, Beijng and Canton, which were headed by Renzong Li and 
Chongxi Bai. Another branch political council arose under Xueliang Zhang in Manchuria (H.-S. Chi, 1976). 
Among these relatively stable regions, the most famous warlord was Xishan Yan who governed Shanxi province 
for almost 40 years. Similarly, in the cases of Yunnan, Zhili and Shandong, even though they all experienced 
changes of regional warlords,  the controlling military factions in each province held tight to power, keeping the 
transitions significantly smooth.  
40 The establishment of the Beijing-Hankou Railway and Tianjin-Pukou line formed the A shape of the strategic 
region, which secured control of Beijing. In order to guarantee the defence of the A shape,  the peripheral 
provinces, which formed a buffer belt, had to be controlled (J. Chen, 1968). 
41The Sichuan warlords had rarely been involved in national political activities. Sichuan itself, as a large isolated 
and rich region, was the great prize for most Sichuan warlords. From 1919, Sichuan was cut up into several  
garrison areas (fangqu), each of which was ruled by one military division and enjoyed politically autonomy, 
independent of each other, of the provincial government, and of central government. In order to enrich and 
sustain their control of their own garrison areas, the local military regimes exploited the masses mercilessly. In 
some extreme cases; local governments even collected taxes 50 years in advance (Gunde, 1976). For instance, 
the surcharges could sometimes be 30 times higher than the land tax proper (Sun, 1935, pp. 213-217).  
 
Table: sky-high surtax vs bas tax in sample counties in Sichuan in 1920s 
County 
Ba 
Xian 
Jiangbei 
Xian 
Fuling 
Xian 
Yunyang 
Xian 
Wan 
Xian 
Xingwen 
Xian 
Yibin 
Xian 
Pengshan 
Xian 
Surtax / base tax (%) 2943 2750 1875 743 3123 1250 1130 625 
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be accurate, it is illustrative and allows the conclusion to be drawn that the political situation 
in Sichuan was anything but orderly. 42 
 
Facing such intense and competitive political and military tensions, most provincial 
governments strove to fully sustain their military rivalry with others, and sought to secure 
control over their territories; consequently, for the period under discussion the level of 
political stability across provinces differed widely. 
 
Power vacuum at the local level:  
The increasing strength of the provincial powers not only changed the balance between them 
and central government; it also altered the relationship between local government (county and 
sub-county) and higher levels.  
 
On the one hand, with the decline of central power, local governments came more under the 
rule of the provincial ‘regimes’. The undermining of central power over local affairs can be 
observed in many ways. For instance, in the control of personnel, under the Qing rule, 
provincial governors had only the right to appoint county magistrates from a list of candidates 
passed down by central government. In contrast, under the Republican regime, provincial 
governments often seized authority over personnel and assumed the power to appoint county 
magistrates themselves(Q. Wang, 2000; Y. Zhang, 1999). In the same vein, the traditional 
prohibition against officials holding posts in their home provinces was abandoned, though it 
had once been an essential method of preventing excessive patronage at the provincial level 
(Qu, 2003, p. 294).43 On the other hand, powerful provincial governments were busy fighting 
against each other, resulting in noticeably less management and supervision over local 
governments. To sum up, county governments faced an incapable central authority and an 
indifferent, if not predatory, provincial government.  
 
In such a hostile and chaotic political environment, was local daily governance drastically 
affected? Fortunately, the answer is no. Many historians claim that the late Qing chaos, the 
1911 revolution and the subsequent warlord era had remarkably less disruptive effect on local 
                                                 
42  Because of the extremely turbulent situation in Sichuan province, we exclude Sichuan from our later 
empirical chapters.  
43 When going through more than 500 county gazetteers containing information on county magistrates, I found 
that in contrast with the long-lasting prohibition, a large proportion of magistrates had actually served in their 
home provinces during the Republican era.   
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governments than people might have expected, because the daily operation of governance 
rested upon the grounded foundation of the local gentry, who had shaped the political fabric 
and social ruling in local communities for centuries (Keenan, 1994; Lary, 2007, pp. 50-51; 
Mccord, 1993, pp. 81-118; Sheridan, 1977). 
 
Through the period under discussion, there were abundant new needs regarding public 
facilities and services, created by rising urbanisation, commercialisation and modernisation. 
Unfortunately, governments had little capacity to meet these demands. Therefore, 
collaboration between government and local elites, including merchants and educated gentry, 
was sanctioned by the state, with elite groups increasingly engaged in providing local public 
services, 44  mostly in such economically developed regions as lower Yangzi. 45  In other 
words, a total administrative collapse at local level was prevented via the assumption of 
power by local political figures (Chauncey, 1992; Mccord, 1993, pp. 81-118; McDonald, 
1978; Remick, 2004; Sheridan, 1977) One may wonder why these grass-roots governing 
bodies, led by local elites, but not necessarily local government officials, would carry out and 
support a new educational model that was seemingly introduced from above. We raise this 
question here but  answer it later more fully in Chapter 4.  
 
In conclusion, the tension between political demands and educational development was so 
intense that it largely shaped the direction of educational reform and its evolution in this 
period. From the late Qing to the Republican period, the formal political structure remained 
more or less the same, and functioned as a four-level division: central, provincial, county and 
sub-county. However, the devolution of central power, conflicts between provincial regimes 
and the power vacuum at the local level profoundly impacted on the functioning of the 
political structure in the event.  
 
                                                 
44 There were many aspects of these increasing activities of local elites, and here we mainly emphasise their role 
in the public domain and their desire and effort to expand education. One other crucial example of local elites’ 
increasingly important role lay in the Lijin tax collection. The collection of this main source of tax revenue was 
quasi-official in practice, which strengthened even further the legitimacy of the local elite in local public affairs.  
45 The birth of the first municipal government in Shanghai can be considered an illustrative example of the way 
in which local power rose in response to the inability of the state. After the first Sino-Japanese war, Shanghai’s 
local figures were organised and ran the new city council to carry out long-standing projects, such as widening 
the streets.  
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2.3 Understanding key features of the Chinese economy  
A more challenging task than understanding Chinese politics is to sketch the outline of 
economic development in China through the late Qing and the Republican eras, simply 
because we know so little about so many issues. This section, based on the sparse literature, 
aims to provide some definitive answers to the key questions about the Chinese economy as 
the background for the educational movement through this period. 
 
How does the economic foundation influence the modern schooling system？ Increasing 
household income generated by economic growth and changing jobs thanks to changes in 
economic structure are the two factors that are closely associated with the increasing demand 
for education. In the following section, the main focus is on two questions. First, was there 
obvious economic development through the period under discussion? Second, did job 
markets start to require different skills from the labour force?  
 
2.3.1 The onset of the economic growth? 
There are  few valid estimates of a GDP series or other measures of the size of China‘s 
economy before 1949, apart from several benchmark years in the 1930s conducted by 
contemporary Chinese economists (T. C. Liu, 1946; Wu, 1947). Without benchmark years in 
late Qing or through the early Republican period, it is challenging to claim that there was 
economic growth during the first half of the 20th century.  
 
Nonetheless, some clues can be identified from other crude indicators. First, China’s 
population grew from approximately 400 million in 1850 to 439 million in 1911 (Cao, 2000, 
pp. 703-704), and remained at 450 million around 1930 (T.-C. Liu & Yeh, 1965, pp. 34-36).46 
The increasing population density and sustained living standards suggest a certain level of 
economic development in this period (Brandt et al., 2014). In addition, Maddison’s work 
shows a  growth in GDP per capita from 1870 to 1913, and a drop in 1950, probably due to 
the effects of warfare in the 1940s (Maddison, 2006, pp. 241, 261). Furthermore, Rawski 
reports a promising growth rate in terms of the national industrial output index, with  total 
output rising by two-fifths between the 1910s and 1930, reflecting an increase of 20-25 
percent in output per capita (T. Rawski, 1989, pp. 329-343).  
                                                 
46  Consensus on accurate Chinese population estimates has not yet been reached among historians and 
demographers. For instance, in the 1930s, the population figure in government records was 500 million; after 
making many adjustments, Wang reaches the same result.   
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In short, without a series of GDP per capita through this period, scattered pieces of evidence 
suggest that there was a sustained expansion of the Chinese economy through the late Qing 
and Republican eras, albeit not as rapid as in other rising nations. In the late Republican 
period, the only standardized national income estimate, adjusted by PPP, shows that the 
Chinese per capita income still only accounted for 35 percent of the Japanese level in the 
1930s (Fukao, Ma, & Yuan, 2007). 
 
2.3.2 Were there changes in economic structure? 
The demand for education is related not only to the absolute growth figure, but also closely 
associated with changes in economic structure – from an agrarian to an industrial economy. 
Before the 1840s, China had been a closed and agrarian economy. How much did the 
economic developments alter the demand for skills in the labour market? Unfortunately, 
detailed data on the composition of employment and GDP by industry only became available 
in 1930s; hence no changing trends can be observed here to illustrate whether there was a 
changing demand for skills caused by any structural economic upgrade.  
 
However, substantial historical details suggest that the onset of modern industrial expansion 
occurred from the late Qing to the first few decades of the 20th century. Several programmes 
were launched by the late Qing court, modelled on Japan’s Meiji Restoration.47 This wave of 
industrialisation was further accelerated by the tremendous growth in international trade.48 
The nominal value of Chinese exports sextupled, while, in real terms, the figure tripled 
(Mitchener & Yan, forthcoming), stimulated by the growth of the most important modern 
industry – manufacturing, including cotton textiles, cigarettes, matches, and rubber goods, 
proceeded steadily before 1937 (T. Rawski, 1989, pp. 65-119).  In addition, a wide range of 
other modern industries flourished in several important economic sectors, namely, modern 
                                                 
47 The first wave of industrialisation was largely stimulated by military demand, which can be traced back to the 
Tong-zhi Restoration (1862–1874) and the Self-strengthening Movement (1861–1895). Due to resistance from 
conservative Manchu elites, the scope of these programmes remained limited, but through the process, a batch 
of modern industrial enterprises was set up, including the pioneers in modern industry – government-supervised 
merchant companies. They were operated by merchants, but were controlled and directed by government 
officials; a few of them were extremely influential companies throughout China’s business history, including the 
China Merchants' Steamship Navigation Company, Kaiping Coal Mines, the Imperial Telegraph Administration, 
the Hua-sheng Spinning and Weaving Mill and the Imperial Bank of China.  
48 Even though the Treaty of Nanking (1840) permitted foreigners to trade with China in five treaty ports, the 
great change came when the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed with the Japanese after the first Sino-Japanese war, 
allowed foreign direct investors in China to set up factories. According to the most-favoured-nation agreements, 
this privilege was extended to other foreign nations. Therefore, foreign capital very quickly flowed into China 
after 1895, and stimulated the growth of modern industry.  
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transportation, money and finance, and communication (Brandt et al., 2014; Y. Chang, 1989; 
T. Rawski, 1975, 1989; J. Wang, 1955; Wright, 1992). These developments remarkably 
reduced transportation costs, communication speed and financing difficulties; as a 
consequence it largely eased and supported economic growth in other sectors, such as 
manufacturing. Foreign investors and Chinese-owned companies shared these achievements 
in the booming industrial sector; the best illustration comes from Bergère, who identified this 
period as the ‘golden age of the Chinese bourgeoisies’ (Bergère, 1986). Echoing these 
historical narratives, estimates of industrial development indicate a similar picture of 
promise. The national industrial output index constructed by Chang shows a respectable 
double-digit annual real growth rate, while Rawski estimates the growth rate as 8.1 for the 
modern industrial sector before 1937 (J. Chang, 1955; T. Rawski, 1989).  
 
Unfortunately, even though the modern industrial sector grew so rapidly, it had started in the 
late 19th century from a small base, and after a few decades of substantial growth, it was still 
small in the context of the Chinese economy as a whole, accounting for less than 3 percent of 
GDP (T. Rawski, 1989, p. 9), and 13 percent of the aggregate industrial output figure in 1933 
(T.-C. Liu & Yeh, 1965, p. 89). Rising industrialisation was not only limited in scope, but its 
geographic coverage also remained regional and not national, in that 80 percent of modern 
industry was concentrated in the Yangzi delta49 and Manchuria50 (Ma, 2008). For instance, 50 
to 60 percent of cotton spindles, which were among the most important exports from China 
through the early 20th century, were located in Shanghai; more illustratively, half the national 
electricity in the 1920s was generated in Shanghai (Ma, 2008). Similar patterns can be 
observed in Manchuria as well; a region with 8 percent of China’s population contributed 
almost a third to its factory production and over 43 per cent to the value added by modern 
transport (Eckstein, Chao, & Chang, 1974).51  In a nutshell, such a small and regionally 
concentrated modern industrial sector barely skimmed the country’s ocean of labour. 
 
                                                 
49 The Lower Yangzi Delta used to be known as Jiangnan, which is part of Jiangsu and Zhejiang province. Many 
historical studies suggest that this region had a long history of commercialisation and economic activities, 
making it the largest economic centre in China since the Song period. The lower Yangzi Delta also occupies a 
central place in recent revisionist literature, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
50  Manchuria in the northeast of China is now known as the three Northeastern provinces. The rapid 
industrialisation in Manchuria since the late 19th century was based on the development of an open frontier, and, 
more importantly, it was dominated by Japanese activities. After 1932, Manchuria was fully controlled by Japan 
and functioned as an essential source of raw materials for Japan’s military expansion in Asia.  
51 Due to a lack of data, the author derived this percentage figure based on the 1941 output in Manchuria and in 
China in 1952 (in comparable prices).  
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The overwhelming majority of the population were still rooted in agriculture (Chien, 1950, 
pp. 11-12). In 1933, Liu and Yeh estimate that about 80 percent of the workforce still 
engaged in agricultural production; but, unlike modern industries, the agricultural sector 
experienced much modest growth in both productivity and output. 52  In the same vein, 
scattered small-scale historical evidence confirms similar results. For instance, data from 7 
counties in Zhili province indicate that more than 80 percent of households engaged in 
agricultural production between 1928 and 1934 (T. Perkins, 2002, pp. 25-26). 53 Putting this 
figure into international perspective indicates  how far China’s economic structure lagged 
behind. For instance, in the 1870s the share of employment in the agricultural sector in the 
UK was only 20 percent, and in the 1930s this number fell to 7.6 percent. Even the strong 
agricultural sector of the US took up only 50 percent of the country’s labour in the late 19th 
century, and the number dropped to  20 percent in the 1930s (Broadberry, 2004). 
 
Table 1.3: Labour force and GDP composition of China, in 1933 
  
Employment 
(million) 
Domestic product 54 
 
number percentage number percentage 
Agriculture sector 204.91 79.05% 18.76 62.78% 
Non-agricultural sector 54.3 20.95% 11.12 37.22% 
     Handicrafts 15.74 6.07% 2.04 6.83% 
     Factories, mining, modern  transportation 2.38 0.92% 1.41 4.72% 
     Finance 0.14 0.05% 0.21 0.70% 
     Trade 14.88 5.74% 2.71 9.07% 
     Government 5.12 1.98% 0.82 2.74% 
*Source: (T.-C. Liu & Yeh, 1965, pp. 37-70) 
 
To summarize, there is no denying that the modern industrial sector expanded rapidly, but, 
because of its small share in total and the geographic concentration of its  location, the 
                                                 
52 Due to inadequate data including acreage, yield or productivity, and because of the remarkable diversity in 
agriculture across China, scholars hold quite different interpretations of how much agriculture output and 
productivity increased in the course of this period. Rawski holds a very positive view, with extensive spill-over 
from modern industry pushing the exceptionally rapid economic growth into traditional sectors (Brandt et al., 
2014; T. Rawski, 1989). However, there is no solid data to suggest that there was a 'take-off' towards sustained 
growth in the aggregate output in agriculture before 1949, because no significant technological breakthrough 
occurred in agricultural production in this period. (Feuerwerker, 1986). 
53 It is true that a proportion of peasants also produced  handicrafts to supplement their income, but the way the 
industrial operation was organised can only be referred to as proto-industrialisation, and not modern industry. 
The proportion of people who reported that they engaged in handicraft production varied significantly, from 2% 
to 60%; therefore, it is very difficult to give a definitive conclusion on this point.  
54 The domestic product by industrial origin is presented in constant 1933 precise. 
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booming industrial development did not alter the composition of labour force on any large 
scale; in other words, the demand for skilled labour increased to only a limited extent 
throughout this period.  
 
2.3.3 Child labour in booming industrialization 
One of the potential outcomes of expanding the modern industrial sector that is relevant to 
education is a prevalence of child labour, a matter which cannot be neglected. Global 
evidence shows that the rise of modern industry, the silk and cotton industries in particular, 
hold back improvements in educational outcomes, because the opportunity cost for children 
in such contexts tends to be higher (Goldin, 1998). Can a similar pattern be found in China in 
the early stages of its industrial development? First, given the size of modern industry 
through this period, child labour cannot have been as prevalent as in the comparable period in 
the UK and US. In addition, given the large reserve of adult unskilled labour in China; 
children were not a leading choice for manufacturers.  
 
It is true that many observers at that time vividly recorded tragic scenes of children aged 
between 7 and 12 years working outside factories (J. Wang, 1955, pp. 1281-1286).55 But the 
number of child workers has not been fully estimated. We infer from a wide range of small-
scale surveys targeting working class households a glimpse of life for workers in China 
during the Republican period. They provide us with important information – the structure of 
workers’ age in its modern factories. The variety of modern industries was limited, including 
only manufacturing, railway, mining, shipping and banking (Wright, 1992, p. 32); and we 
find that the composition of under-age workers largely depends on the nature of the 
industry.56 The railroad industry and mining show very low proportions of child labour, with 
2 percent of the total workers under the age of 20. This is not surprising, given the high 
                                                 
55 Wang records the prevalence of child labour working in Shanghai factories for no wage but 2 free meals and a 
place to stay at night. 
56 Table: The proportions of child labour in China in the 1930s (W. Li, Xia, & Huang, 2006) 
 
Wuxi Wuhan Tanggu railway 
sector 
Administrative staff 
Youngest age  11 10 13 14 14 
Share of aged under 15 
   
 
       male 2.52% 6.21% 0 
 
 
       female 10.54% 21.93% 6.09% 
 
 
       total  5.21% 10.15% 3.08% 2.25% 0.98% 
Sample size 691 1074 227 178 102 
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physical requirements imposed by the nature of the work. The figure for manufacturing was 
slightly higher, among female workers in particular. However, the youngest child labourers 
found were no younger than 10 or 11 years of age, suggesting that even in the textile 
industry, which contained most child labour, a negative effect might be imposed on 
secondary school students rather than primary pupils. In short, the thriving modern industries 
were not the main labour pool for child labour, whereas the proto-industries where children 
and women worked in small-scale and scattered workshops remained the potential job market 
for most children(W. Li et al., 2006).  
 
2.3.4 The dynamic relationship between education and the economy 
The previous sections set out several key features of the economic development through the 
period under discussion, and the last section of this chapter seeks to generalize the dynamic 
relationship between education and economic demand. Briefly, what should we take away 
from such a mixed economic outcome? Did economic conditions lay a good foundation for 
the rise of a modern schooling system? 
 
The dynamic of education and economic development can be summarized as follows: the 
demand for skills caused by economic structural change increases the return to education, 
while educational progress eventually drives up the supply of educated workers, thereby 
reducing the skilled wage (Goldin & Katz, 2008). Looking at the Chinese context, there is no 
literature directly estimating the return to education for each level of schooling,57 However, 
Yan’s pioneering work on the skills premium in China provides us with essential clues for 
guessing the dynamics of such a movement. According to Yan, from 1840 to 1900 the wages 
for skilled workers, defined as people receiving at least an equivalent training to secondary 
schooling,58 increased markedly, demonstrating that there was higher demand than supply for 
educated labour (S. Yan, 2007). However, the skills premium profile stagnated between 1900 
and 1920, then declined slightly in subsequent decades (S. Yan, 2007). In other words, the 
demand for secondary education, perhaps triggered by the boom in modern industries, rose 
quickly in the late 19th century, and was gradually met by the increasing supply of talent due 
                                                 
57 There is no census or individual level survey data that includes questions about both income and education for 
this period.  
58 This definition is congruent with the description of occupations in the category of skilled worker. 
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to the schooling expansion after the beginning of the 20th century.59 At the same time, the 
wages of workers who had obtained some basic education, show little change through this 
period.60 Without estimates of the return to primary schooling, it is difficult to provide any 
conclusive argument, but there is no direct evidence indicating that there was an increasing 
demand for skills failed to be met by the limited supply of educated labour, which caused a 
notable rise in the return to education.  
 
In short, after its opening up to the global market in the late 19th century, China enjoyed 
substantial expansion of its modern industrial sector and a modest economic growth. 
However, because of the narrow scope and limited geographic coverage of its 
industrialization, no full-scale structural transformation was witnessed in China. It meant that 
large segments of the country, its hinterland and rural population in particular, continued as 
agrarian economies with strong elements of proto-industrialisation. The enduring agricultural 
economy meant limited change in the demands for new skills and talents; therefore, even if 
the demand for skilled labour did increase, the effect was not large enough to generate a 
demand-driven education movement. Another issue that cannot be ignored is that education 
demand differed substantially across regions, because of regional dispersion in terms of 
economic development and industrial location. In Chapter Four, regional stories of the rise in 
education over the 20th century in China will be further analysed.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter sets the scene for the remaining ones by introducing the historical, political and 
economic background of the birth of a modern schooling system in China. The modern 
education model was founded in China through a time of turbulence. Western imperialism 
and the rise of Japan affected China profoundly from the late 19th century onwards, leading to 
a series of Western-influenced economic, political and social reforms. The remarkable 
educational movement was one of the many institutional responses to the wide-ranging 
changes, in particular the newly emerging ideological and political demands, but it was 
rooted in a fragmented, if not chaotic, political environment and a largely agrarian economy.  
 
                                                 
59 Enrolment rates in secondary schools rose too late in the period to have much of an effect on the wages of 
skilled workers. 
60 In Yan’s definition, positions that required basic literacy, such as office assistant, office boy and watchman, 
counted as unskilled (S. Yan, 2007).  
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Chapter 2 : The journey: towards a modern education system in 
China  
 
After setting out the historical background, I want in this chapter to outline China’s journey 
towards establishing a modern education system. From the late 19th century, the country had 
been calling for a new education model with the aim of transforming the classic Confucian 
traditional teaching system into a systematically organised, professionally staffed and 
publicly financed new system. Once the new system, modelled on those of Western countries 
and Japan, was set up, it expanded very quickly across the country. In the following sections, 
I briefly introduce the traditional education system that the new model was to transform. 
Then I discuss separately the three essential features of the modern education system, 
followed by summarizing a few of the far-reaching merits of the new educational model. The 
last section focuses on the funding channels of the modern schools.  
 
1. The burdens and legacy of the past 
 
Imperial China’s long written history and its Confucian culture, coupled with perhaps one of 
the most sophisticated literati-bureaucrat systems in the world, for centuries determined the 
essence of what the Chinese chose to view as ‘education’. Such a deeply-rooted past 
constituted the basis of the modern education system in China; it was therefore not possible 
to separate these two altogether. Classic Confucian education operated in China for over a 
thousand years. The most distinguished characteristic of this schooling system was that its 
foremost purpose revolved around one single institution: the Imperial civil service 
examination.61 The extraordinarily high economic and social rewards attached to success in 
this exam made the pursuit of education a hallmark of Chinese society. Such a link between 
education and upward social mobility with exceptionally high financial rewards reinforced 
                                                 
61 The Imperial Civil exam was implemented as early as the Tang Dynasty (618-896) and had existed for more 
than 1000 years before its abolition in 1905. This exam system served to draw the top national talents to become 
bureaucrats and this had a deep influence on Chinese society. In fact, the university entrance examination 
system in contemporary China evolved indirectly from the imperial one.    
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the demand for education, which also laid the ground for the extraordinarily high cultural 
value placed on education among the people.62  
 
The Imperial Court meticulously crafted and monitored the Imperial examination, which 
served the function of choosing bureaucrats from the best candidates. Through this 
mechanism of passing several extremely competitive examinations, one could be admitted to 
a social elite - the class of the gentry. The considerably high returns from education came not 
only in the form of social privilege63 and the official income of a bureaucrat; according to 
some estimates, grey income might be as high as 14 to 22 times the official salary. This 
figure meant that about 22 percent of the agricultural output would accrue to a small group of 
people occupying the top 0.5 percent of the population (Ni & Van, 2006).64 Several studies 
suggest that, thanks to the outstandingly high returns for success in education, Imperial 
China, as a pre-modern society, had an exceedingly high demand for schooling which also 
resulted in relatively high levels of literacy and numeracy (Baten, Ma, Morgan, & Wang, 
2010; E. Rawski, 1979).  
 
At this point, one important question emerges: if the Imperial education system was full of 
excellence, why did negative accounts of it flourish and the call to replace it with a Western 
system become so popular from the second half of the 19th century, in particular among 
enlightened intellectuals?65 Not only reformers at the time, but also contemporary scholars, 
indicated that the imperial education system was one of the reasons why China was failing to 
modernize (Clark & Feenstra, 2001; Huff, 2003; Landes, 2006; Lin, 1995).  
 
There was no denying that some fundamental weaknesses in the traditional education system 
were nakedly exposed when China confronted Western and modern forces. Indeed, two major 
                                                 
62 Such a cultural legacy is also widely witnessed across East Asia; all China’s Asian neighbours, such as 
Vietnam, Korea and Japan, used to be influenced by its Imperial examination system.  
63 Many social privileges were granted to members of the gentry class, including exclusion from corporal 
punishment and corvée (labour service), special arraignment in tax payments, and legitimacy in wearing 
scholar’s robes(C. Chang, 1962, pp. 32-43). 
64 Ni and Van’s calculation implies that the gentry class occupied 0.4 percent of the Chinese population (Ni & 
Van, 2006); whereas according to Chang’s calculation, the gentry class only comprised the top one to two 
percent of the entire Chinese population (C. Chang, 1955, p. 102).  
65 The pioneers, who first called for remodelling the examination system, were some enlightened scholars and 
reformists during the late Qing, including Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. For instance, Liang Qichao wrote in 
1886 ‘there was the deleterious influence of the civil examinations on learning. Most candidates would master 
whatever curriculum was set on the examinations. . . Hence, curricular reform was mandatory to change the 
learning habits of literati who sought public office” (B. Elman, 2000, p. 598). Later on, more and more scholars, 
many of who had received education from abroad, joined the wave of urging the educational reform.  
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shortcomings were widely criticised. First, the narrow focus on Confucian study dis-
incentivised young talent in China from pursuing broad academic achievements, resulting in 
the retarded development of technology and a modern mentality. The contents of the Imperial 
examination mainly covered the Four Books, the Five Classics and the ability to write ‘eight-
legged’ essays.66 Accordingly, classrooms were dominated by the study of Confucian classics 
and the writing of unspontaneous essays (B. Elman, 2000, pp. 53-64). Before the 19th 
century, the gap between Chinese and Western science was already large. The failure to 
acknowledge a wider spectrum of knowledge, such as the natural sciences or practical 
expertise, are believed to be one of the essential explanations for China’s backwardness in 
military prowess and industrialisation (Landes, 2006; Lin, 1995; Yuchtman & Cantoni, 
2013). 67  
 
The other peculiarity of Chinese traditional schooling system was the absence of public 
provision for basic schooling, which failed to reach many children in the country. One 
striking feature of the traditional school system was that the government supported elite 
education rather than basic education (E. Rawski, 1979, p. 24). 68  Partly because of China’s 
sheer size and large population,69 the Chinese Imperial state financed a very small number of 
academies for advanced scholars. It left the task of spreading basic schooling largely in 
private hands. 70 According to Chang, only 0.18 percent of the population ever attended 
government academies in the course of the late 19th century (C. Chang, 1955, p. 217); 
otherwise, the task of spreading basic education among the masses had been carried out by 
                                                 
66 The core of the traditional Chinese education curriculum was the value and belief systems in ‘Confucian 
learning’ (儒学 ruxue). The curriculum experienced slightly change through time. After the Qing period, it 
mainly consisted in three parts. (i). A common classical language; (ii) memorization of a shared canon; and (iii). 
the ability to write elegant essays, known as 8-legged essay (B. A. Elman, 2013, pp. 46-93). 
67 Classical education in Europe between the 16th and 19th centuries shared similar drawbacks to China’s in that 
the curriculum was at first based on religious principles and the medium of teaching was Latin. This education is 
believed to be distant from both modern scientific inquiry and practical economic life.  
68 The Imperial State certainly encouraged the establishment of a very small number of public schools for basic 
education – charity schools (义学) and community schools (社学). However, the central government did not 
allocate any funds for them, and so only a negligible number of them were built. According to Rawski, only 
13,400 out of 40 million school-age boys were enrolled in them, providing negligible opportunities nationwide 
(E. Rawski, 1979, pp. 33-36).  
69As discussed in section 2.2 of Chapter One, in the domain of education and not only there,  the Imperial Court 
used to be quite reluctant to exert control in all kinds of public affairs and voluntarily withdrew from many 
public services, ranging from the supply of legal tender to the issuing of commercial regulations. A significant 
body of literature discusses how Ming-Qing China was actually run by social institutions with little supervision 
from the state, but this lies outside the scope of the present thesis.  
70 The government academies under the traditional system enrolled only those students, who had already passed 
several entrance level examinations, to further their studies at the next level. They were equivalent to modern-
day higher education institutions. They existed mainly in three formats: the Imperial Academy (国子监), 
prefectural schools (府学) and county schools (县学). These government schools, were few in number, and 
located only in provincial capitals, prefectural seats and county seats(C. Chang, 1955, pp. 21-43).  
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households, local communities, lineages and native gentry (Borthwick, 1983, p. 10; P. Deng, 
1997, pp. 2-16; E. Rawski, 1979, pp. 24-33). The most widespread educational institution in 
Imperial China – the Sishu, equivalent to primary school – was purely private; and almost all 
school-age children in traditional China received some education in a Sishu (P. Deng, 1997, 
pp. 6-8; E. Rawski, 1985, pp. 24-33).71 As the expenses incurred in preparing for the civil 
service examination could be substantial (B. Elman, 2000; Shiue, 2013; Yi Xu, Holdvari, & 
Leeuwen, 2013), the lack of public education provision for the lower level of schooling may 
have been a critical reason for the failure of schooling failed to spread among vast 
populations, even though the exam itself seemed to be entirely open and fair to everyone.  
 
In short, owing to its weakness, but also due to the surge in ideological and institutional 
changes through the late 19th century, this long-standing system came to an abrupt end in 
1905. While the traditional education system was outdated, it had in fact laid a solid cultural 
foundation for the success of the new system, in that education was extremely highly valued 
in China.  
 
2. Key elements of the modern education system 
 
The remodelling of the education system in China was a long journey, through which many 
plans were drawn up and a number of regulations were established. By the end of the 
Republican era, the key elements of the modern education system were largely in place. This 
model contains several major features, namely, an educational model largely supported by 
public efforts, a high degree of decentralisation, and an emphasis on radical change in its 
curriculum content.  
 
The first government school in the modern sense was founded in Beijing in 1862, where the 
main task for students was to learn Western languages (Abe, 1987).72 Subsequently, other 
                                                 
71 As the name indicates, Sishu literally means private school (Si in Chinese means privately-owned).Sishu 
received no public funds; more importantly, the government never included them under the heading of schools 
(Xuexiao). This absence of Sishu from the bureaucratic dictionary means that they have no statistical history; 
hence, we have no idea about the national level of enrolment ratios for traditional primary schooling in Imperial 
China. Neglecting Sishu had significant consequences for educational policies in the Republican era, too; the 
Republican government never considered using the Sishu as a basis for the new school system; this led to 
limited success in promoting mass primary education in China during the early 20th century.  
72 Tongwen Guan (同文馆) was the first modern school built by the Chinese government. It served an important 
function in introducing Western knowledge to China. It became part of the Imperial Capital University (now 
Peking University) in 1902. Unfortunately, even with significant support from both the Qing court and Western 
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modern schools flourished in China. However, the strong impulse to reform was not content 
with a small number of new schools, and continued to urge wide and thorough changes. In 
1902, the very first piece of legislation on modern education was issued by the Qing Court, 
which largely emulated Japan’s policies. The Education Act of 1902 outlined the general 
foundation of the first modern educational system in China (Huaxing Li, 1997, pp. 74-94; 
Shu, 1928, p. 6; Yang, 1934, p. 421). 73 It was an unrealistic blueprint, which failed to provide 
concrete guidance to show how an education system should be instituted and implemented in 
the Chinese context; in consequence, it was never put into practice. However, as the first 
government-promulgated Education Act, it still demonstrated an official commitment from 
the state to a brand new education model. The most significant development on the road to 
the new educational model occurred two years later, when a slightly revised version of the 
Education Act was passed in 1904. Its implementation on a national scale marked the official 
start of the modern education system in China (Huaxing Li, 1997, pp. 98-118).74  On 2 
September 1905, a memorandum was finally endorsed to discontinue the civil service 
examination system at all levels in the following year(C. Chang, 1955, pp. 208-209), thus 
officially ending the long-lived traditional education system, and more importantly deeply 
altering the nation’s chief incentive for receiving education. As pointed out, the collapse of 
the Qing dynasty in 1911 did not stop the state from trying to set up a new education system; 
on the contrary, it was pushed repeatedly by subsequent regimes throughout the first half of 
the 20th century, through which three more Education Acts were legislated.75 
 
In short, through the first half of the 20th century, five Education Acts in succession were 
passed. During a time of political turmoil, it is still an open question how seriously these 
education acts were implemented in practice, yet the ambition and aspiration of the state were 
                                                                                                                                                        
powers, the Chinese people were not ready to endorse this new type of education; therefore, the school 
encountered considerable difficulty in attracting students.  
73 The Education Act 1902 (钦定学堂章程), also known as 壬寅学制 and drafted by Baixi Zhang, is made up 
of six chapters. Specific regulations on Higher Education, Secondary Education, Primary Education, and the 
criteria for entering higher grades are all covered in a corresponding chapter. It was further amended by Zhidong 
Zhang and Qing Rong in 1903 (Huaxing Li, 1997, pp. 74-84).  
74 The Education Act 1904 (奏定学堂章程), also known as 癸卯学制, drafted by Bixi Zhang and Zhidong 
Zhang, includes 18 chapters which provide more of a grounded legal and administrative foundation for 
implementing the modern educational system in practice (Huaxing Li, 1997, pp. 74-84).  
75 The Education Acts 1912 and 1913 were combined and are referred to as 壬子学.制 With some slight 
revisions in the following year, the combined version remained intact for the next decade, and was only replaced 
by the Education Act 1922 passed by the Beiyang Government, which is also known as 壬戌学制(Huaxing Li, 
1997, pp. 98-110).. The last Education Act was legislated under the rule of the Nanjing Government in 1928, 
known as (中华民国学校系统), its content was that of the previous one with virtually no adjustments (Huaxing 
Li, 1997, p. 153)  
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at least loud and clear. Altogether, they provided a roadmap and laid regulatory foundations 
for the new education model from many perspectives, including the administrative 
arrangements, the educational provision and the structure of education. In the following 
sections, these features of this new education model are described in turn.  
 
Table 2.1: Education Acts passed through the first part of the 20th century 
Act Passed by Major Revisions 
Education Act 1902 Qing Court 
Layout of the legal foundation of the modern education system. 
Primary education was not regarded as compulsory, but it 
mandated the local gentry to support primary schooling. 
Failed to be implemented. 
Education Act 1904 Qing Court 
The first education act was put in practice. 
Very similar to the Education Act 1902 
Education Act 1912 
Nationalist 
Government  
Compulsory lower-primary education76 was brought in for the 
first time. 
Equal educational opportunities for female students in primary 
school were instituted.  
Education Act 1922 
Beiyang 
Government 
Initiated by provinces, a change in the structure of schooling to 
6-3-3 years.  
Modified and refined the regulations on vocational and normal 
education 
Education Act 1928 
Nationalist 
Government 
No major adjustments compared to the Education Act 1922 
 
2.1 Educational Organisation 
In order to better understand modern education, we start our analysis by focusing on the 
administrative structure under this new educational system. Two questions are addressed in 
this section. First, how did educational organisations operate under this new system? Next, 
what responsibilities and authorities did each of them have?  
 
Central level:  
At the central level, there had never been a government board directly responsible for 
education until the early 20th century.77 In 1905, the founding of the Ministry of Education  
                                                 
76 The Ministry of Education made education  for the first time in 1915, as one revision clause to the Education 
Act 1912, and specified that lower primary schools should be attended for four compulsory years (F. Wang, 
1994, pp. 466-468). 
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(学部 Xuebu) marked the advent of central control in education. Later during the Republican 
era, the name changed several times, settling as the National Board of Education for much of 
its history (Huaxing Li, 1997, p. 391; F. Wang, 1994, pp. 1-7).78 There were two main 
responsibilities for the education office at central level. One was to directly finance and 
manage all the public universities across the country, granting scholarships to overseas 
students, and a very small number of secondary schools. In addition, an individual inspection 
department was created under the National Board of Education to supervise local educational 
affairs (F. Wang, 1994, pp. 1-7).  
 
Provincial level:  
Similarly, a separate education bureau, as one of five bureaus,79 was set up at the provincial 
level, and run by a provincial governor after 1905 (C. S. Li, 1922, p. 42). The responsibility 
of the provincial education bureau included directly supporting secondary education within 
its administrative boundary, and supervising the development of county level education 
(Huaxing Li, 1997, pp. 398-404; F. Wang, 1994, pp. 282-283). Another important force 
operating in the education sector was that of the provincial educational commissioners (视学 
Shixue), who were directly appointed from Beijing (Huaxing Li, 1997, p. 432).80 However, as 
mentioned, central control was limited and the state rarely contributed to fundraising for local 
education; therefore the functions of the commissioners were limited in practice. Other than 
government organisations, powerful civil organisations also functioned in the field of 
education, and this made the separation of educational authority at the provincial level more 
ambiguous. For instance, the provincial education association, a professional self-governing 
organisation, was exceptionally influential,81 notably in provinces where regional elites were 
strong. In these cases, this civil educational organisation assumed many responsibilities, in 
                                                                                                                                                        
77 No separate board of education existed before 1905. The Imperial Exam was the only educational field that 
the Government engaged in. The examination was under the jurisdiction of the Board of Rites (Li Bu); at the 
same time, the money needed for administering the exam was supplied by the Board of Finance (Hu Bu). 
78 In 1927, a reform was initiated by a few high-ranking intellectuals. Modelled on that of France, the National 
Board of Education changed to a series of académies (大学区) as the highest administrative organisations in 
charge of educational affairs. Such a reform was intended to reduce the political and bureaucratic influence on 
educational affairs; but it largely neglected the role of primary and secondary schooling. After two years of  
immature experiment, this reform came to nothing in the end, and the old system was brought back in 1929.  
79 The provincial governor’s office was divided into five bureaus: general affairs, miscellaneous affairs, civil 
administration, industry, and education (C. S. Li, 1922, p. 42)  
80 In total, three independent commissioners in the provincial governor’s office were directly appointed from 
Beijing; one was an educational commissioner. They were there to represent the Ministry of Education (or 
National Board of Education), and were supposed to supervise and report educational performance back to the 
central offices (C. S. Li, 1922, pp. 42-43). 
81 Provincial education association was established and flourished at the end of the Qing dynasty as an attempt 
to incorporate elite power into the court’s agenda.  
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terms of promoting education, for the provincial education bureau, and sometimes received 
large subsidies from provincial budgets (Chauncey, 1992, pp. 102-107). In a nutshell, 
multiple organisations for educational affairs coexisted at the provincial level, where the 
boundaries of responsibility and authorities for different organisations were implicit, and 
determined by the outcomes of a higher level power struggle> This partly explains why the 
situation varied substantially across provinces.  
 
Local level: 
In 1906, the Qing Court enacted a decree calling for the establishment of local education 
exhortation bureaus (劝学所 quanxuesuo) in every county. These were responsible for every 
aspect of modern primary education (Huaxing Li, 1997, pp. 439-444; Yang, 1934, pp. 
33,421). The name of this institution literally means ‘persuading people to learn’. After 1922, 
the education exhortation bureau altered its name to the Local Board of Education, but its real 
function in practice remained similar. There is no doubt that primary schooling constituted 
the major component of modern schooling through the early 20th century. Therefore, the 
county board of education, which undertook the foremost responsibility in primary education, 
constituted the backbone of the educational organisations in China in this development.  
 
As discussed in section 2.2 of Chapter One, an important feature of the local board of 
education was its large autonomy. Not only did the county education bureau enjoy extensive 
autonomy in terms of decision making power in the sector of primary schooling, it also 
encountered exceptionally low levels of supervision and monitoring from above. Its chief 
officers and staff were appointed from the local gentry, 82  and were not state officials 
(Chauncey, 1992; Keenan, 1994, p. 111).83 That is to say, every aspect of primary education, 
including the critical fundraising and daily operation of schools, was managed by members of 
local educated elites, not state officials.  
 
To summarize, in terms of governmental organisation, the education system was formulated 
as a three-tier structure. The distribution of responsibility was clear in the central control of  
higher education, provincial control of secondary education, and local boards of education for 
primary schooling. 
                                                 
82 In most cases, the chief officers of the education hortatory bureaus had no official salary and the positions 
were filled by respectable local gentry. 
83 How was primary schooling financed, managed and promoted by local government and social forces? How 
were local gentry involved in local governance? These questions will be further explored in Chapter 4  
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2.2 Access to education: Increasing importance of public schools 
As emphasised in the preceding discussions, the foremost feature of the modem education 
system lay in the increasingly important role it gave to the government. Unlike the limited 
role that the state had played in Imperial education from the very first, both the Qing Court 
during its last decade, and the regimes that succeeded it showed their desire to create in China 
a public education system to allow schooling to reach as many people as possible. From 
records on educational outcomes, it is clear that the nationwide expansion of modern 
schooling through this period was predominantly driven by the rise of the public efforts.  
There are many ways of demonstrating the role of the government in education. First, one 
commonly seen indicator is the support ratio: government education expenditure as a share of 
GDP. No data are available on either of these indicators; therefore, the second best option 
that we can turn to is the share of publicly controlled schools. One thing that should be borne 
in mind when interpreting this ratio is that a ‘publicly controlled school’ was not synonymous 
with a ‘publicly funded school’.84 Since private schools could receive public subsidies, public 
schools could equally benefit from private funding, including high tuition fees and private 
donations. In the early 20th century China, limited tax revenues meant that most public 
schools under government ownership and control required tuition fees and private donations 
to make up their budgets. Accordingly, the term ‘public school’ in this thesis is more likely to 
refer to schools which were publicly provided, but not necessarily fully reliant on public 
funding.  
First, as regards primary schooling, public primary schools were the main contributors.85 
They were dominant in number at the very beginning of the 20th century and became 
                                                 
84 Public school’ is not at all synonymous with the phrase ‘publicly funded school’; they are entirely different 
concepts. The use of the term ‘financed’ or ‘funded’ emphasises the party which generated revenues (mostly 
through taxes) and directly pays for school inputs. When it comes to education provision, this concept is more 
related to the party which constructed schools, established the curriculum and supplied instructional materials 
(Le & Meleisea, 2013). That is to say, education provision has a slightly broader frame of reference, and its 
tasks include capital investment in the buildings, hiring teachers, selecting the curriculum and so on. Education 
funding, on the other hand, concentrates only on the source of funding (Goldin, 2015).  
85From the late Qing until 1949, four main types of primary school were existing together and delivering similar 
functions: public primary schools, registered private primary schools, non-registered private schools, and the 
long-lived traditional schools - sishu. Neither the government reports nor various surveys at the time contains 
information on the latter two; therefore, the data presented in this chapter exclude these types of institution, 
focusing only on the public and registered private primary schools. There is no denying that the significantly 
large proportion of public schools has something to do with the biased reporting system where non-registered 
private schools and Sishu were not documented properly. However, since there is no guarantee of the quality of 
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increasingly prevalent. In 1946, public primary schools accounted for almost 95 percent of 
the total, demonstrating the dominant contribution of public primary schools to the diffusion 
of mass education among people in China throughout the early 20th century.  
Figure 2.1: Primary schools (public vs. private) 
 
*Sources:  
(i). (Zhonghua minguo jiaoyu tongji tubiao (The education statistic report for Republic of China, fifth) 
1916) 
(ii). (Quanguo Chudeng Jiaoyu Tongji (The statistic report on primary education) 1930) 
(iii). (Quanguo Chudeng Jiaoyu Tongji (The Statistic Report on Primary Education in 1933), 1937) 
(iv). 1946: (Zhu, 1948) 
 
If we turn to higher education, a slightly different pattern emerges for both secondary and 
tertiary schooling. The number of public secondary schools rose substantially throughout the 
first half of the 20th century, but as a share of all schools, they declined from 87 percent in 
1912 to 61 percent in 1945. The loss of importance of public secondary schooling reflects 
variance from what we observed in primary education, i.e. the rise of secondary education 
was mainly boosted by private provision and demand. In the same way, the number of 
universities and colleges did not increase markedly, while the share of public universities 
ranged from 51 percent to 70 percent.86  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
education in the non-registered primary schools and Sishu schools, we can at least claim that public schools 
completely dominated formal primary education.  
86 In 1936, nearly half the university students had previously enrolled in private schools, but the ratio had 
dropped to 31.4% by 1946.  
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In summary, the wider access to education in China during the late Qing and Republican era 
was mainly due to the increasing number of public schools. More importantly, contrary to the 
practice of Imperial China, the limited public financial resources were mainly allocated to 
lower levels of schooling, to prepare a larger pool of literate labour; to the progress at 
secondary and tertiary levels, the private sector served as a more important contributor. 
 
Figure 2.2: Secondary schools (public vs. private) 
 
 
*Source: (Yang, 1934, p. 193; Zhu, 1948, pp. 1429-1430) 
 
Figure 2.3: Tertiary schools (public vs. private) 
 
*Source: (Yang, 1934, pp. 22-23; Zhu, 1948, p. 1406) 
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2.3 Decentralised Structure of the new education system 
Another key feature of the new education system was its decentralisation. Of the many 
attempts to define educational decentralisation, we simply specify that an education system 
can be considered decentralised when the authority to do a range of things – revenue  
generation, spending autonomy, personnel control, and curriculum design – is  assigned to 
lower levels of government (Fiske, 1996, p. 10).  
 
An extensive literature discusses the virtues of a decentralised education system, most of all 
in the early stages of development. Local communities which are equipped with the best 
knowledge about their own locality can arguably guarantee higher efficiency; for instance, 
educational resources can be spent by them in a way that better fits the preferences of the 
residents. At the same time, local government also has an advantage when it comes to  
monitoring, say, the performance of schools, headmasters and teachers. According to 
historical studies, successful practice in European nations and the US through the early phase 
of the rise of schooling largely relied on a decentralised education system (Black & Sokoloff, 
2006; Goldin & Katz, 2008, pp. 136-139; Lindert, 2004a, pp. 115-117). Furthermore, the 
decentralised education model has been passionately advocated by many contemporary 
international organisations, as a path to improve  education in the developing world 
(WorldBank, 2004).  
 
Measurement of education decentralisation can be problematic. As suggested in its definition, 
authorities of many kinds are associated with a country’s system of education. Only when all 
of the above authorities are monopolised by the central level is the system considered highly 
centralised, while if all educational decisions are made at the local level, the system is highly 
decentralised. However, the reality is more complex, and many systems are partly 
decentralised and somewhere between the two extremes (Le & Meleisea, 2013). Therefore, 
what matters more is which decisions are made by a central educational ministry, and which 
emerge at local level. In China’s case, except for curriculum design, which was highly 
centralised, other educational decisions were local.    
 
Furthermore, the degree of decentralisation can also differ from one schooling level to 
another. As pointed out in section 2.1 of this chapter, successive Education Acts through the 
early 20th century outlined clear regulations regarding the allocation of responsibility by level 
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of education, where central government undertook to deliver tertiary education, while the 
state delegated responsibility for secondary schooling to the provincial government, and 
primary schooling to county and sub-county governments. Accordingly, the degree of 
decentralisation rose as the level of schooling went down.  
 
Table 2.2: School by management, 1910s-1940s 
  
Year 
Tertiary school (%) Secondary school (%) Primary school (%) 
national provincial local national provincial local national provincial county grass root 
1916 16.9 83.1 0 0.5 99.5 0.04 99.96 
1930 32.1 67.9 0 0.7 25.5 73.8 0.01 0.01 35.01 64.17 
1933 49.1 50.9 0 0.8 26.9 72.3 0.01 0.01 21.05 78.19 
1940 66.1 33.9 0 4.6 35.2 60.2 0.01 0.01 50.99 48.82 
1945 64.4 35.6 0 3.9 30.5 65.5 0.02 0.02 95.76 
*Sources:  
(i). Primary: the sources noted under Figure 2.1  (ii). Secondary: (Zhu, 1948, pp. 1429-1430) 
(iii). Tertiary: (Zhu, 1948, p. 1402)   
 
  
As discussed, the ideal way to measure the degree of decentralisation is to ask where the 
decisions are made in regard to a long list of areas, namely, covering personnel control, core 
curriculum, school location, and so on, at each level of schooling. Nonetheless, in reality, we 
are constrained by the limitations of the evidence and it is impossible for us to provide 
detailed data on each aspect. The most critical indicators that we can apply refer to 
decentralisation in terms of educational finance. Among the range of administrative 
decisions, revenue generation played the essential role and dominated the further allocation 
of authority for other things. Economists tend to give special attention to educational finance 
to measure the extent of decentralisation. One commonly used method is to look at the 
percentage of educational revenues that come from local sources. In the Chinese case, the 
limited information regarding the composition of educational revenue means that we have to 
resort to something different – the composition of public schools by ownership instead of 
revenue source. The classification in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 are mainly attributed to ownership 
and the source of administrative control, but not financial source. For instance, classifying a 
school as ‘provincial’ did not necessarily indicate that it would be entirely financed from a 
provincial budget. It may have been subsidised by central government and/or private 
donations. 
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In Table 2.2, several important patterns appear. Tertiary education, inconsistently with the 
Education Act, was not highly centralised, and control of more than half the public 
universities or colleges was delegated to provincial government. The situation altered only 
after the full-scale Japanese invasion in 1937, because of the special wartime arrangements 
that made national budgets more important in the realm of schooling. Similar patterns can be 
observed in secondary education. According to government statutes, the task of developing 
secondary education was supposed to be undertaken by provincial authorities, but in fact  it 
was delegated to a lower level. No more than 35 percent of the public secondary schools were 
classified as provincial schools, leaving the rest of the burden to the county government. Last, 
primary schooling was a highly decentralised system with almost all public and private 
primary schools controlled by the lowest administrative units – county and sub-county 
governments. 
 
International comparisons are recalled to put China’s figures into perspective. If we turn to 
the two world leaders in schooling at the time, roughly 70 percent of Prussia’s primary 
schools were funded by local taxes in the 1880s; the figure was similar for the US, where an 
untold number of local communities predominated as contributors to the impressive rise in 
schooling provision. The most decentralised country in Europe was Italy, in that, before the 
1880s, 90 percent of primary schools were funded locally, which was a similar level to that of 
China. In contrast, England lagged behind in terms of schooling, and had a rather centralised 
schooling system before the 1880s; less than 20 percent of primary schools were financed by 
local governments (Lindert, 2004a, pp. 116-117).  
 
In short, through the late Qing and the entire Republican eras, the education system remained 
highly decentralised in China. The degree of decentralisation was not the same across all 
schooling levels, but was greater at the lower levels. As an expanding schooling system in the 
early stages of its development, this new system required extensive funding, supervision and 
management from all tiers of government. With fragmented political bodies and the unequal 
economic development across regions, China’s highly decentralised approach may  have been 
the best possible strategy for developing education at this stage of its development.   
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3. Other benefits of the new education system 
 
After introducing some basic features of the modern education system, to better illustrate this 
landmark transformation in the educational history of China and the progress that it brought, 
this section generalises several major benefits of the modern schooling system. Compared to 
the old system, it brought a handful of critical advantages, including a shift from informal 
schooling to formal education, an extraordinary improvement in curriculum design and equal 
educational opportunities for both genders. 
 
Table 2.3: The difference between traditional and modern education 
  Traditional Education Modern Education 
Purpose 
Civil Service Examinations  path to 
bureaucrat status 
Transmitting knowledge and cultivating 
competent citizens 
Curriculum Confucian classics, Confucian doctrines 
Broader spectrum  of knowledge, 
vocational instruction, new doctrines  
Main 
Features 
1. Civil Service examination oriented 
2. Private provision of basic schooling87 
3. Informal system  
4. Educational opportunities for males 
only 
1.Dominant public schools 
2. Formal system with an explicit 
classification of schooling level 
3. Neutrality towards gender 
 
 
3.1 Formal schooling  
The first critical advance for the modern system was the shift at the turn of the 20th century 
from informal schooling to formal education. This transformation brought China a much 
more defined structure with three tracks of schooling and more professionally trained staff.  
 
                                                 
87 From the Ming dynasty onwards, people who attended the Imperial Examination were required to be students 
of county or prefectural academies (fu xue and xian xue), which were publically financed educational institutes. 
However, every county was equipped with one county academy at most; and only the students who passed the 
first level of the Imperial Examination were permitted to enrol. Therefore, by modern standards, the very small 
number of publically funded educational institutes of county academies and prefectural academies under the 
traditional system was equivalent to higher levels of schooling, such as secondary schools, if not universities. 
Thus, the argument that basic education was mostly privately-provided in Imperial China remains robust.  
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3.1.1 Defined educational structure  
The Imperial education system had strong elements of informal schooling, including a vague 
education structure and no clear criteria for teacher recruitment. At the turn of the 20th 
century, we witness a shift from a sort of Bell-Lancaster method of teaching in which 
students of different ages studied together in one room with one teacher,88 to a schooling 
system, which separated students according to grade. One may wonder what differences 
formal schooling could bring. It is true that knowledge is not necessarily transmitted via a 
formal school system. 89  However, such informal schooling presents extraordinary 
inefficiency. 90  Just as many other institutions established rules and regulations creating 
predictability, so did the formal school system. In order to give education wide appeal to large 
numbers of ordinary people, a formal school system, with a clear education structure, was 
exclusively required. Starting from the Education Act 1904, which was revised many times, an 
explicit structure emerged.  
 
Table 2.6 displays the evolution of the education structure more graphically. The new 
tripartite system developed a structure of parallel tracks for general, vocational and normal 
schools. The multiple schooling tracks diversified the purpose of education. Initially, general 
education remained the dominant form of schooling. One could spend roughly 19 years of 
study in general schools to attain the highest available qualifications. At the same time, there 
was an industrially-oriented option through vocational or technical education. Vocational 
schooling offered know-how or procedural knowledge for specific trades and occupations. In 
contrast to general education, it was practice-oriented and relevant to industrial activities. 
Last, normal education presented a third option, the training of teachers for the expanding 
modern education system, which was particularly important for females,  since teaching 
                                                 
88 The "Bell-Lancaster method" is also referred to as  the monitorial system, an  education method based on the 
abler pupils being used as 'helpers' to the teacher, passing on to other students the information they had learned 
89 Informal schooling, such as private tutors passing down knowledge to students, was a prevalent format for 
elite education, not only in Imperial China but also in Ancient Greece. For instance, Socrates taught Plato, and 
then Plato taught Aristotle, and so on.  
90 Under the traditional schooling system, one may spend many years in the pursuit of many areas of knowledge 
examinations without being able to predict the length of one’s schooling (B. Elman, 2000; Yi Xu et al., 2013) To 
best illustrate the unpredictability of the time needed to attain degree level of degree, we need only think of the 
considerable difference in the age of people passing the examinations. According to historical narratives, among 
some prestigious officials through the late Qing period, we can see significant differences in this regard. Zeng 
Guofan passed the prefecture level exam when he was 23, while Li Hongzhang succeeded when he was 17, 
Zongtang Zuo was 14, and the precocious Liang Qichao was only 11. Studying to pass the first level of the 
Imperial Exam took on average 10.5 years, for the Juren degree,  16 years, and for the Jinshi degree it could take 
as much as  1.5 years more, a total of 17.5 years (Yi Xu et al., 2013).  
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constituted one of the very few acceptable career options.91 Among the three tracks, there was 
no denying that the progress of general schooling dominated the expansion of modern 
education, occupying 60 to 70 percent of secondary education, leaving vocational and normal 
schooling as peripheral. 92 
 
In addition, under each track of education the duration of each level of schooling was clearly 
regulated. This model was promulgated by the Ministry of Education in the Education Act of 
1905, which emulated Japanese arrangements. The system was a 9-4-6 division: primary 
school for 9 years, secondary school for 4 years and tertiary school for 6 years. Primary 
education was further divided into kindergarten, lower primary and higher primary, each 
lasting for 3 years. The structure of education was occasionally altered slightly through the 
Republican period; during this process, the Japanese influence weakened, due to the military 
conflict between China and Japan, while the Western influence became more prominent. In 
1912, the division became 7-4-4. On 26 October 1921, the education system was changed 
again to follow the style of the USA, which favoured a 6-6-4 division. This continued until 
1949; when Communist China was established; at this point a new system was introduced, 
copied from the Soviet Union.  
 
                                                 
91 From 1907, normal schooling for girls was allowed under the new system.  
92 Immediately before the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War, the figure of 309,156 registered secondary 
schools was recorded; for vocational schools, the figure was only 31,592. Similarly, normal school student 
numbers were slightly higher at 38,795, but still almost a tenth of the students enrolled in general secondary 
school (Zhu, 1948). The breakdown records on the number of general secondary schools, vocational school and 
normal school may be found in Chapter 2, Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.4: Structure of Education 
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3.1.2 Explicit regulation on teacher selection criteria  
Apart from a defined educational structure, there were also many attempts to explicitly 
regulate the recruitment criteria for teachers. Given that one of the principal 
propositions of the new educational model was to transform educational content, it was 
essential to appoint eligible teachers who had the academic capacity to deliver the right 
‘education’ to students.  
 
Under the traditional system, most teachers were lower degree holders or those who had 
failed the civil service exam (E. Rawski, 1979, pp. 42-43). In remote and poor villages, 
the elders could sometimes directly engage private tutors who had received very limited 
training (Borthwick, 1983, pp. 14-38; B. Elman, 2000; Gamble, 1954, p. 188). In 
contrast, the modern schooling system outlined strict eligibility requirements on 
teachers for each tier of schooling. In their recruitment, educational attainment stood as 
the main criterion. For a primary school post, only graduates of normal school 
(equivalent to secondary school) were eligible (F. Wang, 1994, p. 463). For a secondary 
school post, a degree from a higher normal school (equivalent to university) was 
required (F. Wang, 1994, p. 283).   
 
Table 2.5: Educational background of primary school teachers, 1946 
 
Tertiary normal 
Secondary  
primary others Total 
Senior junior 
Number 445 66 3329 9567 6472 11102 30981 
Percentage 1.44% 0.21% 10.75% 30.88% 20.89% 35.83% 100% 
Source: (Zhu, 1948, p. 1469) 
 
 Unfortunately, what happens in practice when a brand new education model is built 
from the ground up in a very short time is that teacher availability and quality were 
among the most common problems. Accordingly, the regulations on the criteria for 
teachers also specifically noted that exceptions could be made when a school committee 
approved of a candidate even without the required degree (Huaxing Li, 1997, pp. 513-
514). In other words, such rules were never fully implemented in practice due to the 
extremely low number of teachers who could meet these standards. As presented in 
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Table 2.7, after decades of education expansion, roughly 80 percent of the primary 
teachers failed to meet the standard set  by the Ministry of Education.  
 
3.2 Education quality: academic and practical learning 
There is no denying that the foremost improvement in the new education model was 
that it embraced a much broader academic range in its curriculum, instead of focusing 
solely on theories of morality and statecraft. As pointed out in section 2.1 of Chapter 
One, the advent of a modern education system in China was largely driven by the urge 
to strengthen military might and by aspirations towards state formation. Consequently, 
exceptional attention was given at the time to changing the educational content. 
Academic learning, technological know-how and ideological campaigns were 
emphasised in the new curriculum, which brought magnificent progress in the quality of 
education. 
 
Since the late Qing period, many new curriculum models have been promulgated for 
schools to emulate and enrich the knowledge initiated in the classroom. Into the old 
system, the newly modified curriculum incorporated Western subjects, such as 
mathematics, physics, geography and foreign languages. Table 2.8 sets out several 
regulatory models for school curricula by the Ministry of Education from 1904 to 1948. 
Even though the full implementation of these models in practice was not guaranteed, it 
still conferred a progressive  tendency on curriculum design. It is clear that the major 
change was the remarkable decline of the emphasis on the Chinese Classics; the class 
hours required in the total dropped from 35 to 15 percent. In addition, students spent 
less time studying social science and more time on natural science and manual work. 
These two lines of change can also be observed in the curriculum models for secondary 
school education launched by the Ministry of Education.  
The second important change in the curriculum was the addition of moral training and 
cultural uniformity which was emphasised in classes (Kuo, 1913). In the past, education 
was the vehicle for selecting Imperial officials; therefore classic Confucian education 
had long encompassed ideological control, including loyalty to the emperor and honour 
for Confucius. However, under the new system, education undertook the task of 
spreading and promoting new moral doctrines; instead of promoting obedience and 
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loyalty, new doctrines included nationalism, democracy and later the ‘Three Principles 
of the People’, which were rigorously pushed through the expanding education system 
to the masses.93 In a nutshell, modern schooling was considered a means of cultivating 
virtuous citizens for a modern society. 
Briefly, the change in curriculum design constituted the most profound and far-reaching 
transformation in the new education system. The reform was largely Western-
influenced, leading to the elimination of the Confucian classics as an individual subject, 
the introduction of new subjects, emphasis on manual work and military drill and the 
diffusion of new moral doctrines for the new regimes in place of Confucianism. 
 
Table 2.6: Regulatory models for primary school curricula (%) 
 
1904 1912 1922 1936 1948 
Chinese (Confucian Classics) 35 20 20 17.5 15 
Maths 10 15 17.5 15 12.5 
English 10 15 17.5 15 15 
Social Science 
History 
20 15 15 10 15 
Geography 
Natural science 
Physics 
10 10 10 12.5 17.5 
Chemistry 
Art & PE 10 10 10 15 10 
Manual work 5 15 10 15 15 
*Source: (Shu, 1928, p. 79)  
  
3.3 Equal access to schooling: gender neutrality 
Furthermore, the new schooling system carried another critical virtue: it ended the long 
history of female exclusion from formal education in Chinese society. Gender 
educational inequality is shared by many developing countries in the early stages of 
development and culture, and social politics were among the chief contributors to the 
role of females in the area of education.94 Gender neutrality is an advantage which 
                                                 
93 As discussed in the section ‘decentralised education’, most authority in education was decentralised to 
a local level in the course of this period. The only exception lay in curriculum development, which was 
controlled at the central level.  
94 Similarly, exceptionally little human capital came from females, a phenomenon which emerged in 
most of the Asian countries sharing a similar Confucian ideology to China’s. Even in Japan, Asia’s 
leading nation in terms of educational development, the gender gap in education remained very wide until 
the end of World War II (Yoshihisa Godo, 2001).  
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brings higher incomes (Goldin & Katz, 2008, p. 16), because including females in the 
education system significantly enlarges the base of the skilled-labour force. Including 
females into the formal education system in the Republican era profoundly changed the 
way that people were employed in the labour market. 
 
Females had long been missing from the government sector in Imperial China; hence, 
traditional education system, the foremost purpose of which was to select bureaucrats 
for the Imperial Court, had no reason to include women. Before the inception of the 
modern education system, almost all Chinese females were either home-educated or not 
formally educated at all.95 When these barriers were gradually removed after 1905 with 
the ending of the civil service exams, the rise of educational institutions for females 
began (Keenan, 1994, p. 3).  
 
In terms of institutional setup, educational opportunities in China became more and 
more gender neutral (Huaxing Li, 1997, pp. 74-118; Lu, 1934, p. 42). In 1908, the 
Ministry of Education promulgated statutes which allowed for the establishment of 
normal schools and primary schools, specifically for girls (X. Wang, 1934) and in 1912 
fully functional coeducational schools began to be built. From the available records, it 
appears that the share of female students attending senior primary school was 6.34 
percent in 1923 and by 1930 the figure had doubled, reaching 15 percent (Huaxing Li, 
1997, p. 729). More systematic records regarding the narrowing gender gap were 
documented for secondary schools, as displayed in Table 2.9. After 1916, the number of 
female students attending secondary school began to rise at an unanticipated pace such 
that the male/female student ratio fell from 79 in 1912 to 7 in 1929 and continued to 
fall, finally reaching 3 in 1946. With such an exceptionally rapid rise of female students 
in secondary education, the progress in primary education must have been even better, 
given that the graduation rate for male students in primary schools is normally higher 
than for female students.  
 
Two patterns are worth highlighting here. First, the private sector contributed more in 
promoting equal gender education opportunities. The pioneers in educating women in 
                                                 
95 Not all women were illiterate, of course, least of all those from gentry families. Such women would 
perhaps have had the chance to receive home education in Chinese literature and female ethics. However, 
in traditional China even this type of training was not available for girls in the lower social classes. 
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China were Western missionaries (Lu, 1934).96 A great number of missionary schools 
exclusively for girls were opened in quick succession in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. 
Another important force was the rising number of domestic private girls’ schools. By 
1907, 428 girls’ schools had been established of which more than half were private. 
Furthermore, such a respectable achievement was largely thanks to the spread of normal 
schools. 97 Since the cost of receiving normal education was substantially less than that 
of general education and also since it guaranteed job opportunities after graduation, one 
of the most popular career choices for ‘new women’ through the first half of the 20th 
century was to become a teacher after attending a normal school. 98 
 
Table 2.7: Male/Female student ratio in secondary schools (1912-1946) 
Year 
Female students Male students 
number Percentage (%) number Percentage (%) 
1912 677 0.01 51423 0.99 
1913 470 0.01 57510 0.99 
1914 956 0.01 66298 0.99 
1915 948 0.01 68822 0.99 
1916 724 0.01 60200 0.99 
1922 3249 0.03 100136 0.97 
1929 33073 0.13 215595 0.87 
1930 59939 0.15 337009 0.85 
1933 73667 0.18 342281 0.82 
1946 379087 0.26 1106060 0.75 
     *Source: (Yang, 1934, p. 194) 
 
4. Funding modern schools 
 
Given the fact that both the Qing and Republican regimes faced high fiscal pressure, 
how did these financially needy governments generate sufficient revenue to support 
education? To answer this question, this section first outlines the Chinese fiscal system 
                                                 
96 In 1844, Miss Aldersey established the first mission schools specifically for girls in Ningbo. 
97 The proportion of females in secondary schools did not exceed 4% before 1930, but the girls accounted 
for about 18% of normal school students (equivalent to secondary school) (Tao, 1923, p. 4).  
98 To attract more students, those who enrolled in normal schools were exempt from paying tuition fees, 
while their cost of living was also covered by public funding; in recompense, after graduation, they had to 
serve at least three years in a local primary school (Huaxing Li, 1997, pp. 512-513).  
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before disclosing how tax revenues were generated at each level of government to 
support the development of modern schooling.  
 
4.1 Weak fiscal capacity and the implicit fiscal relationship in China  
Understanding the fiscal system is a serious challenge, because the financial structure of 
government as a whole through this period is difficult to trace. A detailed study of the 
evolution of the fiscal system is beyond the scope of this thesis, but some brief remarks 
about its basic features is more than necessary to understand how the public schools 
were funded. In short, from the late Qing to the early Republican eras, China’s political 
authorities remained unable to gain control over substantial financial resources.  
 
According to Confucian ideals of statecraft, the state intended to impose only a very 
limited economic burden on it population (P. Kuhn & Jones, 1978). In addition, owing 
to high agency cost and the fear of exacerbating bureaucratic expropriation, Imperial 
China, as many scholars emphasise, had long maintained an extremely low level of 
taxation (Brandt et al., 2014; K. G. Deng, 2011, pp. 16-18; Sng & Moriguchi, 2014). 
More importantly, the weak fiscal capacity of the state continued from the Qing and the 
whole Republican eras before 1937, the time period under discussion (T. Rawski, 1989, 
pp. 31-32).  
 
The most striking feature of central-local fiscal relations during the Qing and early 
Republican era was the absence of a clear separation of sources of revenue between 
different levels of the administration and the ‘communist’ attitude to finance between 
various governments in China(C. S. Li, 1922, pp. 59-60). Local government functioned 
as a state agency for  collecting tax revenues on behalf of the central state; apart from a 
minimal amount retained to support basic government operations, most of the tax 
revenue was remitted to the provincial level and then to central government (Marianne, 
1985; D. Zelin, 1984, pp. 26-62). Such implicit regulation attracted heated contention 
over the vertical division of tax revenues. There were many attempts to streamline the 
tax division among different tiers of government after the late Qing.99 Beginning with 
                                                 
99 In 1913, the Ministry of Finance drafted a revenue separation bill to be enacted by the first parliament 
of the Republic of China; however, such an attempt was disrupted by the unexpected seizing of power 
from Yuan Shih-Kai and the dissolution of parliament. Even though such a draft never became a law in 
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the fiscal reform in 1909 and through successive legislations, the government did 
specify distinct sources for central government and provincial government revenues.100 
However, the source of revenue for county and sub-county government remained 
unclear (Duara, 1988, p. 66; C. S. Li, 1922, pp. 701-791). 
 
Because the division of tax revenues was already far from clear on paper, the challenge 
was multiplied in reality. Before 1937, land tax was the chief source of revenue for the 
government (S. Liu, 1935; Shaw, 1926, p. 173). The basic land tax was shared by the 
central state and provincial government.101 In addition, the central government enjoyed 
other stable tax sources, such as maritime customs duties and salt taxes (Sheridan, 1977, 
p. 199); while provincial government tightly controlled Likin, which constituted one of 
the most lucrative sources of revenue for the provincial treasury(Yi Xu, 2009). 102  Last, 
county government possessed minimum de jure power over tax revenues, largely 
relying on the levy of prolific surtax through the tax collection process.103 Thereby, the 
collection of surtaxes and commercial taxes by county and sub-county governments for 
local purposes, in our case spending on local education, became more and more 
prevalent during the Republican period (Chauncey, 1992; C. S. Li, 1922; Remick, 2004, 
pp. 33-35). 
 
4.2 Educational Finance  
As regards educational finance in particular, the state set out the lowest permissible 
standard of educational development for local authorities; local educational officers had 
                                                                                                                                               
the latter Republican era, a wave of regulations were issued to compile budgets for different levels of 
government (C. S. Li, 1922, pp. 75-77). 
100 Under the Beiyang government, several edicts were issued on the separation of tax revenues between 
central and provincial government. Accordingly, land tax, salt lax, maritime custom duties, inland custom 
duties, tea tax, business license tax, etc. yielded revenues under the National treasury; while surtaxes on 
the land tax, trade tax, livestock tax, rental duties and so on belonged to the provincial treasury (C. S. Li, 
1922). 
101 The sharing ratio between central and provincial government was far from clear, and the real figure 
largely depended on the circumstances.  
102 The Likin (厘金), was a form of internal tariff, which was first introduced as a means of financing the 
locally armies recruited to suppress the Taiping Rebellion. It then constituted one of the most important 
sources of revenue for provincial government. Likin became a major tax item from 1860 and was 
especially lucrative in such economically advanced provinces as Jiangsu. It remained widespread  and 
was abolished only in 1931(Yi Xu, 2009).   
103 In theory, the county government was only attached to the provincial government, and therefore had  
little fiscal capacity. However, the collection procedure was carried out by the county governments; 
therefore, they could easily return the base land tax to the province, but levy surcharges for their own use 
through the same process. 
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discretion over decisions to provide more than the minimum. Unfortunately, both the 
Qing Court and the Republican government failed to offer clear guidance on how 
revenues were to be generated to achieve the set goals.104 
 
Central level  
At the central level, the National Board of Education depended mainly on tax revenues 
that went to the National Treasury. However, the lack of any remittance from provincial 
powers, the enormous burden of paying for war indemnities and the primacy of military 
spending in government budgets meant that the central state experienced severe fiscal 
difficulties. The share in government expenditure taken by the educational budget to 
support tertiary schooling was a small, never exceeding 4 percent of the total.  
 
Table 2.8: Education and military expenditure in central government expenditure  
Year 1913 1916 1919 1925 1930 1935 1937 1940 1943 1945 
Education 1.08 1.06 1.32 1.22 2.04 3.7 1.71 2.19 2 1.84 
Military 26.9 31.6 43.8 46.9 45.5 34.9 66 72.1 67.8 84.9 
 *Source: The China Yearbook for the above years  
 
Provincial level 
China during the first half of the 20th century collapsed into a state of political and 
military tension between a number of provincial military cliques. Consequently, the 
central problem of educational funding encountered at provincial levels was also due to 
high military expenditure. The figure varied significantly across provinces, but almost 
all provincial governments considered their priority to be the certainty of enough to 
spend on warfare, leaving little funding for other public goods, including uninterrupted 
investment in schooling.105  
                                                 
104 For instance, the Qing Ministry of Education (xuebu) set liberal standards for local authorities in 1904: 
one tertiary school in each provincial capital, one secondary school in each prefecture, and one higher 
primary school in each county (Yang, 1934). Under the Republicans, the scenario remained similar, even 
though the responsibility for each tier of government became more distinctly defined by newly-issued 
statutes. The state specified that the responsibility for constructing higher primary schools was up to the 
county government, while the lower primary schools were the responsibility of townships and villages 
(Yang, 1934). Secondary education continued to come under the provincial government and tertiary 
education under the central government.  
105 Cases of defalcation for military purposes were commonly seen. For instance, in 1924, the provincial 
government of Zhili controlled by Wu Peifu, misappropriated educational funds for the purpose of 
financing the second Zhili-Fengtian war, which directly led to a large number of schools being abandoned 
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Unfortunately, annual information on provincial budgets is not available. For 1933, 
however, we have rich data documenting provincial educational expenditure. On 
average, 12.44 percent of the income of the provincial budget was used on education, 
which was higher than the proportion used by the central government; whereas the 
regional dispersion was large. Anhui Province spent 24.15 percent of its revenues on 
supporting educational development, while for some remote provinces, such as Qinghai 
and Guizhou, the shares were only 4.97 percent and 6.93 percent respectively  
(Quanguo Jiaoyu Jingfei Tongji 1932-1933 (The national educaitonal finance 1932-
1933) 1937, p. 21). As suggested by the educational regulations, provincial 
governments mainly undertook the responsibility for secondary education, which 
occupied 47.2 percent of provincial budgets; while 20 percent was allocated to tertiary 
schooling and only 13.6 percent for primary schooling (Quanguo Jiaoyu Jingfei Tongji 
1932-1933 (The national educaitonal finance 1932-1933) 1937, p. 23).  
 
Local level106 
As noted in the Education Act 1904, 1912 and the later revised clause of the Primary 
Education Act 1915, it is clear that the county and sub-county governments were 
supposed to collect enough funds to support primary education (F. Wang, 1994, pp. 
441-517). However, both county government and sub-county communities were in low 
financial circumstances, as discussed above. Their budgets could not be met solely 
through public efforts and relied on a combination of funds from various sources: local 
taxes, rents from public lands, donations from the local wealthy elite, as well as parental 
contributions (tuition fees). Accordingly, the main revenue for county budgets came 
from surcharges on tax, land tax in particular(S. Liu, 1935, pp. 159-194).   
 
In 1933, based on education reports for 7 provinces, we find 74.9 percent of the 
eudcation revenues at county level coming from surcharges on tax107; surchages on land 
                                                                                                                                               
and a 500,000 drop in school enrolments (Huaxing Li, 1997, p. 539). A similar story is observed in Fujian 
province, where due to grave arrears of educational funding from the provincial budget, school teachers 
went on long strikes. Similar scenarios were seen in many provinces, such as Hunan, Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu. 
106 A more detailed analysis on local level educational finance is made in Chapter 4, focusing on the rise 
of primary schooling.  
107 The dmminant surcharges were on land tax. When the new Republican regime was established, land 
tax was composed only  the three charges that made up the base tax of land tax (zhengliang). However, 
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tax alone accounted for 47.25 percent of the revenue (Quanguo Jiaoyu Jingfei Tongji 
1932-1933 (The national educaitonal finance 1932-1933) 1937, p. 108). Other 
compelling evidence lies in more than 400 county government balance sheets on 
educational finance in the 1930s that have been collected in the present study. As Table 
2.4 shows, the county budget for primary education came at this time from two main 
sources, namely, tax surcharges (land tax as a whole) and revenues generated from 
endowed school land. 
 
Table 2.9: Sources of the revenue for primary education (county) 
  All Hubei Shandong Henan Zhili Jiangsu 
Various surcharges 63.7 41.49 70.4 76.7 59.62 70.29 
     surtax on land tax 40.61 21.94 62.3 51.8 26.43 -- 
*Note: 
 In the 1930s, a number of provinces published government reports on education enclosing statistics 
at county level, but the informativeness of these reports differs significantly across provinces. Of the 
provincial reports that I collected from archive, 108  five carefully document the source and 
composition of educational income. The above table presents information for the provinces of 
Hubei, Zhili, Jiangsu, Shandong and Henan, 423 counties in total. 
*Sources:  
(Quanguo Jiaoyu Jingfei Tongji 1932-1933 (The national educaitonal finance 1932-1933) 1937, pp. 
105-109) 
(Shandongsheng Gexian Difang shibaniandu Jiaoyu Jingfei Suiruiyilanbiao (County balance sheets 
for education in Shangdong Province across counties, 1929) 1930) 
(Hunansheng Zuijin Geniandu Shengshixianqu Jiaoyu Jingfei Diaocha Tongji (The county-level 
reports on education finance of Hunan Province), 1933) 
(Hebeisheng Gexian Putong Jiaoyu Gailan (The county-level reports for general edcuation in Hebei 
province), 1928) 
(Henan jiaoyu yianjian (The Education Yearbook of Henan province), 1930; Jiangsu Jiaoyu Gailan 
(The education reports for Jiangsu province), 1933) 
  
 
The fiscal burden of building up modern primary schools was not only laid upon county 
governments, but also drained the resources of sub-county communities. These grass-
roots governing entities bore a double burden: paying new taxes to fund the new 
                                                                                                                                               
after warlord politics developed, surcharges were added to land tax and collected for the county budget. 
In most cases, the surcharges on land tax even exceeded the base tax. The best illustration comes from the 
infamous Sichuan province. We observe that in some counties, such as Wan County, surcharges were 30 
times higher than the basic land tax (Sun, 1935, pp. 213-217). 
108 To my knowledge, 11 provinces published similar education reports in 1930s, in response to a  request 
from central government. 
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governmental schools located in the county seat; and bearing the costs of establishing 
and managing the modest lower-primary schools that at the time outnumbered every 
other kind of educational institution in China teaching lower-primary age children 
(VanderVen, 2005, pp. 204-235). In the absence of any formal taxing authority for 
townships and village governments, rural communities had to find the money wherever 
they could. These local primary schools relied on a combination of sources, including 
community funds, individual donations and tuition fees. This practice appears to have 
been common across early-20th century China.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The discontinuation of the civil service examination in 1905 officially marked the 
advent of the modern schooling system in China. The new education model contained 
three main features. First, the new education system intended to make schooling 
extensively available to the whole population; and for this reason the system was largely 
public. The state was more supportive towards primary education and the private sector 
was allowed to play a greater role in providing higher level, or more elite education. 
Second, the education content was radically transformed, from focusing only on the 
Confucian classics to a new and vigorous curriculum of Western subjects; in the same 
vein, the new curriculum also emphasised an ideological campaign aimed at the whole 
population. Last, this new education system was crafted as a highly decentralised 
structure, the degree of decentralisation being highest at primary level.  
 
This new education system was modern, public and expensive; as a result, the first and 
most important task was to raise funds for the increasing number of modern schools. 
With a weak fiscal capacity and vaguely regulated fiscal relationships, each level of 
government showed its prowess and grabbed whatever it could lay its hands on; in the 
melee, not only were legitimate tax revenues mobilised, but also a pool of countless 
surtaxes, commercial fees, collectively owned endowments and private contributions to 
pay for the new education system.   
 
Along these main features, a number of outstanding improvements took place in 
subsequent decades, thanks to this educational movement. The four major areas of 
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progress were: (i) the shift from informal schooling to formal education; (ii) the 
absolute dominance of public schools in the education sector; (iii) significant 
improvement in curriculum design; and (iv) equal educational opportunities for both 
genders.  
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Chapter 3 : Long-term Trends in Schooling: Measuring 
educational development  
 
We have seen in the preceding discussion that a brand new education system was set up 
at the turn of 20th century. In order to assess the spread of modern schooling, the 
quantitative dimensions of this educational development will be presented in this 
chapter. Long-term estimates of China’s educational growth in the first half of the 20th 
century, in terms either of flow variables or stock measures, are extremely rare. This 
paucity of empirical analyses can mainly be attributed to the lack of census data. Most 
of the existing literature focuses on the post-reform period, leaving us with very little 
knowledge about how much education actually grew before 1949. In this chapter, on the 
basis of various measurements, we try to plot a general trajectory of the educational 
growth of China from the dawn of the 20th century onward. 
 
Human capital was created through both formal and informal education; therefore, 
indicators which try to capture the education received by people are also often treated as 
proxies for human capital (Wößmann, 2000). Scholars have explored a variety of 
indicators to quantify the level of human capital across regions and over time. In the 
extensive literature are three widely used categories of measurement, namely, literacy 
rates (or numeracy rates), gross enrolment ratios for different schooling levels, and 
educational attainment (or average years of schooling). The former two refer to flows of 
investment in education, while the last captures the stock of human capital.  
 
The global view holds that there are huge differences in educational development across 
countries; whether measured by enrolment rate, educational attainment, or quality of 
schooling. By the early 20th century, some nations, led by the US and Prussia, had 
already achieved universal primary schooling, while other nations, such as China, had 
only begun to establish a first national education system. The ‘Great Divergence’ in 
terms of education has been so huge that, by 1860, the primary enrolment rates in the 
US had reached 70 percent (Goldin, 2015) This figure went on rising and hit the figure 
of 90.6 percent in 1880 (Lindert, 2004a, p. 91), a level realised by China only after 110 
years – around the 1990s.  
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This chapter aims to address two questions: i). How quickly and widely did the modern 
education system spread? ii) Was there a steady increase in human capital? Since no 
perfect indicator exists, this chapter starts with an overview of the changing trend in 
literacy rates, providing a basic picture of the education level through the first half of 
the 20th century. Then estimates of gross enrolment ratios for each level of education are 
presented, to directly reflect the expansion of formal schooling. The last section turns to 
a widely used educational stock indicator – average years of schooling – to further 
demonstrate the human capital development in China. Finally, to put China into 
perspective, we draw international comparisons based on each indicator.  
 
1. Measuring Literacy Rates in early 20th century China 
 
The literacy rate measures the proportion of population with the ability to read and 
write. 109 This indicator captures the very first part of the investment made in education 
and neglects further investment, which could generate higher levels of cognitive ability, 
skills and knowledge beyond basic literacy; consequently, it reflects only a small 
component of human capital, providing no more than a lower benchmark for measuring 
overall educational achievement. Nonetheless, in pre-modern societies where a very 
limited number of people receive education, the literacy rate offers a crucial clue to the 
spread of basic education across the population; at the same time, for the sake of 
simplicity and data availability, the literacy rate tends to be observable well before other 
sophisticated measurements appear. In the same vein we could count numeracy rates, 
which reflect people’s ability to apply simple numerical concepts, as an alternative 
proxy for the basic level of human capital; many studies suggest that numeracy rates are 
highly correlated with literacy rates (A'Hearn, Baten, & Crayen, 2009).  
 
Through the early 20th century, China, with no national census data, provides the main 
only information on its literacy rates from a number of social surveys, conducted as part 
                                                 
109 Ways of defining a person as literate or not are also ambiguous. Quoted in UNESCO, Gray offers a 
definition of a literate person as one ‘who has acquired the knowledge and skills in reading and writing, 
which enable him to engage effectively in all those activities in which literacy is normally assumed in his 
culture or group’ (Gray, 1957). In practice, for many historical studies on pre-modern societies, the 
people who can sign their names can be easily distinguished as the literate ones.  
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of the rise of ‘investigative modalities’ in pursuit of a ‘culture of fact’ (Lam, 2011). 110 
In this section, we gather circumstantial evidence on the literacy rates in China between 
the late 19th century and the first few decades of the 20th century. Drawing on existing 
micro-level surveys and case studies, this section sketches a general picture of the 
changing trajectory of national literacy rates from the late 19th century onward.  
 
Late Qing (1840-1911) 
As a starting point, it is critical to pin down Chinese literacy rates in the late Qing 
period as a benchmark. Many historical narratives suggest that Imperial China already 
possessed a highly literate population, but very few provide concrete evidence to 
support this claim. Based on Maritime Customs Reports, Perkins estimates that less than 
50 percent of males over school age in 1880s could be regarded as literate (D. H. 
Perkins, 1975, p. 4). Similarly, in her landmark book on education in the Qing dynasty, 
Rawski argues that basic education, mainly in an informal and traditional format, was 
under the rule of the Qing diffused nationwide, resulting in a high literacy rate. She 
points out that, even though the variation could be remarkably large across regions and 
between genders, a rough guess at the literacy rate during the late Qing might be 30 
percent to 45 percent for males and 2 percent to 10 percent for females (E. Rawski, 
1979, pp. 8-23).  
 
If these figures are valid, then China had a very similar level of literacy rate to late 
Tokugawa Japan, where the rate for men was estimated at 40-50 percent, and for 
women 13-17 percent (Ohkawa & Rosovsky, 1973, p. 8). This suggests that, before the 
20th century, in these terms China was comparable to Japan. 111  However, the gap 
widened quickly after Japan’s economic take-off under full-scale Westernization, with 
the Japanese literacy rate reaching 45 percent in 1890 (Luween & Foldvari, 2008). If we 
bring European nations into the comparison, China’s achievement in this area before the 
20th century is much less impressive. Most Western European nations and the USA 
experienced a remarkable rise in literacy as early as 1500; indeed, before 1900, 
probably 80 percent of Americans could be regarded as literate (the number stands at 90 
                                                 
110 In social science, a foremost important methodology – the collection of empirical facts – came to 
China relatively late, only after the late 19th century when China was exposed to Western culture as well 
as its academic environment.  
111 The attempt to modernise the country following the Western model occurred in Japan in the 1860s, i.e. 
a few decades earlier than in China.  
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percent if whites alone are included) (Black & Sokoloff, 2006); and the ratios was 88 
percent in Germany, 77 percent in the UK and 70 percent in France (Green, 1990, p. 
33). Apparently, China, and all East Asia, lagged well behind the West in offering broad 
access to basic schooling. 
 
In contrast to studies of literacy rates, Baten et al. find that given the low income level, 
the numeracy in Imperial China was intriguingly high (Morgan, Baten, Ma, & Wang, 
2009). According to the calculations of Morgan et al., from 1820 to 1920, numeracy 
among the Chinese was on a par with numeracy in the UK and France; moreover, it was 
much higher than that of India or Turkey. If we do not point fingers at the pragmatic 
bias age-heaping index, 112 this finding demonstrates the possibility that basic education 
was already widespread in China before the advent of the modern schooling system.  
 
In the same vein, some historians have documented the prevalence during the Qing 
dynasty of written communication of all kinds in hiring labour, renting property, 
spreading news and even in binding marriages, in remote rural societies as well as 
towns and cities (E. Rawski, 1979, pp. 9-13; M. Zelin, 1994). Such a high incidence of 
written contracts, advertisements and news indicates a large proportion of readers dating 
from the 18th century.  
 
Republican Era (1911-1948) 
Did the formation and the spread of modern education from the 20th century onward in 
China actually raise the literacy rate? In his important book on China, Chien indicates 
that the literacy rate in the Republican era stood at 70 percent, which seems a 
considerable jump above the figure in the late 19th century; unfortunately he offers no 
compelling explanation for this figure (Chien, 1950, p. 13). Between 1918 and 1919, 
Gamble and Burgess conducted an extensive survey in the city of Beijing; their results 
show that only 16 percent of its residents could not read. Adjusting for missing data, the 
literacy rate that they report corresponds to Chien’s figure – about 70 percent literacy 
(Gamble & Burgess, 1921, p. 507). This result is confirmed by John Buck’s study. Buck 
carried out one of the most comprehensive large-scale individual surveys in China 
                                                 
112 Many critics have doubted whether the measure of the age-heaping index can be considered a good 
indicator of the numeracy rate. One possible explanation for the fact that the Chinese were less able to 
round up their age to the nearest 0 or 5 is a link to the tradition of the Chinese zodiac, which made it 
easier for the Chinese to remember their exact age.  
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through the 1930s. Compared with  every other researcher in this field, he presents 
exceptionally detailed records on Canton, one of the most important commercial urban 
areas and international trade centres in China throughout this period; the literacy rate in 
urban Canton that he reports is as high as 80-90 percent (Buck, 1937). Even though both 
studies focus on metropolitan areas only, these figures demonstrate a fairly high level of 
human capital in China, by any standard; more importantly, it indicates a pronounced 
increase in the literacy rate from the late 19th century to the 1930s.  
 
Exactly opposite evidence, however, can also be found in the existing literature. For 
instance, another important study by Gamble and Burgess, which was conducted in a 
model county of Zhili Province - Ting county – finds that in the 1930s only 20 percent 
of the population over six years old could be counted as literate. Breaking down this 
number, only about one third of males were literate, while 3 percent of females were 
able to read and write (Gamble, 1954, p. 185). Moreover, Buck studied regions far 
beyond Canton, and the results derived from pooling data for different regions together 
suggest that 45 percent of all males over 7 years of age had received some schooling, or 
could be considered literate. This scattered set of  estimates shows no marked rise 
compared to the level of the literacy rate through the late Qing period. How should we 
interpret such different results for the same period? For both views to hold, the only 
plausible explanation is that there was a high level of regional dispersion in the literary 
rates across China at the time.   
 
Instead of drawing evidence from contemporary social survey data, another way to 
measure the literacy rate for the first half of the 20th century is to get the estimate for the 
following period, and then project the result backwards. The first population census 
after the Communist party came to power was conducted in 1953; unfortunately, it does 
not include information on literacy. The second was in 1964 and documents a literacy 
rate in China of 66 percent. Given that the massive campaign on ‘eliminating illiteracy 
in rural China was undertaken in the 1950s’, 113 most scholars believe that the literacy 
                                                 
113 Under the rule of Mao, a large-scale education movement was set in motion throughout the country to 
eliminate illiteracy. The efforts were not limited to schools, but went far beyond formal educational 
institutions – classes for adults as well as children, for males and also females were held inside and 
outside schools. Different formats for informal training schools, adult schools, short-term schools and 
part-time schools emerged to teach people basic reading and writing skills and impart some knowledge of 
the new regime. Almost the entire nation was involved in this mass education movement: government 
offices, factories, urban committees and villages all held different kinds of study sessions for their people 
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rate soared dramatically between 1950 and 1960. This implies that literacy rate 
preceding 1949 would have been well below 66 percent.  
 
In a nutshell, the scattered and circumstantial evidence make it difficult to provide any 
conclusive claim about the levels of literacy between the late 19th century and the early 
20th century. But there are a few points we can be quite certain about; first, literacy 
increased after the late 19th century. The proportion rose from less than 50 percent to 
close to two-thirds. Moreover, the regional gaps in literacy rates were noticeably wide, 
in particular the urban/rural differences. In some major urban centres, the literacy rates 
shot up, reaching so high a level that universal literacy, for men at least, came very 
close; whereas in remote and rural areas, literacy rates remained remarkably low just as 
they had in many pre-modern societies. Last but not least, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
the rising literacy in China from the 20th century onward was largely attributed to the 
radical improvement of equalising educational opportunities for women. 
 
2. Measuring gross enrolment ratios for 20th century China 
 
The most commonly seen and widely cited indicator for the quantity of formal 
schooling is the gross enrolment ratio. It estimates the share of students enrolled at a 
schooling level relative to the total population of similar age; it therefore explicitly 
reflects the schooling attainment of a population.  
 
Gross enrolment ratio is defined by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics as enrolments at 
a given level of schooling divided by the population of the official age range associated 
with this level of education.  
𝑒𝑔 =
𝐸𝑔
𝑃𝑔
                     (3.1) 
In Equation (3.1), Eg is the enrolment (the number of students enrolled) at schooling 
level g and Pg is the total population of the age group that national regulations require 
to be enrolled at grade level g. It should be noted that, according to the formula, the 
gross enrolment ratio is calculated by taking all the people enrolled at a certain level of 
education nominated by the population who belong to this age cohort. Given the 
                                                                                                                                               
(T. H.-e. Chen, 1974, pp. 18-51). If we do not cite figures on the quality of the education, at least the 
regime can be credited with the achievement of raising the literacy rate in China through this period.  
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existence of under- and over-aged students, gross enrolment ratios may possibly exceed 
100 percent. 
 
One particular strength of gross enrolment ratios as an indicator lies in their 
accessibility and availability. Enrolment records are usually abundant in most societies, 
because international organisations such as the World Bank, national statistical bureaus 
for any given country and local statistical departments across the globe collect annual 
series for political purposes. 114  Moreover, when collecting figures on enrolment, 
education reports often enclose relevant data on the number of schoolhouses, teaching 
staff and educational expenditure. This rich information allows scholars to measure the 
size of the formal schooling sector from different standpoints. Another reason why the 
gross enrolment ratio is exceptionally popular in academic studies is that enrolment data 
constitutes the starting point for almost every other more demanding estimate of 
educational stock, such as average years of schooling, which can be derived from the 
series of long-term enrolment ratios. Finally, as the most standardised and widely used 
indicators for education quantity, gross enrolment ratios have been estimated in many 
studies across the world, which facilitates global comparisons of educational progress.  
 
Notwithstanding all the virtues of enrolment ratios as a measure of educational 
attainment, they have several possible defects that may cause problems in measuring 
Chinese educational progress. First, in common with most studies targeting developing 
countries, the central challenge lies in ‘the population risk’. In earlier historical periods, 
as well as for developing countries, a figure for the total population is rare, let alone a 
valid school-age cohort population (Benavot & Riddle, 1988). The imperfect 
demographic data documenting a detailed breakdown by age group prevents us from 
estimating the school-age population precisely. The tremendous challenge is further 
multiplied when the eligible age group for each level of education changes over time, 
because of changes in official regulations regarding the entrance age and length of any 
given level of education. 115  Furthermore, besides the main concern over ‘the risk 
population’, there are other reasons to question the quality of historical enrolment 
                                                 
114 The enrolment ratio is very sensitive to exogenous factors, such as changes in the educational system 
or the fiscal budget; therefore, governments tend to document information on enrolment.  
115 For details on changes of length and the entry age for each level of education over time, please refer to 
Table 2.4.: structure of education, in Chapter Two. 
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records documented in government reports. Some of these problems are minor, while 
others are more substantial. Enrolment figures are not necessarily equal to attendance, 
and according to historical accounts in Europe through the comparable period, 
attendance rates tend to be 15-30 percent lower than the corresponding enrolment rates 
(Benavot & Riddle, 1988). This problem could be quite severe in China during the first 
half of the 20th century, in particular during the agricultural harvest season.116  The 
accuracy of ‘bottom-up’ enrolment figures is doubtful. For instance, the universal truth 
about government reports is that local government tends to over-report performance, in 
order to demonstrate its good government and to attract more subsidies. In the Chinese 
context from 1900 to the 1930s, this kind of bias could be relatively small in its context, 
given the weak supervision and limited subsidies from the upper tier of government. 
 
2.1 Expansion of primary schooling 
China was far from achieving universal literacy in the early 20th century. The  rise of 
primary education therefore held exceptional importance throughout this period. This 
section estimates how much primary education progressed through the first half of the 
20th century, for both the modern and traditional tracks of ‘primary schooling’. 
 
2.1.1 Modern track of primary schooling 
Before 1900, the only areas of the world where most of the school-age children had 
access to primary education were the United States, Canada, Prussia and Scandinavia. 
Universal primary schooling was eventually achieved in other Western European 
nations and Japan after the beginning of the 20th century  (Benavot & Riddle, 1988; 
Easterlin, 1981; Lindert, 2004a; Mitch, 2013). Compared to the extensive literature on 
the developed world, studies estimating Chinese historical educational enrolment ratios 
are scarce, as few resources have survived the ravages of time. Benavot provides three 
aggregate estimates; the primary enrolment ratio for China in the 1920s was 4.5 percent 
                                                 
116 The government had detailed regulations on term lengths and attendance times. For instance, 1st 
August was the start of every academic year, which was broken up into three terms. The summer vacation 
lasted between 30 and 50 days. The winter holiday and spring breaks were regulated at 7 days each, and 
should not exceed 14 days. For rural primary schools, according to social norms,  extra breaks could be 
granted in autumn through the harvest season (F. Wang, 1994, pp. 63-64). However, the attendance 
figures in practice must be unimaginable. Concerning the highly agrarian nature of China’s economy, 
attendance rates would probably have dropped sharply during busy seasons for farming, such as autumn 
harvest-times. 
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and the figure rose to 10.3 percent and 12.4 percent for the 1930s and 1940s 
respectively (Benavot & Riddle, 1988). Recently, Chaudhary et al. have reported that in 
1900 only 4 percent of the Chinese school-age cohort was enrolled in modern primary 
schools, which includes only the national enrolment figure from the first education 
yearbook published in 1907 and simply applies the figure of 15% of the population as 
the school-age group (Chaudhary, Musacchio, Nafziger, & Yan, 2012) .117  
 
Figure 3.1: Gross enrolment rates in modern primary education, 1900-2005 
 
  *Source: i. enrolment data: Chinese Yearbooks on Education in corresponding years. 
                 ii. Population and age structure: (Hou, 2001) 
 
In 1878, the first Chinese primary school in the modern sense was established in 
Shanghai (Yang, 1934, p. 421); 118 from this date China’s  modern primary schools 
began to flourish. The most drastic development on the journey towards universal 
primary education took place in 1915, when compulsory education was legislated, 
oblige children to attend at least 4 years of lower primary schooling (F. Wang, 1994, pp. 
460-468). Even though such a policy was too ambitious at the time to achieve, modern 
primary schooling spread more quickly afterwards. The number of primary schools was 
only 173 in 1902 but it grew by 1850-fold in the following few decades, to 320086 in 
                                                 
117 This chapter shows a slightly lower primary enrolment ratio than that of Chaudhary et al. (Chaudhary 
et al., 2012); because they apply 15% of the population as the school-age group in China; while we apply 
both age-groups, 6-11 and 5-14. as our population nominators.  
118 In 1878, China’s first modern primary school (Zhengmeng School) was established in Shanghai by 
Huanlun Zhang.  
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1936, the eve of the breakout of Japan’s full-scale invasion of China,119 illustrating the 
marked expansion of primary education over the early 20th century.  
 
Figure 3.1 displays the changing trends of primary enrolment ratios throughout the 20th 
century and, according to official regulations regarding the pupil’s school-age group, we 
employ 6-11 as the eligible age range for primary education. Data on primary enrolment 
ratios in China through the first half of the 20th century, together with comparable data 
for the United States, Japan120 and India are reported in Table 3.1. One point that should 
needs to be stressed here is that, unlike the data presented in Figure 3.1, to facilitate 
cross-country comparison, a broader school-age band (5-14) is adopted in this table;121 
the numbers set out in Table 3.1, should therefore be regarded as a lower bound for the 
accrued enrolment ratio in China. 
 
According to Figure 3.1, at the beginning of the 20th century, the primary enrolment 
ratios stood at about 1 percent (2 percent), 122 leaving a wide gap between China and its 
counterparts.123 But it rose rapidly in the proceeding decades and hit 17 (27 percent)124 
on the eve of the Japanese invasion in 1937; the expansion of its primary education in 
the three decades was so successful that its primary enrolment ratio outstripped India’s 
(11 percent) and at least rivalled Brazil’s (21 percent) (Lindert, 2004a, pp. 91-93) . 
 
Unfortunately, the noticeable rise of primary schooling was interrupted by the 
catastrophic upheaval of the 1937 invasion, which was then followed by a 4-year civil 
war between the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party. Illustrated in Figure 2.1, 
                                                 
119 The national figures on enrolment after 1937 are highly doubtful. Since the National Government kept 
losing control over territories to Japan, they were unlikely to receive educational reports with the same 
geographic coverage as had been sent before the war. To avoid the complexity relating to data quality 
caused by the major warfare, even though we present data series covering the wartime period, this study 
focuses mostly on the years before 1937.  
120 Between the 19th and early 20th centuries, all other Asian nations were under Western regimes, most of 
which promoted a modern educational system. Only three nations in Asia were not completely colonised: 
Japan, Thailand and China.  
121  Since regulations regarding the school-age population differed across countries, to make the 
comparison easier, many studies in calculating primary enrolment ratios adopt the age range of 5-14 as 
their school-age population nominator.     
122 The figures outside parentheses are the ones calculated by applying the 5-14 age cohort as the school-
age population for primary schooling; whereas the figures in parentheses are the ones reached by applying 
6-11 as the age group for primary schooling.  
123 China’s unusually low enrolment ratio in primary schooling is caused by the fact that the modern 
formal education system in China was established much later than in other developing countries. The 
process started only at the turn of the 20th century in China, whereas for the nations colonised by the 
West, the modern education system was established by government in the early 19th century. 
124 As noted in footnote 122  
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the enrolment ratio dropped sharply, falling to 12 percent (19 percent)125 after 1937 and 
the ratio recovered slowly after this. The level before the war was not regained until 
1947.  
 
Table 3.1: Modern Primary Enrolment Ratios, per 1000 population (5-14) 
Year China Year India Japan 
United 
States 
1907 12 1890 44 370 971 
1912 33 1900 47 507 939 
1915 47 1910 65 599 975 
1922 72 1920 80 602 924 
1930 119 1930 113 609 921 
1949 214 1950     
 
*Source: 
i.For China, the enrolment data comes from Yearbooks on Education in corresponding years; 
and population and age structure is from (Hou, 2001). 
 ii: For the United States, India and Japan come from ((Lindert, 2004a, pp. 91-93)). 
*Note:  
For primary schooling, the schooling age population refers to children are between 5 and 14 
years old.  
 
 
Even though not the focus of this study, it is worthwhile to briefly outline the general 
trajectory of primary schooling after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, a huge jump occurred in the primary enrolment ratio 
in the early days of Mao’s leadership. This remarkable achievement can in part be 
attributed to the efforts of the new Communist government in providing equal 
educational opportunities for all social classes, in accordance with the Communist 
Party’s political ideology (T. H.-e. Chen, 1974, pp. 59-84). At the same time, this 
sudden increase in the enrolment ratio can also be regarded as a bounce back after the 
abnormally low war-time level. The rising trend did not last for long; instead, primary 
enrolment ratios went on to experience several significant fluctuations. The first 
occurred between 1952 and 1962, covering the period of the Great Leap Forward; while 
the second and more extensive interruption took place from 1965 to 1968, during the 
                                                 
125 As noted in footnote 122. 
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early stages of the infamous Cultural Revolution. 126  The primary enrolment ratio 
bounced back rapidly and reached its peak of 107 percent in 1975, reflecting a success 
in achieving universal primary education in China after almost one century of 
endeavour.  
 
In conclusion, modern primary schooling in China was scarce at the turn of the 20th 
century. It started to converge with its counterparts in the developing world through the 
first half of the 20th century. Despite a handful of disruptions between the 1940s and the 
1970s, the primary schooling expansion achieved its aims, with enrolment rising to 100 
percent by the 1980s.  
 
2.1.2 Alternative educational tracks: enrolment in Sishu (私塾)) 
The low primary enrolment ratios at the very beginning of the 20th century can be partly 
explained by the fact that the educational transformation took time to be fully 
implemented. Despite traditional education’s being officially discontinued in 1905, a 
large number of traditional-style primary schools did not disappear overnight but 
persisted as substitutes for modern primary schools throughout the early 20th century. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, under the traditional schooling system, the Imperial State 
rarely provided the masses with schooling at a lower level; consequently, the 
educational institutes serving the function of spreading basic schooling, which could be 
referred to as the traditional style primary schools, were collectively called Sishu (P. 
Deng, 1997, pp. 6-8; E. Rawski, 1985, pp. 24-33).127 These traditional primary schools 
were privately funded, informal and small-scale. The central focus of this study is on 
the modern (formal) education system; however, the prevailing presence of Sishu cannot 
be completely neglected. According to Tao, the actual enrolment ratio for primary 
                                                 
126 Contrary to what might have been anticipated, the primary schooling enrolment ratios managed to 
keep their increasing trend after 1968 through the whole late Mao period; unlike higher education, most 
primary schools continued to operate during the Cultural Revolution. By the 1980s, almost every 
commune had its own primary school; however, the quality of education was considerably compromised. 
In schools, academic performance was no longer valued highly, while political loyalty and conformity 
were highly emphasised, and became the dominating criteria for judging a student’s performance.  
127 Sishu (私塾): the sishu was purely private, as the name indicates (Si means privately owned in 
Chinese); and almost all school-age children in traditional China were educated in them. Sishu were 
conveniently divided into 3 general types: Family Sishu; lineage or village Sishu and privately established 
schools. This absence of Sishu from the bureaucratic dictionary means that they have no statistical history; 
hence, we have no idea of the national level of enrolment ratios for traditional primary schooling in 
Imperial China.  
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education in China should at least be doubled, if Sishu are taken into account (Tao, 
1923, p. 6). In a nutshell, calculating the enrolment ratios for Sishu and sketching the 
changes in them helps us understand the level of modern primary education and how it 
was attained.  
 
Under the traditional system, in general, there were two types of sishu separated by their 
curriculum. 128  Children went to junior Sishu to learn to read, write and do basic 
arithmetic so as to cope with everyday life;129 after about 4 years of basic studies, 
students could further enrol in senior Sishu to learn the Confucian classics in 
preparation for the Civil Service examination (E. Rawski, 1985, p. 31). After the 
abolition of the exam in 1905, senior Sishu eventually faded away, but junior Sishu 
continued to run in villages, small towns and also big cities, as an alternative to modern-
style primary schools.130 After the collapse of the Qing dynasty, to address the persistent 
popularity of Sishu across the country, a series of regulations was launched calling for 
their improvement to a standard comparable with the modern primary schools 
(Borthwick, 1983, p. 81) 131 . All these reform programmes saw very limited 
achievement, but then the state changed its attitude and banned the legitimacy of Sishu 
altogether after 1928 despite their activities (Liao, 1936; B. Zhang & Qin, 2001, pp. 14-
17). Sishu continued to play a big role in the basic education of the population 
throughout the first half of the 20th century. 132 
 
                                                 
128 Sishu varied a great deal from every standpoint (E. Rawski, 1979, pp. 44-53), the detailed elaboration 
of which is outside the scope of this study. Here we provide only a very general classification.  
129 Almost of all Sishu had very similar and standardized curriculum,. They used  Thousand Character 
Text (千字经), Hundred Surnames (百家姓), and Three Character Classics（弟子规）as text book to 
train children to read and write. These texts at least constitute 1500 different characters, and also encoded 
with classical Confucius values(B. A. Elman, 2013, p. 47). 
130 Another important reason why the Sishu persisted through the early 20th century was that many degree 
holders in late Qing no longer had any prospects in the public sphere after the end of the civil service 
examinations; they returned to their localities and created a large labour pool for potential Sishu teachers 
(Liao, 1936, p. 20).  
131 A movement for sishu reform began in Jiangsu in 1904, and then spread to other regions of China and 
was finally taken up by the central government in 1910 (Borthwick, 1983, pp. 19-21; Jiangsu Jiaoyu 
Gailan (The education reports for Jiangsu province), 1933). 
132 The Sishu remained widespread only until 1949, when the Communist Party forcibly carried out a 
sweeping elimination of them. In order to transform China into a socialist state-ownership system, the 
Communist party on accessing power demolished the whole private sector. Along with this economic and 
political line, private schools, including Sishu, which comprised 40% of all educational institutions, were 
forced to disappear once the Party established its rule in 1949 (P. Deng, 1997, p. 8). 
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As the Sishu lacked the official status of recognized educational institutions under the 
Republican government (both the Beiyang and the later Nationalist governments), 
neither educational yearbooks nor national surveys carry a record of them. Without 
systematic data on enrolment records, it is impossible to estimate the average national 
enrolment ratio for Sishu. However, via scattered fragments of regional data, one 
important clue to their level and the changing patterns of Sishu enrolment ratios can be 
followed.  
 
Regional benchmarks  
At the very beginning of the Republican period, it is obvious that the Sishu 
outnumbered the modern primary schools. Using county gazetteers for 10 counties from 
5 different provinces across China, Hu reports that between 1907 and 1911, when 
modern education had just been introduced, the highest enrolment ratio for Sishu was 23 
percent (for a county in Zhejiang province), the lowest was 8.8 percent (for a county in 
Fujian province) and overall the average figure stood at 14.9 percent (Hu, 2009). To put 
this figure into perspective, even the lowest Sishu enrolment ratio among the 20 
counties (8.8 percent) was in 1912 more than 4 times the level for modern primary 
schools (2 percent).  
 
Figure3.2: Relationship between modern primary schools and Sishu 
 
*Source: (Hebeisheng Gexian Putong Jiaoyu Gailan (The county-level reports for general edcuation in 
Hebei province), 1928; Hunan quansheng Jiaoyu Tongji (The education reports for Hunan province), 
1931). 
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But things seem to have changed so substantially in the proceeding decades that the 
Sishu reduced their share of the primary education sector. For instance, in 1930 the 
province of Hunan reported the development of its primary schooling in each county; 
this report is one of the very few provincial education reports documenting data on 
registered Sishu enrolments. The enrolment ratio for the Sishu was only 3.1 percent, 
which was one-fifth of the modern primary school enrolment ratio in the same year 
(17.7%) (Hunan quansheng Jiaoyu Tongji (The education reports for Hunan province), 
1931). Similarly, Zhili province reported the enrolment figures covering all counties in 
the 1930s and the results present a similar pattern: that the enrolment ratios for Sishu 
were much lower than the one for modern primary schools in the 1930s (Hebeisheng 
Gexian Putong Jiaoyu Gailan (The county-level reports for general edcuation in Hebei 
province), 1928). According to Figure 3.2, the negative relationship between modern 
primary schools and Sishu evidently indicates that the relationship between the modern 
primary school and that Sishu allowed them to substitute for each other.  
 
The Sishu prevailed in urban centres, and were if anything more prevalent in rural 
regions. In the preface to ‘Statistics of Chinese education’ published in 1923, the editor 
particularly specifies that in Nanjing city, one of the major metropolitan centres in 
China of the time, the Sishu numbered more than 500, accommodating about 12,000 
students. The city of Canton reveals a similar figure; here approximately 20,000 
students were enrolled in 1000 Sishu. In both cities, the number of students attending 
Sishu was much larger than the number of all students in modern primary schools (Tao, 
1923, p. 6).  
 
Without more systematic and representative estimates on Sishu, it is difficult to build a 
conclusive argument; but two important patterns can be identified. First, the rise of 
modern schooling heavily reduced the number of Sishu. There is no denying that 
traditional style primary schools declined gradually, to be replaced by substantially 
increasing numbers of modern primary schools. However, even as it declined; the 
presence of Sishu across China endured throughout the first half of the 20th century as 
an alternative to the modern primary school. 133 More importantly, all the calculations 
                                                 
133 The persistence of Sishu can be explained by a few factors. First, when it came to affordability, Sishu 
had some advantages. The tuition fees for Sishu were much lower than those of modern primary schools. 
According to regulations from the Ministry of Education, the yearly fee for lower primary schools was 
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on enrolment ratios in the previous section exclude Sishu and they tend to underestimate 
the actual proportion of the Chinese population who received some equivalent to 
primary education between 1900 and 1950134. However, the more intractable challenge 
of taking Sishu into account lies in how to adjust for the quality of different types of 
primary education.  
 
In short, modern primary schooling spread nationwide at an impressive speed in China 
through the first half of the 20th century; after several exceptionally difficult episodes,  
universal primary schooling finally arrived in the 1980s. However, if the traditional 
track of primary schooling is taken into account, the picture becomes slightly different 
for the early decades of the 20th century; the estimates of modern primary enrolment 
ratios underestimated the real proportion of the population who received a certain level 
of basic education during the first half of the 20th century. If the Sishu are included, they 
bring China well above India and Brazil in primary enrolment ratios, but still a long 
way below Japan.  
 
2.2 The limited rise of secondary education 
In this section, we turn to measuring the rise of secondary education. The progress of 
secondary education must have been based on a firm foundation of primary schooling, 
which created a pool of eligible primary school graduates demanding secondary 
education. The successful spread of universal primary education in most advanced 
nations preceding World War II led to the launch of the ‘High school movement’, 
headed by the USA, after the 1940s (Black & Sokoloff, 2006; Goldin & Katz, 2008, pp. 
194-246). In contrast, because most Chinese were still striving to attend primary school, 
the primary enrolment ratio was lower than 30 percent through the first half of the 20th 
century and naturally only a selected minority of these could proceed to secondary 
                                                                                                                                               
around four yuan (twelve yuan for higher primary schools); while a child attending Sishu was charged 
less than two Yuan(F. Wang, 1994)。 Second, the short distance to the school was another factor to 
favour the Sishu. Modern primary schools were not widely prevalent in rural areas; therefore, people were 
more inclined to enrol their children in the local Sishu than in a distant primary school that might be was 
well outside their own village. Last but not least, according to the regulations of the Ministry of Education 
at the time, the recruitment for modern schooling was remarkably open and liberal, in that students were 
allowed to transfer easily from Sishu to modern primary schools, or graduate from Sishu and pursue their 
education in modern secondary schools (P. Deng, 1997, p. 8). 
134 As most of the developing countries continued with their indigenous educational systems through a 
comparable time period, and most of them did not include indigenous education in other studies either, 
this underestimate probably has only a minor impact on international comparisons.  
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education. In theory, secondary education comprised general secondary education, 
vocational schooling and secondary normal schooling; and this section addresses each 
stream of secondary education separately. 
 
2.2.1 General secondary schooling 
Figure 3.3 presents the pattern of change in the secondary enrolment rates from 1907 to 
1949. Here, the enrolment data for secondary schooling refers only to students enrolled 
in general secondary schools, excluding secondary normal schools and vocational 
schools. In addition, according to education regulations, we employ 12-17 as the age 
group for secondary schooling (12-14 for lower secondary schools and 15-17 for higher 
secondary schools)135. One thing worth mentioning is that we not only calculate the 
total enrolment ratio series, but also construct a separate enrolment for junior secondary 
schools and senior secondary schools after 1931, when separate enrolment records for 
the two began to be kept.136  In the same vein, international comparison results of 
Chinese secondary schooling enrolment ratios with those of the United States, India and 
Japan are reported in Table 3.2.137  
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the enrolment ratios for secondary education barely grew 
between 1907 and 1927. In 1912, the ratio was only 0.103 percent, meaning that there 
was only about one in every 1000 in the relevant school-age group was attending 
secondary school. Compared to the strikingly high level of India’s secondary enrolment 
ratio, 2 percent, and Japan’s 13.9 percent, China in the 1910s lagged far behind. 
Between the 1920s and the 1930s, the speed of secondary schooling expansion 
                                                 
135As pointed out in section 4.1 of Chapter Two, the duration of secondary schooling changed a few times 
over the Republican period. Under the Regulation of Education Act 1904, secondary schooling was for 4 
years only; accordingly, the school-age group would have been 16-19. In 1912, the length of secondary 
schooling did not change, but given that primary schooling reduced its duration, the corresponding age 
group for secondary education became 14-17. Again, the model was changed in 1922 and emulated the 
US education system; the length of time for secondary schooling became 6 years, consequently the 
school-age cohort changed to 12-17. The frequent changes in the corresponding school-age group for 
secondary education made it difficult to identify one specific age group from which to estimate enrolment 
ratios for secondary education.  
136 Compulsory education in China today covers only 9 years (primary education and junior high school); 
hence, the graduate ratio for junior secondary school is very important. 
137 Unlike the wide consensus to define the primary school age cohort as 5-14, scholars apply different 
age groups to secondary schooling, which makes international comparison more challenging. For 
instance, Goldin applies the range 14-17 to secondary schooling in the US (Goldin, 1998), Leewuen 
applies 12-17 to Japan (Leeuwen, 2007), Broadberry simply uses people under the age of 20 as the 
nominator (Broadberry, 2004), and Latika applies 15% of the population as the figure for school-age 
children (Chaudhary, 2009).  
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accelerated. The enrolment ratio grew by more than three times, rising from 0.2 to 0.7 
percent. This short period of its prospering may be attributed to the separation of lower 
secondary school and higher secondary school in 1922 (Shu, 1928, p. 80).138 Issuing 
lower secondary school diplomas to students who finished 3 years of secondary 
schooling partially accounts for the significant decline in the number of dropouts. 
 
Figure 3.3 Gross enrolment ratios in secondary education, 1907-1949 
 
       *Source: 
        i. enrolment data: Chinese Yearbooks on Education in corresponding years. 
        ii. Population and age structure: (Hou, 2001) 
 
 
In contrast to the sharp drop of primary education during the war, only a very short 
window of disruption to the progress of China’s secondary education was created by the 
Japanese invasion. The enrolment ratio fell substantially in the first two years after the 
war; however, it bounced back quickly and the number rose at unprecedentedly rapid 
rates during the civil war period, from 0.5 percent in 1945 to 2.1 percent in 1948. This 
was mainly driven by the increasing number of private secondary schools, as mentioned 
in Chapter Two.139  
                                                 
138 As displayed in the Table 2.6, Chapter Two, the education model was promulgated by the Ministry of 
Education in the Education Act of 1925, which changed the education structure from 7-4-4 to 6-6-4. 
While the length of secondary school was extended to 6 years, it was further divided into junior and 
senior secondary schools, each of which had a separate diploma to grant to its graduates.  
139 As displayed in Figure2.2, Chapter Two, private secondary schools increased rapidly, most of all 
through the wartime period. In 1912, most secondary schools were public (87.9%), while in 1946 the 
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Table 3.2: Secondary Enrolment Ratios per 1000 population 
Year China Year Indian Japan 
United 
140States 
1907 0.7 1890 16.4 26.5 
 
1912 1.2 1900 21.2 50 106 
1915 1.7 1910 35.1 132.4 145 
1922 2 1920 42.1 310.7 
 
1930 7.5 1930 65.7 505.4 511 
1937 7.6 1940 75.4 589.7 677 
1945 5.4 1945 85.3 767.9 
 
1949 20.7 1950 166.1 695.1 745 
*Source: 
i. .China’s enrolment data come from Chinese Yearbooks on Education in corresponding 
years; and population data is from (Hou, 2001). 
 ii. Data for the United States comes from (Goldin, 1998, p. 27); while data for Japan and 
India comes from (Leeuwen, 2007) 
 
 
If we put China’s progress in secondary education into international perspective, the 
picture is less satisfactory. By the 1940s, the United States had already finished its great 
‘high school movement’ and was approaching universal senior secondary education, 
while the enrolment ratios for secondary schooling in Japan and India were 59 percent 
and 8 percent respectively. Comparatively speaking, the secondary education enrolment 
ratio still stood at less than 1 percent in China, indicating that secondary schooling was 
much less widespread there than in its Asian counterparts, let alone in the major 
Western countries.  
 
For the second half of the 20th century, the enrolment ratios for secondary education 
rose rapidly during the first few years of the Mao period, followed by several 
fluctuations.141 Because of a programme launched to promote mass secondary education 
                                                                                                                                               
private secondary schools accounted for half the total number. The number of private secondary schools 
rose from 523 in 1938 to 1937 in 1945; their enrolment increased from 155,688 in 1938 to 581,052 in 
1945. It is highly likely that when public funds failed to provide enough schooling to match the demand, 
an increasing number of private educational institutions stepped into the market to meet the need.  
140 Data for USA  presented here is the senior secondary enrolment ratio (school age is defined as 14-17 ) 
to secondary schooling in the US (Goldin, 1998) 
141 Not surprisingly, the changes in the enrolment ratio in secondary schooling deviated from the secular 
trend during the Mao period. The number dropped after the beginning of the Great Leap Forward and 
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from 1955, a significant number of secondary schools were built in rural China, 
resulting in an increase in the enrolment ratio to 49 percent in 1977. The aggressive 
educational expansion could not be sustained and the ratio gradually returned to a 
regular trend. The enrolment ratio for secondary education rose rapidly after the 1980s, 
in particular after 1986 when a law on compulsory education was introduced; this 
obliged every child to receive 9 years of education, including 3 years of lower 
secondary schooling (Wikisource, 2013). 142 
 
Figure 3.4: Gross enrolment ratios in secondary schooling, 1949-2005 
 
*Source:  
i. enrolment data: (Zhu, 1948, p. 1428); 
ii. Population and age structure: (Hou, 2001) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
stagnated at the same level until 1968. As mentioned, the damaging effect of the Cultural Revolution on 
education was mostly focused on tertiary education; even with several fluctuations, the enrolment ratio in 
secondary schooling managed to increase steadily. We also see that higher secondary schooling was more 
under attack than lower secondary schooling, which is consistent with what most of the historical 
literature suggests. In order to effect a thorough reform of the educational system, a closure order, which 
targeted higher secondary schools and universities, was launched in 1966 (T. H.-e. Chen, 1974, p. 25).  
142 The Law on Nine-Year Compulsory Education (中华人民共和国义务教育法), which took effect on 
July 1, 1986, established requirements and deadlines for attaining universal education tailored to local 
conditions and guaranteed school-age children the right to receive at least nine years of education (six-
year primary education and three years secondary education). 
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2.2.2 Vocational schooling and normal schooling 
Formal schooling, with its emphasis on academic content and general knowledge, 
constitutes only one stream of education. Vocational training which provides job-
specific skills and normal education which targets teacher training are also important 
aspects of human capital formation. From global accounts, the expansion of vocational 
schools and a flourishing apprenticeship system had long been vital for supporting the 
growing industrial sector in Europe, for Germany in particular and perhaps the UK as 
well (Broadberry, 2004). The late- developing world presented a very different pattern 
in terms of vocational education, where it remained  a minor line in the secondary 
education sector; for instance the share of students in 1970 on the vocational track of 
secondary schooling was only 10.1 percent for Asia and the figure has dropped further 
in recent decades (UNESCO, 2000).  
 
Table 3.3: Composition of Secondary school (general/normal/vocational) 
Year 
School type Percentage (%) 
Total General Normal Vocational General Normal Vocational 
1912 832 500 253 79 60.1 30.4 9.5 
1916 962 652 198 84 67.8 20.6 8.7 
1922 1096 547 385 184 49.9 35.1 16.8 
1930 2992 1874 846 272 62.6 28.3 9.1 
1937 1896 1240 364 292 65.4 19.2 15.4 
1941 2812 2060 408 344 73.3 14.5 12.2 
1945 5073 3727 770 576 73.5 15.2 11.4 
*Source (Zhu, 1948, p. 1428) 
 
The first attempt to provide modern technical training in China began quite early, in the 
1860s. From this date, more and more vocational schools were encouraged to provide 
procedural knowledge, at a comparable level to secondary schooling (F. Wang, 1994, 
pp. 340-373).143 In the same vein, for the development of a newly established and 
expanding modern education model, training more qualified teachers was acknowledged 
to have crucial importance; normal schools were therefore largely promoted by the 
government throughout the period, as well. According to Table 3.3, normal and 
vocational education clearly grew fast, along with the general secondary education; 
                                                 
143Detailed information on the system of vocational education and normal education can be found in Table 2.6, 
Chapter Two.  
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however, of the three tracks, the progress in general schooling dominated, leaving 
vocational and normal schooling as peripheral contributors. 
 
Figure 3.5 shows that enrolment ratios for normal schools and vocational schools had 
the same changing trajectories as general secondary education had. They grew very 
slowly in the first two decades after the advent of the Republic of China and enjoyed a 
boom during the golden age between 1927 and 1937. After a sharp fall during the 
Second World War, their increasing momentum for both vocational and normal 
education was sustained until the end of the 1940s. Several points should be borne in 
mind when interpreting these series. First, secondary normal education spread faster 
than vocational schools, which is easy to understand. In a new and expanding education 
system, providing more and more eligible teachers would have been the priority for 
keeping the new education system running. Furthermore, the name ‘vocational schools’ 
is given here only to the formal vocational schools that provided technical training, but 
excludes the apprenticeship system that existed in many handcraft manufacturing 
sectors in China. Third, the enrolment ratios for both vocational and normal schools 
were considerably lower than for general secondary education. For instance, in 1946, 
the peak point of vocational enrolment ratios was below 0.2 percent and for normal 
schools, the figure was only about 0.35 percent, while the ratio for general secondary 
schools stood at around 2 percent.  
 
Figure 3.5: Gross enrolment ratios (normal school vs. vocational school) 
 
*Source: schooling:  (Zhu, 1948, p. 1428); population and age structure: (Hou, 2001) 
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In conclusion, the diffusion of secondary education, both general track and 
vocational/normal track, had only limited success through the first half of the 20th 
century and can mainly be attributed to the rise of lower secondary schools and the 
increasing relative importance of private schools. In regard to the second half of the 20th 
century, substantial progress  was made in expanding secondary education, which 
contributed to attaining the goal of universal education for all schoolchildren up to the 
9th grade.  
 
2.3 The shaping of higher education  
Without breadth of access to a basic education, college and university level schooling 
remained the preserve of members of the elites in China, a very limited group of people. 
The first university, which happened to be the first modern educational institution in 
China, was founded in 1862 –Tongwen  Guan (同文馆); it later became a part of the 
Imperial Capital University (now Peking University) (Yang, 1934, p. 9).  
 
Figure 3.6: Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education, 1912-1946 
 
*Source: schooling(Yang, 1934, p. 60; Zhu, 1948, p. 1406); population and age structure (Hou, 2001) 
 
Figure 3.6 displays the enrolment ratios for tertiary education throughout the first half 
of the 20th century, universities (with a 4-year programme) and colleges (usually 
referring to institutions that offered a 2-year programme) being shown separately. It is 
difficult to assign a proper age band to tertiary education, not only because the relevant 
educational regulations changed frequently, but, more importantly, because of the 
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presence of so many over-age and under-age students in tertiary education, compared to 
those in primary and secondary schooling. In Figure 3.6, the age band employed is 18-
21. Throughout the first three decades, tertiary education experienced no progress, 
perhaps even an actual decline. The enrolment ratio in 1907 stood at 0.07 percent and 
stayed at the same level for several decades. A substantial increase occurred only after 
the 1940s144 and the ratio reached 0.21 percent in 1949. To put Chinese figures into 
perspective, a much higher level of enrolment in tertiary education had already been 
reached in Japan – its enrolment ratio was 4.05 percent, while even India reached 0.48 
percent, i.e. more than 3 times the level for China.  
 
Table 3.4: Tertiary Enrolment Ratios, per 1000 population  
Year China Year India Japan 
1907 0.07 1900 0.9 5.7 
1912 0.07 1910 1.3 10.7 
1922 0.05 1920 2.6 15.9 
1937 0.05 1930 3.1 29.8 
1945 0.13 1940 4.8 
 
40.5 
1949 0.21 1950 10.8 46.5 
*Source: 
i. China’s schooling data is from (Yang, 1934, p. 60; Zhu, 1948, p. 1406); 
and population and age structure (Hou, 2001). 
ii. Data for Japan comes from (Leeuwen, 2007) 
 
Under Communist Party rule, tertiary education experienced several drastic disruptions, 
through the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. As vividly portrayed in 
many historical narratives, tertiary education was the main target of attack during the 
Cultural Revolution, because of Mao’s ideological goal of sweeping away bourgeois 
intellectuals. In 1966, the university entrance examination was abolished and almost all 
universities were shut down completely for one whole decade (Z. Deng & Treiman, 
1997).145 The university entrance examination was restored only in 1977. Following the 
                                                 
144 One thing worth stressing is that the Japanese invasion did not hugely damage tertiary education. Most 
of the universities, located in big cities, were able to take advantage of the relative safety of the 
international settlements and French concessions in these cities. Meanwhile the universities located  in 
occupied China did not cease to operate; they merely fled south and continued to function throughout the 
war.  
145 Although the damaging effect of the Cultural Revolution is generally regarded as continuing for some 
10 years, there was a gradual “return to normality” throughout the 1970s, since most universities began to 
reopen in 1972. But even with this, the quality of education remained low, because educational 
opportunity was still tied to political conformity and family origin,  not to academic performance. 
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economic reforms of 1978, the rise of tertiary education accelerated after the 1990s, 
above all when private universities were re-introduced in 1994. 146  
 
2.4 Summary 
Throughout the 20th century, changes in the educational model, the intervention of 
warfare, massive educational campaigns and political radicalism resulted in substantial 
fluctuations in educational progress and the extent of these influences for each level of 
schooling was different. As displayed in Figure 3.7, a pattern of educational 
development from primary to secondary and finally to tertiary education emerges in the 
Chinese case. In fact, for most of the 20th century, the ‘primary school movement’ still 
constituted the main driving force behind the education expansion in China. 
 
Figure 3.7: Enrolment proportions in China (primary/secondary/tertiary) 
 
*Source: Same as in Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, and Figure 3.6  
 
3. Measuring the Chinese Human Capital stock 
 
Gross enrolment ratios reflect only the flow of pupils into education. After the rise of 
growth theory in the 1950s (Becker, 1964), economists began to be more interested in 
the size of the human capital stock embodied in the current productive labour force of a 
                                                 
146 In 1994, the Ministry of Education, for the first time, accredited six private higher institutions to issue 
graduate certificates. 
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country. 147  In response to a growing literature on growth accounting, studies on 
estimating human capital stocks across countries flourished (Barro & Lee, 1993, 1996, 
2001; Cohen & Soto, 2007; Yoshihisa Godo, 2001; Krueger & Lindahl, 2001; 
Kyriacou, 1991; Lau, Jamison, & Louat, 1991; Wössmann, 2000).  
 
Educational attainment is defined by the US Census Bureau Glossary as the highest 
level of education completed in terms of the highest degree or the highest level of 
schooling completed (US Census Bureau Glossary, 2000). Mean years of schooling, for 
their part, indicate the average number of completed years of education of a country’s 
population  (UIS). 
 
Of the many studies assessing human capital stock across countries, there are a few 
which provide estimates for China after 1949; whereas few writers try to push back 
their timeline  before 1949, leaving the first half of the 20th century remarkably under-
explored. For instance, in their influential work, Barro and Lee offer an assessment of 
the average years of schooling for China from 1975 to 2000, based on census data 
(Barro & Lee, 1996, 2001). Similarly, Yan Wang (2004) uses Barro and Lee’s method 
to construct a measure of China’s human capital stock from 1952 to 1999. However, 
due to the unavailability of census data for the period before the 1980s, she draws on 
India’s distribution of educational attainment to indicate the distribution in China, 
leading to some unreliable results. Deng and Treiman trace the figures back to the Mao 
period and uses data from the 1982 census of the People’s Republic of China, 
presenting the educational attainment by birth cohorts throughout the Mao period (the 
1950s to 1980s) (Z. Deng & Treiman, 1997), focusing on how much the Cultural 
Revolution affected educational stock in China. Luween et al made the first attempt to 
quantify the human capital stock for the first half of the 20th century, however, their 
study is highly relied on the number of people who participated in civil service 
examination and the assumed ratio of successful rate of passing each level of exam, 
which make the accuracy of this estimate suspicious(Yi Xu et al., 2013). 
 
                                                 
147 The main weakness of the flow variable is its time-lagged effect on the stock of human capital. The 
children currently enrolled in schools are not yet part of the labour force; therefore, current school 
enrolment ratios do not necessarily relate directly to the stock of human capital embodied in the current 
productive labour force of a country. The accumulated stock of human capital depends indirectly on the 
lagged values for school enrolment ratios, where the time lag between schooling and future additions to 
the human capital stock can be very long and also depends on the custom length of the education phase.  
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In the following sections, long-term estimates of human capital stock are constructed to 
provide a general picture of China’s educational development over the 20th century. To 
begin with, the methodology and data are briefly introduced. Then we present an overall 
picture of the educational growth of successive birth cohorts of Chinese people in the 
20th century via two measurements: average years of schooling of 30-year olds and of 
the working-age population (15-64). Section three uses data from the first national 
individual survey (Chinese Household Income Project) as complementary evidence to 
not only confirm the previous results, but also to provide richer information on gender 
inequality and urban-rural dispersion in the Chinese educational stock. Finally, the 
educational stock years are compared to those of other nations.  
 
3.1 Methodology and Data 
The estimation of average years of schooling has to be derived from the educational 
attainment data. Therefore, we consider the estimation methodology for these two 
measurements together. Wössmann distinguishes three fundamental approaches 
(Wössmann, 2000) to estimating educational attainment. The first, pioneered by Barro 
and Lee, interpolates the census data for the years in between (Barro & Lee, 1993, 1996, 
2001; Cohen & Soto, 2007)148. This approach has the strict requirement of high quality 
census data at 5- or 10-year intervals. However, in China’s case, the number of censuses 
is extremely limited;149 more importantly, only after the 1980s did the questionnaires in 
the population census begin to include questions about education attainment. Thus, the 
Barro and Lee method cannot be applied in this study. The second approach is the 
Perpetual Inventory Method which is often employed in historical analysis. With a 
sufficiently long series of enrolment data available, the ‘total school enrolment’ for the 
corresponding years and ages can be accumulated after adjusting for changes in 
mortality, immigration, repeaters and drop-outs (Yoshihisa Godo, 2001; Yoshihiha 
Godo & Hayami, 1999; Lau et al., 1991; Nehru, Swanson, & Dubey, 1995; Schulze & 
Fernandes, 2009). The third approach is the projection approach, which estimates the 
‘average years of schooling’ from censuses for a few benchmark years based on lagged 
                                                 
148 Many adjustments have been made to the basic Barro and Lee method by other scholars; for instance, 
the approach adopted by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics to the estimation of MYS (2010); however, 
the differences are quite small, and the methodological foundation remains intact.  
149There were two national-scale censuses in China in the first half of the 20th century, carried out in 1912 
and 1947. However, very limited and scattered information on educational attainment was included in the 
answers. After the start of Communist rule, three national censuses were conducted before it became a 
10-year regular routine; these were in 1956, 1964 and 1982.  
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enrolment ratios (Kyriacou, 1991). Depending on the relationship between years of 
schooling and lagged enrolment ratios, the series of educational attainment figures can 
be projected backwards. In summary, in accordance with the availability of data on 
China, this paper mainly adopts the Perpetual Inventory method, but uses the projection 
approach in the following sections for further estimations. 
 
Perpetual-inventory approach 
The Perpetual Inventory method (superscript PIM) derives the relevant stock measures 
from the available flow data; therefore, educational attainment is directly built from the 
‘total school enrolment’ for the corresponding years and ages.  
 
𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑀 =  ∑ ∑ 𝐸𝑔,𝑡+𝑔−1(1 − 𝑟𝑔 − 𝑑)𝑝𝑔,𝑡+𝑔−1𝑔
𝑇−𝐴𝑙+ 𝐷𝑜
𝑡=𝑇−𝐴ℎ+𝐷𝑜
       (3.2) 
 
where Eg,t is the total (gross) enrolment at grade level g at time t, as in Equation (3.2), 
Ah is the highest possible age of a person in the labour force, i.e. 64; and Al is the 
lowest possible age of a person in the labour force, i.e. 15. 𝐷𝑜  is the age at which 
children enter school, typically assumed to be 6 years; 𝑟𝑔 is the ratio of repeaters to 
enrolments in grade g (assumed to be constant across time), d is the drop-out rate 
(assumed to be constant across time and grades) and 𝑝𝑔,𝑡 is the probability of survival 
until the year T for an enroller at grade g at time t.  
 
The key challenge of applying Perpetual Inventory in historical analysis is the high 
requirement comprehensive enrolment records. According to Equation (3.2), estimating 
the average years of schooling for the working age population for a given year requires 
enrolment records going back over the previous 58 years. To capture the estimate for a 
single year, if only for one age cohort at age 30, the enrolment data must go back 24 
years. Furthermore, in most historical analyses, for the sake of simplicity and if data are 
unavailable, no corrections can be made for repeaters and drop-outs.  
 
Projection approach 
In order to project estimates to periods in an earlier epoch, there is a short-cut approach 
– the projection method. If one assumes that the relationship between educational 
attainment and lagged enrolment ratio is stable, regressing the educational attainment on 
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lagged enrolment to derive an equation with which to estimate the average years of 
schooling for the missing years is a valid solution. Kyriacou finds that this relationship 
is strong across 42 countries (Kyriacou, 1991; Wössmann, 2000).   
 
Data 
In order to estimate human capital stock in China over the 20th century, at least three 
sets of annual data are required: the size of the total population, the age structure and 
student enrolment numbers at primary, secondary (junior high school and senior high 
school) and tertiary levels.  
 
One vital point to bear in mind when interpreting the results in the following sections is 
that the series of enrolment figures used to calculate the educational stock variables 
include only records from the formal modern educational system. As discussed in 
section 2.1.2, above, the traditional educational system was still important in China 
throughout the first half of the 20th century; neglecting the enrolments for Sishu would 
severely underestimate the total human capital attained in the first few decades of the 
20th century.150  
 
3.2 China’s catching-up in educational stock  
3.2.1 The average years of schooling of 30-years old 
Even though the average years of schooling of the workforce is the most common 
indicator used in the literature, we start our analysis by applying the PIM to more 
defined age cohorts and to assess the average years of schooling of each birth cohort 
measured at the age of 30, when presumably everyone has completed formal schooling. 
If we do so, we can project the annual enrolment series to a much earlier period and also 
provide more insights into how the educational stock changed over time. The enrolment 
records are available from 1900 and we assume that the children who began to receive 
education at the same age as the age group we are looking at are now 30 years old; the 
                                                 
150 Studies on estimating human capital for other developing countries encounter similar problems as 
well; however, the downward bias might be smaller compared to China, because the size of their 
indigenous education system was relatively small. Under Western or Japanese imperialism and 
colonisation, a modern educational system was established earlier in the above countries than in China 
and their indigenous educational system deteriorated in the 18th and 19th centuries, leading to relatively 
small provision for traditional education at the beginning of the 20th century. 
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series of average years of schooling can be traced back to the birth cohorts born as early 
as 1894.  
Figure 3.8: Years of schooling by birth cohorts at age 30 years 
 
*Source: see  Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, and Figure 3.6  
 
Figure 3.8 plots the average years of completed schooling for the Chinese population, 
adjusted to age 30 using the PIM approach. From the late 19th century to the 1980s, for 
people born in this period, the average years of schooling rose substantially from little 
above 0 to over 10 years. The period can be roughly divided into several sub-phases. 
First, if we assume that people normally stayed in the education system from 6 to 22, 
most of the  cohorts born before 1924 (who were 30 between 1924 and 1954), 
presumably received their education during the first half of the 20th century,151 when the 
average years of schooling grew slowly and steadily, by 0.4 years per decade. The 
second sub-period was a short phase of stagnation. The figure barely changed for the 
generations born between 1924 and 1933 (who were 30 years old between 1957 and 
1963). This age cohort received education between 1930 and 1955.152 However, a great 
acceleration occurred afterwards, for the cohorts born between 1933 and 1965 (who 
were 30 years old between 1963 and 1995).153 The rate accelerated remarkably; the 
average years of schooling rose from 1.63 years to 9.1 years, implying a growth of 1.9 
years per decade, which is an impressive rate rise, even compared to the USA during its 
                                                 
151 We assume that school age starts at 5 and normally ends at 22. In this case, for people born between 
1894 and 1924, the period for which they were supposed to attend school fell some time in the years 
between 1900 (1894+6) and 1946 (1923+22).  
152 Similarly as noted in footnote 43, people born between 1924 and 1933 were supposed to attend school 
some time between 1930 (1924+6) and 1955 (1933+22).  
153 Again, people born between 1933 and 1965 were supposed to attend school some time between 1939 
(1933+6) and 1987 (1965+22). 
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so called ‘human capital century’.154 A small anomaly is seen for people born between 
1965 and 1970 (who were 30 years old between 1995 and 2000), who would have 
received education between 1971 and 1992. But very quickly the series went back to its 
regular trend and the average years of schooling started to rise again after the 1970 birth 
cohorts. 
 
3.2.2 The average years of schooling of the working-age population 
The average years of schooling of the workforce is the most standardised indicator for 
educational stock, which directly indicates the amount of human capital embodied in the 
whole labour force; it can also be further used in growth accounting to estimate the 
impact of education on economic growth. 155  In this section, we offer estimates on 
human stock of the workforce at various points between 1920 and 2000, estimated by 
the Perpetual Inventory methodology and a slightly modified version of the projection 
method.  
 
Because no records are available for the dropout rates and repeaters, we modify the PIM 
strategy for our estimation:  
 
𝑆𝑡
𝑃𝐼𝑀 =  ∑ ∑ 𝐸𝑔,𝑡+𝑔−1 × 𝑝𝑔,𝑡+𝑔−1𝑔
𝑇−𝐴𝑙+ 𝐷𝑜
𝑡=𝑇−𝐴ℎ+𝐷𝑜
        (3.3) 
 
where Eg,t is the total (gross) enrolment at grade level g at time t, as in Equation (3.3), 
Ah is the highest possible age of a person in the labour force, set at 64; and Al is the 
lowest possible age of a person in the labour force, set at 15. 𝐷𝑜 is the age at which 
children enter school, typically assumed to be 6 years; and 𝑝𝑔,𝑡  is the probability of 
survival until the year T for an enroller at grade g at time t.  
 
The key challenge of applying the Perpetual Inventory in our case is the data 
requirement for enrolment records. According to Equation (1), estimating the average 
years of schooling for the 15-64 working age population for a given year requires 
enrolment records going back 58 years. Unfortunately, the earliest records of modern 
                                                 
154For the US birth cohort born between 1876 and 1951 (who are supposed to receive education between 
1882 and 1973), education expanded most rapidly, the average schooling of a 35-year old increased by 
0.82 years per decade (Goldin & Katz, 2008, p. 19). 
155Applying educational stock series in growth accounting is far beyond the scope of this study.  
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schooling enrolments in China start only at around 1900;156 thus, with PIM, the earliest 
figure that we can calculate from the enrolment data is the year 1958. The other problem 
is that there are no enrolment data at grade level before 1990s; hence, we can use only 
the enrolment figures at each schooling level: primary, secondary (junior high and 
senior high) and tertiary. 
 
Given the limitations, we resort to  Projection Method to cover the first half of the 20th 
century. We regress the educational attainment obtained on the basis of the PIM on 
lagged enrolment to derive an equation with which to estimate the average years of 
schooling for the missing years 
 
𝑆𝑇
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡−20 + 𝑎2𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑡−5 + 𝑎3𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑔,𝑡−5   (3.4) 
 
where ST
project
 is the projected average years of schooling at time t; epri,t−15 is the 
enrolment ratio of primary schooling at time t-20; similarly esec,t−10 is the enrolment 
ratio of secondary schooling at time t-10; and ehig,t−5  is the enrolment ratio of 
secondary schooling at time t-5.157  
 
Table 3.4: Regression results for the projection approach 
  Coef. Std. Err. T 
P t-20 0.046 0.0033 13.73 
S t-10 0.032 0.0073 4.38 
U t-5 0.417 0.1003 4.16 
Cons 0.273 0.1512 1.8 
R== 0.9644 F=379.71     
 
 
According to the regression results, we can generate the equation below: 
𝐴𝑌𝑆 = 0.046𝑃𝑇−20 + 0.032𝑆𝑇−10 + 0.417𝑈𝑇−5 + 0.273     (3.5) 
 
                                                 
156In the literature, the extrapolation can be used to project back the enrolment series. However, a modern 
school system in the Western sense was introduced in China only at the end of the 19th century; this clear 
structure break in Chinese educational history around the turn of the 20th century, invalidates the use of 
extrapolation to estimate enrolments before 1900.  
157 We have tried various combinations of lagged periods, and the results are quite similar. 
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Table 3.5: Human capital accumulation in China (1920 -2000) 
Year 
Population AYS for 
workforce 
Enrolment ratios 
(6-20) Total Workforce (15-64) % 
1920 472 70 0.45 4.81 
1930 489 70.02 0.6 8.33 
1940 518.77 67.99 0.98 10.81 
1950 551.96 62.85 1.31 18.3 
1960 662.07 57.29 1.75 33.05 
1970 829.92 58.02 3.18 43.22 
1980 987.05 61.25 5.24 55.3 
1990 1143.33 64.97 6.25 56.76 
2000 1276.27 70.15 8.48 69.48 
 
Growth Rate    (percent per year) 
1920-2000 1.25 
 
3.74 3.39 
1920-1949 0.52 -0.36 3.63 4.55 
1950-2000 1.69 -0.53 3.81 4.73 
   1950-1960 1.84 -0.92 2.91 6.09 
   1960-1970 2.29 0.13 6.17 2.72 
   1970-1980 1.75 0.54 5.14 2.5 
   1980- 1990 1.48 0.59 1.78 0.26 
   1990-2000 1.11 0.77 3.09 2.04 
 
 
The estimated results on the educational stock of the workforce throughout 20th century 
China are summarised in Table 3.6. The average years of schooling of the workforce 
progressed substantially between 1920 and 2000. The figure started at a very low level, 
0.45, and had risen to 8.52 in 2000. The increase was about one year per decade, which 
yields a substantial annual rate of increase -- 3.74 percent per year. Through the first 
half of the 20th century, educational stock rose slowly, from 0.45 years in 1920 to 1.12 
years in 1948. During the first decade after the founding of Communist China, no 
impressive growth took place either. The educational stock stood at 1.14 at 1949 and 
had reached 1.53 by the end of the decade, an increase of only 0.39 years per decade. 
Rapid growth occurred only in the preceding couple of decades and the AYS increased 
sharply from 1.9 in 1960 to 8.48 in 2000, with an increase of 1.65 years per decade. In 
regard to growth rate, the tipping point appears to be around 1970; even though it 
decelerated somewhat afterwards, it still remained at a high level. Given the fact that 
Chinese economic growth accelerated after 1978, it is consistent with what the literature 
  
 
92 
suggests: that educational catching-up usually preceded rapid economic growth in the 
countries of East Asia(Behman & Schneider, 1994; Dobson, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, data for the period after 1958 allows us to calculate the average years of 
schooling of the working-age population, distinguishing different levels of education. 
According to Table 3.7, the increase in human capital stock was due largely to the 
‘primary school movement’. Even in 2000, half of the schooling received by the 
working-age population was composed of primary education. The share of secondary 
schooling rose rapidly after the 1970s, whereas the role of university and college level 
education remained marginal, occupying less than 3 percent of the years of schooling. 
 
Table 3.6: Average schooling at different levels of education in China, 1950 – 2000 
Year 
Average Years of Schooling Percentage (percent) 
Total Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
1920 0.45 
      
1930 0.6 
      
1940 0.98 
      
1950 1.31 
      
1960 1.75 1.38 0.29 0.07 19.35 1.88 0.46 
1970 3.18 2.35 0.75 0.08 33.94 5.62 0.54 
1980 5.24 3.3 1.82 0.12 41.58 14.89 0.79 
1990 6.25 3.6 2.47 0.19 46.82 20.78 1.19 
2000 8.48 4.7 3.33 0.46 50.34 25.98 2.81 
*Notes: 
i. Average schooling refers to the average years of schooling for the working population. 
ii. Primary schooling, provided for persons aged 6 -12 years 
iii. Secondary schooling, provided for persons aged 12 -18years 
iv. Tertiary schooling, provided for persons aged 18-24 years 
 
In order to fully understand the growth trajectory of Chinese education attainment, we 
should  make international comparisons. Figure 3.9 presents comparative data on the 
average years of schooling of the working-age population for several countries over the 
20th century. Drawing the data from Godo and Leewen, from the very beginning of the 
20th century Japan remained the Asian front runner in terms of educational stock and its 
lead remained unchallenged over the entire 20th century. The other Asian countries 
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gradually converged with Japan; however, for Korea and Taiwan this convergence 
occurred much earlier and faster than it did for the bottom tier – China and India.  
 
 
Figure 3.9 shows an intra-Asian divergence in terms of educational stock between 1920 
and 1960. With a very similar educational level in 1920 to those of  Taiwan and Korea, 
China then fell back, widening the distance to its Asian competitors. The acceleration in 
Taiwan and Korea between 1920 and 1950 can be partially explained by the enthusiastic 
promotion of mass education by the Japanese colonial government (Tsurumi, 1977). 
Only after 1960, did the growth rate in China begin to rise sharply; in the 1970s it 
surpassed India’s average years of schooling and began to narrow the gap between it 
and the other countries of Asia. 
 
Figure 3.9: International comparison of educational attainment 1920- 2000) 
 
*Source: 
i. Data for USA, Japan, Korea and Taiwan come from (Yoshihisa Godo, 2001; Yoshihiha Godo & 
Hayami, 1999). 
ii. Data for India are from (Leeuwen, 2007) 
 
 
To further display how China’s educational catching-up took place, we employ the 
results in Figure 3.10 with Japan’s educational data as a benchmark to calculate the 
Japan/China gap at each level of education. China’s educational attainment in 1920 was 
only 10 percent of that in Japan, but the ratio had risen to 60.3 percent by 2000. We 
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have seen a clear trend of convergence for both primary schooling and secondary 
schooling, but tertiary education, in contrast, took a long time to converge. In 1958, the 
average years of primary schooling, received by Chinese people was only 19 percent of 
that for their Japanese counterparts, but by 1995 the ratio had increased to 75 percent. 
Similarly, secondary schooling rose rapidly. In 1958, the Chinese received less than 1 
percent of the years of secondary schooling that the Japanese had. The speed with which 
China caught up in secondary education accelerated rapidly after 1970 and in 2000, the 
Chinese got almost half the secondary education that Japanese received, showing 
considerable improvement. But the movement of the Japan/China ratio in tertiary 
education demonstrates that Chinese higher education caught up to only a limited extent 
over the 20th century.  
 
Figure 3.10: The China/Japan ratio in educational attainment by level of education 
 
*Source: Data for Japan come from (Yoshihisa Godo, 2001; Yoshihiha Godo & Hayami, 1999). 
 
3.3 Complementary evidence using individual survey data 
In this section, as a robustness check we use Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 
data from the first individual survey conducted in 1988 to provide complementary 
evidence to the previous estimations.158 At the same time, CHIP data provide much 
                                                 
158 Detailed information about the CHIP is available at the website 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ICPSR/access/index.html  (The Study No. for CHIP 1998 is 9836 and the 
Study No. for CHIP 1995 is 3012).  
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richer information allowing us to explore other features of the growth of educational 
stock in China through the 20th century.  
 
The CHIP 1988 is the first national individual survey data asking questions about years 
of schooling and providing a sub-sample of the annual income and expenditure surveys 
of the Chinese State Statistical Bureau. Its questionnaire includes the question, ‘How 
many years of schooling have you received?’ The data contain two large samples 
(67,186 rural households and 34,945 urban households) drawn by the State Statistical 
Bureau (Griffin, Keith, & Renwei, 1988). On the basis of CHIP 1988, we can roughly 
compute the outline of the years of schooling for different birth cohorts and, more 
importantly, we can examine gender disparities and urban-rural inequalities from the 
standpoint of educational attainment. 
 
The main weakness of this dataset is that the size of its sample may be selectively small 
regarding old cohorts identified in 1988. Few people born between 1890 and 1900 were 
still alive in 1988. The CHIP 1988 incorporates 56,438 individual observations; 
however, the sample size for the 1890s birth cohorts consists of only 110, while for the 
1900s birth group, the number is 489. At the same time, given that education is highly 
likely to be positively associated with the length of one’s lifespan, the level of 
educational attainment for those early birth cohorts who were still alive in 1988 may be 
higher than the average for their generation. 
 
Gender inequality 
Figure 3.11 demonstrates the gender gap in terms of educational attainment through the 
20th century based on CHIP cohorts. Apparently, women and men shared the increase in 
education, but females gained more than males, in particular those who were born in the 
decades preceding the 20th century and after the 1930s. The higher rate of growth of the 
educational stock for females is due to the initial gender inequality in education at the 
beginning of the 20th century. This male-female inequality can partly be explained by 
the Confucian ideology, which confines women to a subordinate role in education. As 
pointed out in Chapter 1, one of the weaknesses of traditional Chinese education was its 
exclusion of  females from the formal educational system. Even though the wide gap in 
education between males and females rapidly closed, taking only a few decades of 
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modern educational expansion, the educational advantage for males did not disappear at 
any point throughout the 20th century. 
 
Urban-rural gap  
Similarly, Figure 3.12 illustrates the urban-rural divide in educational development in 
China. People from both urban and rural settings shared the increase in educational 
attainment. However, the gap in years of schooling between rural and urban residents 
persisted throughout the whole period and remained between 4 and 6 years, which 
accounted for more than half of the average years of schooling received by the 
workforce. Such a marked urban-rural divide in educational attainment suggests that the 
educational expansion was not equally distributed across urban and rural areas and the 
failure to provide equal educational opportunities is still widely visible in present-day 
China. Moreover, the biggest disparity occurred for the 1920 birth cohort, who received 
education from around 1930 to 1950, implying that in the Republican era educational 
inequality was still noticeable. The huge urban-rural divide in education fits the features 
of educational decentralisation and the fact that modernisation and industrialisation 
were concentrated in a handful of regions, cities and treaty ports during the Republican 
period.  
 
Figure 3.11: Years of schooling by birth cohort and gender 
 
*Source: Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 1988 (Griffin et al., 1988) 
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Figure 3.12 : Years of schooling by birth cohort and urban-rural divide 
  
*Source: Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 1988 (Griffin et al., 1988)  
 
Re-examination: what did we miss? 
The CHIP data allow us to re-examine the previous results stemming from enrolment 
data, enabling us to compare the two results coming from two data tracks. 
 
As discussed earlier, one major disadvantage lying in enrolment data is that it excludes 
the records of traditional schooling, as well as all other kinds of informal education.159 
The average years of schooling that we obtain on the basis of formal school enrolment 
data, reflect only the amount of formal and modern education; however, the educational 
attainment series derived from CHIP data should capture all the kinds of education that 
people have received.160 
 
Figure 3.13 shows that for the earlier generation, i.e. people born from the late 19th 
century to the 1920s, the gap between CHIP and enrolment is about one year. This 
missing ‘one year’ for Chinese people born between 1895 and 1913 may be explained 
as the traditional schooling that they received in Sishu, which cannot be counted in 
                                                 
159 For instance, the informal education that people received in various forms of part-time schools and 
adult schools, which were very prevalent between 1950 and 1980, cannot be reflected in the enrolment 
series. 
160 The questionnaire in CHIP 1998 is designed in the form ‘how many years of education have you 
received?’ Answers to this kind of general question tend to include all the kinds of education that have 
been received.  
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when we use government reported enrolment data. Additionally, the gap can also be 
caused by the older cohorts over-reporting their actual educational attainment.  
 
Figure 3.13: AYS stemming from enrolment data vs CHIP 
  
* Source: 
1. AYS at age 35: using the Perpetual Inventory approach and based on enrolment data 
2. Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 1988 (Griffin et al., 1988) 
 
For the birth cohorts born between the 1920s and 1940s, the gap enlarged remarkably, 
implying that the informal schooling received by people born in this period increased 
significantly. Such increasing informal or adult education embodied in this age cohort 
can be attributed to their attending the massive campaign to eliminate illiteracy in the 
Mao period after reaching adulthood. Afterwards, the gap narrowed more gradually. 
 
 In short, educational attainment rose throughout the 20th century, but the real acceleration 
began only from the 1960s. China gradually converged with its Asian competitors and after 
the 1970s even surpassed some, such as India. In terms of educational inequality, gender 
disparities remained severe, but narrowed over time. In contrast, differences in enrolment 
and attainment, by region and residence (rural or urban), remained strikingly high, partly 
due to the decentralisation of educational finance in the Republican period and partly 
because economic development itself was marked by regional inequalities in China, and this 
shifted the demand and supply of different types of education.  
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter used different measurements, alternative approaches and two datasets to assess 
the progress of education. The results are mixed when we consider flow variables. 
Changing patterns of literacy and numeracy rates indicate that China possessed a 
relatively high level of human capital as early as the turn of the 20th century under the 
traditional education system; through subsequent decades, the literacy rate rose further, 
but modestly over time. The enrolment ratios for formal schooling paint a different 
picture revealing that at the beginning of the 20th century China lagged badly behind in 
terms of schooling outcomes but bore the marks of a phenomenal educational expansion at 
the end of the Republic era and beyond. These different trends do not necessarily 
contradict each other, but are a reflection of the transformation of informal schooling to 
formal education. Under traditional education, a less defined schooling system and 
flexible teaching methods, it may have been possible to spread basic literacy to the 
masses. The remarkably increase in gross enrolment ratios suggest, however, wide 
acceptance for the diffusion of formal Westernized education when it was made 
available to Chinese children.  
 
The result regarding educational attainment plots a slightly different trajectory, with 
little rise in the educational stock, as measured by average years of schooling, until the 
1960s. The major contributor to the increase in human capital stock is the extensive 
spread of primary schools. Secondary schools expanded rapidly only after the 1980s and 
universities in the 1990s. Primary education expansion is mainly responsible for the rise 
of human capital in China through the 20th century.  
 
In addition, based on the first individual level survey that included information on 
schooling, we are also able to discern the trends of the gender gap in educational stock, 
as well as the urban-rural inequality for the birth cohorts of the 20th century. The 
estimates show that the gender gap closed up considerably, in particular for people born 
after the 1930s; while urban-rural disparities endured as the chief source of educational 
inequality in China. In the same vein, an intriguing gap between the results based on 
two tracks of data was observed, which presumably captures the amount of informal 
schooling received in the population.  
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To put Chinese accomplishments in education into international perspective, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, China lagged far behind most of the developed countries, 
whether measured by literacy rates, enrolment ratios or human capital stock. We also 
find evidence of China’s catching up with its developing counterparts, including India 
and Brazil, through the first half of the 20th century. However, the tipping points based 
on enrolment ratios and educational stock do not line up. The accelerating growth in 
enrolment ratios occurred much earlier, starting from the 1940s; while the catch-up for 
China, measured by educational stock, ensued only after 1960.  
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Chapter 4 : Risen from Chaos: What drove the spread of 
Modern Primary Schooling in China in the early 20th century  
 
Universal access to primary education is a social policy that spread quickly from 
the nations of Europe to the US in the nineteenth century and later to Asia. In 
China, the attempt to provide mass schooling was part of a greater agenda to 
establish a modern and Western-inspired education system at the dawn of the 
20th century. 
 
Why and how did mass schooling in China rise when it did? In order to look into its  
determinants through the opening stages of its development, this chapter for three 
reasons focuses on primary education. First, at this stage, universal education in China 
targeted primary schooling alone.161 Second, according to the calculations in Chapter 
Three, the average years of schooling of the Chinese workforce in the 1940s reached 
only around two years, with almost all its education throughout this period received 
from attending primary schools. Last but not least, of all levels of education, primary 
schooling has been shown to have its most positive effect during the early stages of 
industrialisation; the rates of return in late industrial nations are generally believed to 
be higher for primary schooling than for further education (Psacharopoulos, 1981; 
Psacharopoulos & Patrions, 2004).  
 
A growing body of literature has focused on identifying the determinants of 
educational expansion (Beltran Tapia, 2013; Chaudhary, 2009; Gallego, 2010; Go & 
Park, 2012; Goldin & Katz, 2008; Lindert, 2004a; Lindert & Go, 2010; Musacchio, 
Fritscher, & Viarengo, 2014). What makes China’s historical path particularly 
interesting? First, given that most existing studies concentrate on investigating OECD 
countries or former colonies, the case of China in the early 20th century would enrich 
the literature by increasing our understanding of what drives the rise of education in 
societies setting out in very different economic and political conditions from those of 
                                                 
161 The Education Act (1904) referred to primary education as mass schooling, and in 1915, the state 
officially made lower-primary schooling compulsory (F. Wang, 1994, pp. 460-468). However, the 
requirement of providing compulsory lower-primary schooling was without doubt too ambitious in 
China’s economic and political circumstances, so the actual implementation of such legislation was 
never wholly successful.  
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the developed world. Moreover, it is always an empirical challenge to disentangle 
the effects of supply and demand in schooling. With a distinctly new education 
system, China’s sudden and substantial change in education quality and quantity 
through the first half of the 20th century was arguably an exogenous supply 
shock. This experience provides a good testing ground for sorting out the 
contributing factors in the increasing supply of mass education, subject to some 
data limitations of pre-1950 China. 
 
This chapter reveals that a critical role was played by the informal practices of 
governance imposed by one of the most important social groups in the history of 
China, namely the gentry. The local gentry, most of whom passed the civil service 
examination with a lower degree, supported the expansion of modern education 
because of their enduring public obligatory responsibility to local education, and their 
private interest in modern schooling as a potential source of income. Equally 
importantly, Mancur Olson’s story of roving bandit is applicable in the context of 
China, in that we find the pattern of political stability bred better governance (in terms 
of schooling provision), and the positive effect of the local gentry was also enlarged 
in regions exposed to more unstable politics.  
 
The findings of this chapter are exceptionally important. First, it notes an interesting 
contrast with the early stages of educational development in Europe, where the 
landholding elites were seen as the main interest group blocking the provision of 
education to people of lower rank(Cressy, 2006; Kaestle, 1976; Lindert, 2004a, pp. 
100-104). In addition, as the local gentry’s status was granted via traditional 
education, this finding confirms the legacy of traditional education in fostering the 
rise of modern schooling, which has been neglected in the field of Chinese 
educational history. Lastly, this research sheds light on the growing literature 
stressing the importance of informal institutions enforced by social groups as 
providers of public goods in non-democratic societies (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; 
Sklar, 2004; Tsai, 2007; Yinqing Xu & Yao, 2014, Forthcoming).  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. First, a conceptual framework is 
presented alongside the existing literature on factors contributing educational 
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provision. Then, a brief introduction of the first modern primary education system in 
China is set out in section 2. Section 3 provides a politico-economic framework to 
explain the regional variations in schooling, in which the intentions and incentives of 
several key interest groups are identified. Finally, new archival data is used to conduct 
a series of empirical tests. The results are consistent with our conjecture: economic 
factors have limited power to explain the dispersion of schooling variables, whereas  
political stability and the strength of local elites contributed more to the successful 
diffusion of modern primary education in China throughout the early 20th century.  
 
1. Conceptual framework: what are the driving forces of education? 
 
Schooling outcomes are determined by the supply and demand of education. On the 
demand side, more children can be attracted to school either by reducing the cost 
of education or by increasing the return attached to it. However, global evidence 
suggests that for basic education in particular, educational provision, especially 
through a public initiative, is vital. This is because publicly supplied education can  
reduce the cost of education to such an extent that receiving it becomes affordable for 
the first time to most of the population. Many cross-sectional studies confirm this 
claim (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2011). Therefore, in examining the expansion of 
mass schooling in China through the early 20th century, this chapter focuses mainly on 
the supply of education provided throughout this period. 
 
1.1 Explaining supply  
 
“Mass schooling did not arise spontaneously from popular demand or from the action 
of market forces alone. It was to a large degree organised from above by the state.” 
(Green, 1990, p. 297). 
 
Bearing in mind the predominant importance of the supply of schooling in the 
expansion of mass education, our focus begins with the factors that contributed to 
education provision. Supplying education is a public decision; and public schools 
dominate the history of educational expansion. The literature from other countries 
indicates that economic prosperity, the commitment of the government, and the 
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homogeneity of local communities most powerfully explain  the rise of educational 
spending (Gallego, 2010; Goldin & Katz, 2008; Lindert, 2004a). 
 
1.1.1 Economic factors on the supply side 
The relationship between economic development and education remains unclear in the 
literature. Cross-sectional studies show that public efforts in mass schooling provision 
increase with the level of economic development (Frenandez & Rogerson, 2001; 
Lindert, 2004b; Lott, 1990a; Mitch, 2013), because economic prosperity generates 
higher tax revenue for the government and wealth for households, both of which are 
positively associated with schooling provision and enrolment ratios.  
 
1.1.2 Government commitment 
Politics largely shape the level of government commitment to education and the 
procedures for implementing education policies. Previous research shows that the two 
major definitive actors in this area are the type of political regime and the extent of 
administrative decentralisation.162 More importantly, different combinations of these 
two factors generate different outcomes.  
 
1). Decentralized education system in democratic societies: local elections as 
enforcement 
Educational outcomes seem to be positive when high political participation is 
combined with administrative decentralisation. As discussed in Chapter One, it is 
widely agreed that that broad-franchise democracies tend to provide more public 
education than elite-franchise democracies, because universal education is essential 
for keeping the election procedure in operation, allowing the poor to be more 
politically active and enhancing the capacity of citizens to make good ‘electoral 
decisions’ (Castelló-Climent, 2008; Freire, 1976; West, 1965, pp. 40-49). In the same 
vein, many authors further develop the idea that local democracy amplifies the 
                                                 
162 The decentralisation of education does not stand by itself as a predictor of whether it facilitates or 
suppresses the development of education. There are several advantages of a decentralised education 
system, the two essential ones lying in the improvement of financial and administrative efficiency, 
which could lead to the same level of resources being allocated to higher education (Goldin, 1998; 
Lindert, 2004a; Mitch, 2013). For instance, limited revenues could be spent more wisely and monitored 
more closely; however, regional attainment levels could vary substantially under such a regime.  
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advantages of a decentralised education system, because when educational decisions 
are delegated to local residents, voters tend to raise funds by taxing themselves to 
promote the education of their own children (Campante & Chor, 2012; Cappeli, 2014; 
Gallego, 2010; Goldin & Katz, 2009; Lindert & Go, 2010).  
 
2). Decentralized education system in non-democratic societies: Problems of 
enforcement when formal institution is weak163 
By contrast, when control of education is decentralized in authoritarian regimes, 
schooling outcomes can be ambiguous. Under such a political system, local officials 
naturally have no democratic accountability to local residents. Thus, the decision-
making process is not determined by the popular will of local residents, but rather by 
the political dynamics – the equilibrium achieved between the preferences of various 
veto interest groups.  
 
In most of cases, developing countries are equipped with weak formal administrations 
to enforce benevolent governance. The way in which mass education progress was 
encouraged or hindered in developing countries, where the political and economic 
conditions differ from those in developed economies, have been illuminated in 
recent empirical studies(Chaudhary, 2009; Chaudhary et al., 2012; Go & Park, 
2012; Musacchio et al., 2014). These studies all point to one fact: when formal 
institutions fail to provide accountability to the populace, the nature of the political 
elites is the key factor in explaining the amount of education provision.  
 
In short, it is informal rules, usually enforced by important social groups, to 
implement public policy in societies where formal democratic and bureaucratic 
institutions are weak. This process can lead to high levels of corruption and local 
predation, as commonly witnessed in Latin America, Central Asia and Africa 
                                                 
163 Formal institution is not necessarily weak in non-democratic socities. Local officials can be strongly 
incentivised to deliver good governance, including promoting mass education; when official’s career 
prospects is closely tied to achieving the ‘right’ goals set up by superiors. For instance, a reward 
mechanism, placing economic growth as the central criteria for local official’s career advancement, 
substantially contribute to China’s economic development after 1978(Hongbin Li & Zhou, 2005; Shih, 
Adolph, & Liu, 2012). Unfortunately, a strong personnel control system plus setting up the ‘right’ goals 
for the officials to attain is not a common scenario can be observed in most of non-democratic 
countries. 
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(Collins, 2003; O'Donnell, 1996). Nonetheless, more and more evidence points out 
that informal institutions can also bring about benevolent governance, in particular 
when the informal institutions encourage collective action in the financing of public 
goods. In the Chinese context, informal rules created by social groups, for instance, 
with regard to lineage, have been found to be accountable for  the local provision of 
public goods, including education, in China even today (Tsai, 2007; Yinqing Xu & 
Yao, 2014, Forthcoming).164 
 
1.2 China’s exogenous education supply shock in the early 20th century 
Even though we stress the role of supply in education expansion for societies in the 
early stages of development, the demand for schooling also matters. In fact, it can be 
difficult empirically to separate the impacts of demand and supply.  
  
However, a remarkable change in the provision of education within a short period 
could arguably be considered as an exogenous supply shock. At the turn of the 20th 
century, China’s distinctive new education system provided a sudden and substantial 
change in the quality and quantity of education. The number of primary schools was 
only 173 in 1902, but grew by 1850-fold in the next few decades, to 320,086 in 1936. 
At the same time, the ‘quality’ of education also changed radically under the 
commands of the state.165 Such a dramatic sudden change in education within a short 
term window can be seen as an exogenous supply shock. Therefore, early 20th century 
China is a suitable empirical testing ground for understanding what drives the rise and 
provision of mass education. 
 
 
                                                 
164 The damage to traditional social groups, such as those formed by lineage and gentry, through the 
Cultural Revolution period was devastating. But social groups have continued to play a major role in 
providing public goods in today’s China. To some extent, it suggests a heavy inertia and marked power 
of resistance to change among  traditional social groups in Chinese culture.  
165 Here, ‘quality of education’ does not indicate the teacher-student ratio or school improvements in 
facilities; rather it refers mainly to the fact that the content of education went through radical change 
during this period. Whether the change of curriculum was good or bad is not the central focus of this 
chapter, but at least it is clear that the content of education changed dramatically.  
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2. Historical Background: the new primary schooling system  
 
This section briefly sets out several key features of China’s primary education system. 
As pointed out in Chapter Two, the primary schooling system had two principal 
features: the dominance of public over private schools, and the highly decentralised 
design. The following sections elaborate on these two features.  
 
Figure 4.1: Primary Schools by Management 
 
 
Many types of educational institution coexisted and delivered similar primary 
education to children throughout this period. They are broadly categorised as public 
primary schools, registered private primary schools, non-registered private schools, 
missionary primary schools166 and traditional primary schools – sishu167 in Figure 4.1. 
But because this research focuses on the rise of modern schooling, the sishu, as 
part of traditional education, lies beyond its scope. Unregistered private schools 
and missionary schools are also excluded, because the former hold no statistical 
history, and the success of the latter cannot be attributed to the efforts of the 
Chinese state. Thus, the data under discussion include only public and registered 
                                                 
166 Data on missionary schooling are included in the regression section to indicate the penetration of 
Western culture, but are not assessed here in relation to education progress in China. 
167 As discussed in previous chapters, after the termination of the Civil Service examination, Sishu 
continued to provide basic literacy and numeracy to children; thus, they were quasi-primary schools. 
Unfortunately, the Republican government discontinued Sishu in the formal schooling system.  
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private primary schools, which, as is shown below, accounted for the majority of 
educational institutions in the category of modern primary schooling. 
 
2.1. Primary education in context 
Both the declining Qing Court and its successors showed a marked intention to pursue 
the development of a public and funded education system, with particular focus on the 
primary school sector. The second important feature of the modern primary education 
system lay in its highly decentralised design – the decision-making authority was 
concentrated within government at the county level.168 As discussed in Chapter Two, 
the first Education Act of 1904 had already outlined clear regulations regarding the 
allocation of responsibility for each level of education: central government undertook 
to deliver tertiary education; secondary schooling was delegated to provincial 
governments; and primary schooling to county and sub-county authorities (Huaxing 
Li, 1997, pp. 533-538). In this new system, accordingly, as the degree of 
decentralisation increased downwards through the schooling levels, primary education 
was the most decentralised. 
 
Table 4.1: Composition of public primary schools (%) 169 
Year 
Public Primary Schools 
National Provincial 
Local 
County Sub-county 
1916 0.03 74.07 
1930 0.01 0.61 26.45 48.49 
1933 0.01 0.62 17.26 64.12 
1940 0.01 0.16 47.49 45.47 
1946 0.02 0.14 94.1 
*Sources: same as the Figure 2.1 
                                                 
168 The term ‘local government’ in this research refers to county government and sub-county governing 
bodies.  
169As pointed out in Chapter Two, the classifications in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 relate to the authority in  
administrative control and to ownership, but not to sources of revenue. For instance, ‘public school’ in 
this chapter refers to schools that are publicly provided, but not necessarily fully reliant on public 
funding. Similarly, to put a school in the provincial category does not necessarily indicate that it was   
entirely financed by the provincial budget. It might have been subsidized by the central government 
and private donations. 
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As shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, local primary schools (county and sub-county 
government) accounted for the largest proportion. Throughout the whole period, the 
percentage of national and provincially administered primary schools never reached 
more than 1% of the total of primary schools, which reflects the marginal role that 
central and provincial governments played in the spread of such schooling. 170  In 
contrast, the share of local primary schools stood at about 75% in 1930, and the figure 
continued to increase over time, reaching 94.1% in 1946. This breakdown of data is 
consistent with the educational regulation that the task of diffusing modern primary 
education should fall mainly on local governments.  
Table 4.2: Composition of public primary schools by province in 1933 (%) 
                                                 
170  The only exception is the province of Hubei, which in 1931 reported 204 provincial primary 
schools, accounting for 5% of the total number, which is much higher than the national average. The 
abnormally high involvement in primary education of the Hubei provincial government is not only the 
legacy of the personal commitment to modern education of the former Viceroy of Huguang, Zhang 
Zhidong; it is also because in 1928, Hankou’s ‘Special Municipality’ status was removed, leading to its 
merger under Hubei province. The Hubei provincial government took over all the primary schools in 
Hankou city originally founded by the municipality, and these were counted as provincial primary 
schools. 
  
National & 
Provincial 
County 
& Municipal 
District Township Others 
ALL 0.62 16.98 26.38 34.5 3.97 
Zhili 0.11 14.84 5.85 74.01 2.69 
Henan 0.14 15.55 28.1 47.7 3.69 
Shanxi 0.13 3.29 0.5 93.2 2.31 
Shandong 0.17 8.34 26.28 51.27 11.38 
Shaanxi 0.18 16.85 16.55 35.33 10.8 
Gansu 0.82 34.06 54.16 2.67 1.23 
Jiangsu 0.44 88.41 2.32 2.43 0 
Anhui 1.11 37.74 38.08 1.57 0.31 
Jiangxi 1.15 13.51 16.69 18.28 6.09 
Fujian 1.06 22.41 39.22 0 0 
Zhejiang 0.21 6.6 44 8.48 0.7 
Guangdon
g 
0.06 3.27 13.95 18.61 0.9 
Guangxi 0.05 5.52 90.21 0 0 
Hubei 4.34 28.78 18.67 4.87 1.08 
Hunan 0.04 1.94 48.42 12.32 2.07 
Yunnan 0.11 6.59 53.27 33.63 3.45 
Guizhou 0 62.36 16.65 5.34 1.63 
      *Source:   
(i).Department of Education, Quanguo Jiaoyu Jingfei Tongji 1932-1933 (The national educational finance 
report 1932-1933), 1937 
(ii). Department of Education, Quanguo Chudeng Jiaoyu Tongji (The statistical report on primary 
education), 1934 
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For the year 1933, explicit information is found on the ownership of primary schools. 
In Table 4.2, we see that except for a small number of provinces, the largest driver for 
the rise of public primary education was not the support of county governments, but 
rather local communities (at district and township levels). Around 64% of primary 
schools in 1933 were provided by small local communities that did not even count as 
legitimate state organs, which further proves the great extent of decentralisation in 
primary education in this period. 
 
2.2 Financing primary schools 
A rapidly expanding modern primary schooling system requires extensive funding. 
This section moves to one of the most critical questions: how the increasing number 
of modern primary schools was financed throughout the first half of the 20th century. 
The system was a patchwork of financing. In general, restrained by resources, 
different types of primary schools relied on various sources of revenue (Chauncey, 
1992; Ven, 2005). 
 
Table 4.3: The difference between provincial, local and private schools 
Year 
Students per school Expenditure per student(Yuan) 
Provincial Local Private Provincial Local Private 
1916 205.33 33.91 27.46 27.70 6.35 22.22 
1933 163.98 44.78 52.81 28.54 7.74 10.01 
1940171 383.40 112.54 128.68 21.16 6.57 7.33 
1946172 359.68 57.65 125.14 207371.83 24727.31 20833.45 
*Sources:  
(i).  1916: (Zhonghua minguo jiaoyu tongji tubiao (The education statistic report for Republic of 
China, fifth) 1916) 
(ii). 1933: (Quanguo Chudeng Jiaoyu Tongji (The statistic report on primary education) 1934) 
(iii).1940: (Quanguo Jiaoyu Tongji ( The national education statistic report ), 1940) 
(iv). 1946: (Zhu, 1948) 
 
                                                 
171 The 1940 educational yearbook covers only nine provinces.  
172 The high expenditure per student in 1946 was due to the soaring inflation rate.  
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2.2.1 Provincial primary schools: 
In principle, the provincial department of education managed the funding for a 
handful of provincial primary schools directly from provincial budgets. These schools 
were few, accounting for less than 1% of the primary schools in this period. In fact, 
most were higher-primary schools attached to provincial secondary schools, and 
located in the provincial capitals or prefectural seats. They enjoyed more adequate 
and stable sources of revenue, and were well-built and better equipped, which allowed 
them to accommodate a large number of students; some of whom may have had to 
travel some distance. 
 
2.2.2 Local primary schools 
The overwhelming majority of modern primary schools were local, registered under 
the county or even local communities, which often faced severe fiscal constraints. 
Their budgets could not draw on one revenue source alone; instead they had to be met 
through a combination of funds from various sources: local surtaxes, rent from public 
land, and donations from local wealthy residents, as well as parental contributions 
(tuition fees). 
 
In contrast to the grander and more expensive provincial primary schools, local 
primary schools were modest. On average, local primary school taught about 50 
pupils in all, and the spending for each student was only one quarter of the amount 
spent on each student at a provincial school. In line with such principle of austerity, 
local primary schools are often recorded as occupying the older property of a 
traditional academy that was renovated to form a new schoolhouse. Sometimes 
Buddhist temples and traditional Tangs where local people worshipped their ancestors 
were confiscated and furnished as modern primary schools (Gamble & Burgess, 1921, 
p. 130). The condition of schoolhouses was so modest that they often lacked on-site 
toilets (Liao, 1936, p. 69). 173 
 
In order to shed more light on how local primary schools raised funds, more than 400 
available county government balance sheets on educational finance in the 1930s were 
drawn on for this research. As Table 4.4 shows, the county budget for primary 
                                                 
173 This adverse condition directly led to reluctance among female students to attend primary schools, 
which severely affected the enrolment ratios for girls.  
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education came from two main sources: surtax (mainly on land) and revenues 
generated from endowed school land. 
 
Table 4.4: The revenue composition for primary education at county level (Yuan) 
 
All Hubei Shandong Henan Zhili Jiangsu 
Various surcharges 63.7 41.49 70.4 76.7 59.62 70.29 
   surcharges on land tax 40.61 21.94 62.3 51.8 26.43 
 
Endowed school land 17.8 43.51 12.9 16.33 8.53 8.19 
*Note: As in table 2.9, this table presents information for the provinces of Hubei, Zhili, Jiangsu, 
Shandong and Henan, 423 counties in total. 
*Source: See Table 2.9 
 
 
1). Non-statutory revenues: the main revenue source of local primary schools 
Tax revenues were the main source of the funding for setting up and maintaining the 
public primary education system. Table 4.4 shows that revenues from various types of 
surcharges accounted for more than 60% of the budget, constituting the primary 
element in the county budget for education. However, according to the Chinese fiscal 
system laid out in Chapter Two, county governments had no official fiscal capacity to 
retain most of these tax revenues for local use. 174 Therefore, these surtaxes , that local 
governments relied on to build up modern schools, can be regarded as non-statutory 
revenues. 
 
According to both historical narratives and the available county balance sheets, it is 
abundantly clear that fiscally-stressed local governments resorted to informal 
practices to raise funds throughout this period. They levied various surtaxes and other 
                                                 
174 As pointed out in section 4.1 of Chapter Two, county governments were officially equipped with 
minimum fiscal capacity to facilitate the financing of primary education. Under Qing rule, county 
government collected taxes only on behalf of the state, and had to remit most of the tax revenue to the 
province. They were allowed to retain only a small proportion for standard local administrative 
expenditure, including wages for officials and necessary expenditure on ritual ceremonies (Marianne, 
1985; Remick, 2004, pp. 32-34; D. Zelin, 1984, pp. 26-62). Entering the Republican era, there was still 
no separate source of tax revenue below provincial level (C. S. Li, 1922, pp. 701-791), and 
consequently, no fundamental improvement could be made in the counties’ fiscal capacity (C. S. Li, 
1922, pp. 701-791; Remick, 2004, pp. 35-39). Because of the way that tax revenues were divided, 
county governments were habitually strapped for cash. 
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forms of commercial fees from residents to fund local projects, including local 
primary schools(Chauncey, 1992; S. Liu, 1935; Remick, 2004, pp. 37-39; Sun, 1935; 
Y.-c. Wang, 1973), despite the fact that they were not given legal fiscal capacity to 
levy new levies.175 
 
The central state made great efforts to consolidate the excessive local taxes after the 
collapse of the Qing dynasty. 176  For instance, the Beiyang government strictly 
stipulated that land surcharges had to be lower than 30% of the base tax (Sun, 1935, p. 
187). Similarly, the Nanjing government continued to launch edicts, and specified that 
the total amount of surcharges must not exceed the base tax (Sun, 1935, p. 124). 
However, in practice taxation was well beyond control. Throughout the first few 
decades of the 20th century, increasing varieties of surcharges on land tax were 
enforced, and the tax rates of these newly issued items skyrocketed, far exceeding 
what the state regulated. According to contemporary documentation, as many as 673 
new items were taxed, which made the systematic management of land tax an 
impossibility (S. Liu, 1935, p. 187; Sun, 1935, pp. 213-217). 177 Another method to 
regulate tax revenues for primary schooling was to grant local governments the 
authority to institute ‘educational launches’. This term refers to tax revenues that were 
reserved by government regulations for the support of schooling. However, the edicts 
on educational launches differed significantly between provinces; the launches mostly  
failed after a very short period of relief for local government (Du & Yang, 1934). 178 
 
                                                 
175 Regarding the fiscal system of China through this period, please refer to eh section 4.1 of Chapter 
Two. Briefly, county government should only work as a state agent in tax collection, and they had no 
right to retain large amount of tax revenue for local use without remitting back to central, no alone 
levying new tax items without upper government‘s permission.   
176 The common practice of charging permissible surtax for local projects was partly endorsed by the 
Qing regime because of increasing special local needs and the state’s weakness. Shandong and Zhili 
provinces first began to allow local governments to levy surcharges on land tax for local flood control 
and famine relief after the severe flooding of the Yellow River in 1903; these opened the door to 
surcharges on the land tax, which then became prevalent across China. e 
177 For instance, comparing the level before the state’s collapse, the surcharges on land tax increased by 
86 times in Hubei in 1934, 9.5 times in Jiangxi, and occasionally three times higher than the base tax in 
Sichuan and Jiangsu (Sheridan, 1977, pp. 203-205). Not only had the amount of surcharging  
skyrocketed, but also their variety had increased substantially. In Jiangsu province, more than 147 
kinds of surcharge were enforced on the base tax for local use between 1912 and the 1930s.  
178 For instance in Jiangsu, before 1913, salt (lijin) and transportation surcharges were reserved by law 
for  educational expenditure. Later, an animal slaughter tax, a brokerage tax, and surcharges on rice, 
were set aside as educational launches (Du & Yang, 1934). In Shaanxi province, such launches 
included a slaughter tax and a cotton tax. In Yunnan province, the tobacco tax revenue was devoted to 
education (The education finance of Yunnan province 1933, p. 42). 
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In short, consistent with the historical literature, we find direct evidence that 
surcharges, land tax in particular, were the dominant source of education revenue for 
local primary schools. In the 1930s, according to our sample, nearly 65% of 
educational revenues came from the tax surcharges in the county budget. Moreover, 
this figure was noticeably higher in rich agricultural provinces, for instance, 
Shandong and Jiangsu. Thus, non-statutory revenues predominated as sources of 
funding for primary education development at county level. 
 
2). Historical legacy: the importance of endowed school land 
Another important contribution to public primary school financing came from the 
rents earned from community-owned school land, which had been endowed to support 
traditional academies.179 In Table 4.4, our sample shows that 17.8% of educational 
expenditure in the 1930s came from the rents of endowed school land. In the same 
vein, a micro-study of Ding county during the Republican era finds that the operations 
of 47% of the county’s primary schools  depended on rents from school-owned land 
to some extent(Gamble, 1954, pp. 200-201). 
 
Under Imperial rule, endowed school lands were owned by traditional academies 
which, as mentioned in the previous chapter, were publicly-provided higher education 
institutions for prospective examination candidates. When the schoolhouses of 
traditional academies were converted to modern primary schools, these emerging new 
schools also inherited their long-lasting source of revenue, i.e. endowed school land.  
 
The amount of school land was largely controlled by one measure: the size of the 
county/prefectural academy, which was determined by a quota system regulating the 
number of successful candidates who could pass the first level of the exam (the 
licensing exam). 180  This quota system is further detailed in the data analysis 
                                                 
179 The system of endowed school land (学田) emerged very early during the Northern Song period 
(960–1127), and matured in the Qing dynasty. In general, endowed school land was land bestowed by 
the Court or donated by local elites, and used exclusively to support traditional academies, including 
county academies and prefecture academies.  
180 As noted in Chapter 2, the academies under the traditional education system were by modern 
standards equivalent to public higher education institutions. They enrolled students, only if they had 
already passed the first level of the Imperial Examination, the prefecture-level examination (乡试), to 
further their studies for the next level. They existed mainly in three forms: the Imperial Academy (国子
监), prefecture school (府学) and county school (县学). Therefore, the higher the quota granted to one 
county for successful candidates at the first level, the larger its academies might be.  
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section. 181  Localities which provided outstanding candidates in the Civil Service 
Examination were equipped with larger and more traditional academies, resulting in 
certain advantages in their modern replacements, in that they inherited better revenue-
generating channels.  
 
In summary, a successful diffusion of primary education took place during the first 
half of the 20th century, in which the role played by the central government and 
provincial powers was limited. While curriculum design was centralized, the authority 
and responsibility for other important elements of primary education, including 
finance and daily operation, were left entirely to county governments and even sub-
county governing entities. Such success in increasing the number of local primary 
schools was largely sought through two financial channels: local levies and rents 
earned from land endowment, a legacy from the traditional education system.  
 
3. Was the prosperity the main determinant of the rising mass 
schooling in China?  
 
Despite political fragmentation and economic backwardness, modern primary 
education expanded remarkably in China throughout the first half of the 20th century. 
How was public primary education so successfully diffused?  
 
In theory, regions with more prosperous economies enjoy a larger tax base, and as a 
result can mobilise higher public funding and household income to support the 
expansion of education. At the same time, higher demand for skilled workers in 
economically advanced regions can result in a greater interest in education among the 
population. It is therefore natural to speculate that modern primary schools tend to be 
more prevalent in economically prosperous regions. 
 
Unfortunately, the limitations in our data prevent us from testing this argument 
properly. As discussed in Chapter One, except for the benchmark year 1933, there are 
no concrete measures for GDP per capita, income level, the return to education and 
                                                 
181 As an institutional means of controlling and regulating the power of local elites, a set number of 
candidates were assigned to each county and prefectural academy; the actual quota depended on the 
importance of each administrative unit.  
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the share of agriculture in the economy at national level, let alone at the county unit 
level, for the period under discussion. 
 
Even though we are constrained by a lack of the usual proxies for economic 
development across counties, there are some plausible indications to show where 
these wealthy regions were located. The existing literature has established that 
Chinese modern economic development was a regional phenomenon (Jia, 2014; Ma, 
2008; T. Rawski, 1989). The main driver of economic growth was China's enforced 
‘opening-up’ to the world economy after 1840. Most of the modern economic activity 
was concentrated in treaty ports, coastal areas and the Lower Yangtze Delta, which 
were believed to have better market access and institutional systems. Accordingly, we 
presume that these counties enjoyed better economic performance than the rest, and in 
the following section we classify them as ‘rich & open’ counties. 
 
As displayed in Table 4.5, the ‘rich & open’ group shows a higher population 
density,182 and much more modern industry, confirming our assumption that these 
counties outperformed other regions in terms of economic development. However, in 
1907these places appear to have had few educational advantages compared to other 
regions. For later periods, it is striking that, instead of delivering superior 
performance, the ‘rich and open’ regions showed poorer outcomes in primary 
education development, in terms of both school accessibility and enrolment rates. In 
1916, only one primary school was available for 2,631 people in the ‘rich & open’ 
regions, while enrolment ratios stood at 9%. In contrast, the rest of China enjoyed 
much higher school density rates; one school per 1,886 people, leading to a higher 
enrolment (10 %). The same pattern holds true for 1932, with no sign of the gap 
having closed. The very short time slot during when ‘rich & open’ counties 
outperformed in primary schooling development was at the very start of the new 
system. This may reflect fact that greater exposure to Western ideas facilitated the 
acceptance of this new educational model. However, this ‘first mover advantage’ was 
not maintained in the following decades.  
 
                                                 
182 The only sensible proxy for economic conditions at county level for the period under discussion is 
population density. In a pre-modern economy, such as China, the more densely populated regions are 
highly likely to have a more advanced agriculture sector and to be more commercialised, and so have a 
more advanced economy.  
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Map 4.1: The ‘open and rich’ regions vs. the rest of China 
 
 
*This map covers only China proper, without the province of Sichuan. Blue dots 
indicate regions with domestic modern factories. Red triangles refer to treaty port. 
The grey line illustrates the Yangtze River.  
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Table 4.5: Statistical summary for primary schooling level by group 
  Rich & Open The Rest 
 
obs mean std.Dev obs mean std.Dev 
1907 
      
Population density 223 268.35 320.7 804 157.12 174.09 
Modern industry 223 0.41 0.39 804 0 0 
Enrolment ratios 223 2.32 5.31 804 1.79 2.6 
Schools per 1000 people 223 0.13 0.21 804 0.14 0.42 
1916 
      
Population density 309 267.19 264.83 871 148.51 141.1 
Modern industry 309 0.26 0.43 871 0.056 0.23 
Enrolment ratios 309 8.94 6.21 871 9.52 8.99 
Schools per 1000 people 309 0.38 0.31 871 0.53 0.48 
1932 
      
Population density 151 263 308.11 435 202.9 314.46 
Modern industry 151 0.28 0.45 435 0.071 0.25 
Enrolment ratios 151 21.28 13.64 435 22.78 44.98 
Schools per 1000 people 151 0.65 0.39 435 0.95 1.53 
*Source: 
(i). 1907: 
Ministry of Education(1907), Guangxu Diyici Jiaoyu Tongji Tubiao (The first statistic report on 
Education) 
Population: To construct 1910 county level population, we apply the county level variations within a 
given prefecture based on 1920 data(Stauffer, 1922) to the 1910 prefectural population data (Cao, 2000; 
Z. Yan, 1955). 
(ii).1916:  
National Board of Education(1916),  Zhonghua Minguo Jiaoyu Tongji Tubiao (The education statistic 
report for Republica of China, fifth) 
Population: (Stauffer, 1922) 
(iii).1933:  
Unlike 1907 and 1916, there is no national yearbook on county-level schooling information nor 
population in 1930s; instead, a number of provinces published government reports on education enclosing 
detailed statistics respectively. We gather 10 provinces that published similar education reports in 1930s, 
including Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Shanxi, and Zhili, 
covering 787 counties.  
Education Bureau of Fujian Province(1930), Fujiansheng Jiaoyu Tongji (Education reports of Fujian 
province)  
Education Bureau of Guangdong Province(1935), Guangdongsheng ershisan niandu Jiaoyu Gaikuang 
(The education reports of Guangdong Province in 1933) 
Education Bureau of Guangxi Province(1932), Guangxisheng Jiaoyu Tongji (The education reports for 
Guangxi Province) 
Education Bureau of Guizhou Province(1932), Guizhousheng Jiaoyu Tongji (The education reports on 
Guizhou province)  
Education Bureau of Hebei Province, Hebeisheng Gexian Putong Jiaoyu Gailan (The county-level reports 
for general edcuation in Hebei province), 1928 
Education Bureau of Henan Province(1930), Henan jiaoyu yianjian (The education yearbook of Henan 
province) 
Education Bureau of Hunan Province(1931), Hunan quansheng Jiaoyu Tongji (The education reports for 
Hunan province), 
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Education Bureau of Jiangsu Province (1933), Jiangsu Jiaoyu Gailan (The education reports for Jiangsu 
province) 
Statistic Department of Shanxi Province(1930), Shanxisheng Dishici Jiaoyu Tongji (The tenth education 
report on education in Shanxi province) 
Education Bureau of Hubei Province(1932), Zuijin Hubei Jiaoyu Yilan (The education reports on Hubei 
province) 
 
 
More rigorous empirical tests are applied and presented later in this thesis. However, 
this simple statistical result already provides us with one interesting finding: that the ‘ 
rich & open’ places, which are believed to enjoy better geographic location, 
institutional set-up, and economic performance, enjoyed only their early adopter 
advantages for a very short time, and then fell behind in the task of spreading primary 
education to the people. In other words, the rise of primary schooling cannot be fully 
explained by the level of economic development.  
 
4. Interest groups on education provision 
 
As discussed in previous section, all the educational decision were made at local 
level, how did local interest groups' preferences play out and drive the public primary 
education diffusion successfully in China through this period? 
4.1 Was the commitment from govern the driving force?  
In theory, mass schooling system is largely an outcome of government, given that 
public efforts, including financial source and government administration, constitute 
the main contributor. In this section, the preferences, intentions and capacities of each 
level of government regarding the primary education agenda are explored.  
 
4.1.1 The limited role of central, provincial powers and populace 
1). The central state 
As discussed earlier, the Qing and later Republican governments played little part in 
the course of China’s primary schooling expansion. The primary education system 
had originally been designed to be delegated to county governments, while at the 
same time, central government’s loosening grip on local administration further 
reduced its ability to supervise and control primary education. Even when it came to 
curriculum design, the highest priority of central government in this area, very little 
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actual implementation was achieved by the central state apart from issuing edicts on 
paper concerning models for primary school curricula.,  
2). Provincial powers 
Provincial powers responded differently to the agenda of ‘promoting mass schooling’. 
Given the regional political fragmentation and weakening central control, not all the 
provincial leaders were prepared to bend over backwards to achieve the top-down 
targets set by the central government. To generalise, people who aligned themselves 
closely with the central state would have much more incentive to carry out this 
education reform, as a sign of political conformity. But those who counted themselves 
as opposing powers, or those who engaged in political and military struggles might  
have had little interest in implementing ‘expensive’ ventures in national education. 
 
Apart from regional politics, provincial leaders’ personal preferences may also have 
mattered. A few cases emerged where provincial leaders zealously promoted modern 
public schooling within their territories as a sign of their passionate personal 
commitment to education, rather than of their sense of political responsibility for  
attaining the central government’s target. A famous example is Xishan Yan, who 
ruled Shanxi province for four decades. 183  He published a small booklet and 
newspapers within Shanxi, which enthusiastically promoted mass schooling. 184  In 
1918, Yan insisted that all school age children in his domain had to attend primary 
school for at least 4 years, and spoke frequently of the importance of mass schooling: 
‘Mass education consists of instilling within the mass of the people the proper 
attitudes and virtues’ – Xishan Yan (Gillin, 1960, p. 70) Apart from Yan, there were a 
few other regional leaders, who also emphasised educational development; most of 
them had themselves previously obtained a good education. 185  However, others 
                                                 
183 For instance, Xishan Yan, the son of a merchant, ruled Shanxi province for almost the whole 
Republican era. He was famous for his zealous commitment to mass education. Yan believed that the 
problems confronting China could be solved only through the moral rehabilitation of the people, which 
can be achieved only by mass schooling. He therefore keenly promoted primary education by making 
four years of schooling compulsory for all children, and compelling the rich to subsidise public 
education through taxes (Gillin, 1960). At the end of the Republican period, Shanxi, as the obvious 
front runner in terms of modern schooling promotion, had a primary enrolment ratio that already 
reached a similar level to Japan’s, leaving other provinces in China far behind. 
184 For instance, Yan published a village daily, entitled Village Talk (Cun Hua); at the same time, he 
tended to use posters, plays and slogans to spread his political and ideological propaganda.  
185 For instance, Peifu Wu, who ruled Zhili province, was often referred to as a ‘scholar warlord’, 
because he gained the title  of Jinshi (the highest degree level under the traditional education system). 
Another warlord, Jiongming Chen, obtained Shengyuan status, and furthered his Western education by 
study in Guangdong School of Politics and Law. Both of them actively encouraged education in their 
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responded to this education policy with much less support, and hardly any intention of 
making mass primary education their spending priority.  
 
3). People’s resistance 
The new education system was not solely the product of government. Acceptance on 
the part of the people who would actually send their children to school played a 
distinctive role. Despite the seeming virtues of the modern education system, to a 
great extent the masses in fact resisted it.   
  
The reason for such resistance was largely a fiscal matter. The increasing tax burden 
fell on all local residents; however, the benefits of the modern schooling system were  
not evenly spread. 186  For an average Chinese resident, the whole purpose of an 
education was to learn how to read and perform basic calculations. Therefore, the 
much more expensive modern school system, proudly providing Western subjects as 
an ‘optional’ mode of education, failed to appeal to ordinary peasants who, like 
everyone else had to pay for it.187  
 
Moreover, stronger resistance came from the cultural perspective. The new type of 
schooling was a severe threat to the enduring social norms and conventions of local 
residents. Both the traditional schools that provided Confucian classical education and 
the religious Tang at which local residents worshipped their ancestors were regarded 
as the most important symbols of the legitimacy of traditional culture. As noted 
above, many modern schools confiscated the buildings and materials of the traditional 
academies and Tangs. This resulted in much social protest, even massacres, as 
documented in gazetteers and newspapers. Zhang and Ding recorded a full list of 
protests and riots between 1901 and 1911. Among these, it is clear that anger at the 
new levies were the foremost and most common trigger. Of the 450 protests recorded, 
17 were attributed to the levying of a new tax to support modern education (Z. Zhang 
                                                                                                                                            
own provinces, and also contributed significantly to promoting gender equality in education. 
Unfortunately, many other provincial leaders were in contrast completely indifferent to the education 
agenda, and devoted little effort to its progress. 
186 According to the calculations in Chapter Three, the average period of schooling in the early 20th 
century lasted only about two years; thus modern schooling had little relevance to most  rural Chinese.  
187 A large proportion of rural children still enrolled in local sishu, because of the relatively low tuition 
fees and easy access. Their parents did not want to pay tax to fund modern primary schools for them. 
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& Ding, 1982), suggesting that resistance to any new tax was strong, to education 
levies above all.  
4.1.2 County governments: local implementation 
As emphasised, nearly all educational decisions on primary schooling were delegated 
to local level, and according section 2.2, it is clear that most of primary schooling 
were financed by tax revenue collected by government. Were county officials the 
ones who carried out the execution regarding promoting primary schooling such 
policy? What kind of incentive did they bear?  
 
Local politics in early 20th century China failed to meet one necessary condition for 
delivering functioning governance – political stability. Olson (1993) sketches a 
pattern under which greater government accountability emerges in places with higher 
political stability (Olson, 1993). Accordingly, it is only in politically stable conditions 
that a government can have an effective long-term horizon  in which to function. If 
the political future is unpredictable, a government has very little incentive to provide 
public goods, such as education, which generate no short-term benefits. Many 
historical narratives portray China from the late 19th century as undergoing political 
turmoil at national level; however, ascertaining the extent of political instability at the 
county unit is a much more challenging task. Here, we exploit the frequency in the 
turnover of county magistrates to reveal a general picture of the political stability of 
different localities. We collected more than 500 county gazetteers containing relevant 
information on magistrates.188 As Table 4.6 shows, throughout the Republican era the 
average time that a county magistrate was in office was notably short. The data 
suggest an exceptionally high frequency of reshuffles of local officials, with more 
than half the counties’ magistrates serving only from six to twelve months.189 To 
provide a comparable reference to the figure, under Qing rule the term of a magistrate 
in office was at least 3 years, bearing in mind that the personal evaluation of each 
                                                 
188 County gazetteers(县志), sometimes translated as chorography. In Chinese history, every county 
compiled gazetteers to record the geographic, political, social and economic contents of the locality. 
Under a new regime, new content would be added, but the old records were not replaced. For this study 
we collected more than 500 county gazetteers published in the 1990s, which contained information on 
magistrates in its locality for the whole Republican period.   
189 Instability and confusion was similarly server at upper level of government. There were 24 cabinet 
reshuffles, and for the post of prime minister alone, there were people held the office between 1916 and 
1928(H. Chi, 1976, p. 2).  
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magistrate took place once every 3 years (Qu, 2003, p. 60).190 In short, the frequent 
reshuffles in office created a remarkably unstable local political and administrative 
climate.  
    
Table 4.6: Turnover of county magistrates 
Local 
magistrates 
Average length in office (years) 
<0.3 0.3-0.5 0.5-1 1-1.5 1.5-2 >2 
1911-1917 0.59 9.7 64.71 12.94 7.06 4.9 
1917-1932 0 3.07 55.36 26.3 3.97 7.33 
Note: This table relies on information from a large collection of Chinese gazetteers. I collected 
information on 592 counties, the gazetteers of which recorded the names and tenure of its magistrates 
through this period. The list of county gazetteers is too long to present here, and can be found in the 
Appendix B.    
 
Even if there were sufficient time for county magistrates to put their policies into 
practice, they had no clear political incentive to provide public goods. Without the 
granting of a political voice to the masses, local authorities were not accountable to 
the people. In theory, one way to enhance the effectiveness of local governments and 
local officials were accountable through the tight control of their career prospects via 
the personnel appointment system. Under such institutions, even without local 
elections, local officials were strongly incentivised to attain the goals set by their 
superiors in order to advance their political career. 191  However, the reward 
mechanisms through this trying period had very vague targets on specific 
responsibilities of county magistrates should achieve,192 and placed far more emphasis 
on political conformity than on governing performance.193 In other words, displaying 
                                                 
190  Under Qing rule, after each three-year evaluation, the magistrate would be allowed to stay, 
relocated, or advanced in office (Qu, 2003, p. 60). Compared with the norms in the Qing dynasty, the 
tenure time for magistrates throughout the Republican era seem considerably reduced.  
191A target-setting framework contributed substantially to China’s economic development after 1978. 
Even though officials faced no pressure from local elections, the Communist Party tightly controlled 
the appointment system of local officials over a wide range of targets. The targets are usually easily 
measurable ones, for instance GDP growth.    
192 As discussed in section 2.2 of Chapter One, what specific activities a county magistrate should 
undertake had never been made explicit in Chinese history (Chien, 1950, pp. 43-45; Qu, 2003, pp. 29-
34). The relevant regulations stayed similarly vague in the Republican period.  
193 With the abolition of the civil service examination, a new recruitment process was set up, which 
combined recommendation by high officials, a review by the Ministry of the Interior, and a newly 
designed magistrates’ examination (Wou, 1974). In practice, the actual appointment was often handled 
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political loyalty to a provincial leader or a certain faction played a dominant role in 
local officials’ careers and their advancement (Chauncey, 1992; McDonald, 1978).194  
 
Furthermore, supervision from the provincial and central governments was so weak 
that even if governing performance were considered an important criterion for a local 
official’s future prospects, it would be highly unlikely for upper level government to 
receive an accurate and timely account of performance. Taking education as an 
example, throughout the Republican era, very few local educational inspections were 
held, and detailed education records were available for very few years; thus 
evaluating one magistrate’s governing performance on the basis of educational 
development was ruled out.  
 
With such minimum incentives, why did local officials take huge political risks by 
levying non-statutory surcharges against central government’s regulation to build up 
primary schools? Did they do it for the purpose of corruption? The eroded state 
capacity did in fact enable local governments to increase their fiscal capacity, if not 
autonomy, and such liberty paved the way for local exploitation. There is no denying 
that some exploitative and extractive governance was observed in some regions.195 
Starting from the late 19th century, the great increase in the number of new local 
levies caused an outbreak of anti-tax riots, some of which even developed into 
significant rebellions against the government (Z. Zhang & Ding, 1982). However, no 
large-scale predatory behaviour towards local residents was recorded, and the extent 
of the disruption to local governments’ day-to-day operations was less than expected 
(Mccord, 1993, pp. 81-118; Q. Wang, 2000). Moreover, for schooling in particular, 
the tax revenue collected was indeed directed to the increasing number of modern 
primary schools.  
 
In conclusion, an examination of the incentive structure and fiscal capacity of local 
government raises a puzzle. Facing no institutional checks, clear political incentives 
or even legitimate fiscal tools, we see local governments making non-obligatory 
                                                                                                                                            
on an informal basis, and, because of the lucrativeness of those posts, they were usually assigned by the 
regional leaders as an important forms of leverage for establishing their own local patronage networks. 
194For instance, all counties experienced a very fast turnover of magistrates around 1927, because after 
the success of the northern expedition, the Nanjing government attempted to integrate various regional 
powers under its control. 
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efforts to collect non-statutory surtax, not for purposes of corruption and predation, 
but for increasing the provision of local public goods. Why? 
 
4.2 The real decision maker: local gentry 
As discussed in section 2.2 of Chapter One, there had been a power sharing between 
officials and other elite groups at local level through Chinese history(C. Chang, 1955, 
pp. 51-70; K. G. Deng, 2011, p. 26; Qu, 2003, p. 31; Remick, 2004),and the seizing of 
local power by elite groups was enhanced through the late 19th century and early 20th 
century to fill local administrative vacuums(Keenan, 1994; Lary, 2007, pp. 50-51; 
Mccord, 1993, pp. 81-118; Sheridan, 1977). Therefore, the development of mass 
education was not determined solely by local officials’ incentive. Instead, it was an 
outcome affected by the dynamics of vested interest groups within local politics.  
 
The more critical interest group in local politics was a specific social elite group – the 
gentry. As discussed in Chapter One, throughout the crisis-ridden final ages of Qing, 
and the chaotic first few decades of the 20th century, there was an expansion of gentry 
management in local communities. It has been widely observed that local elites 
stepped in to ensure the continuation of order in local civil administration. Drawing 
evidence from historical narratives, the gradual assumption of authority over taxation 
and appropriation of public facilitates after the late Qing period became common 
(Chauncey, 1992; Dennerline, 1975; Keenan, 1994, pp. 125-141; Mccord, 1993, pp. 
81-118; McDonald, 1978; Remick, 2004; Sheridan, 1977; Wakeman & Grant, 1975, 
pp. 1-25). Therefore, it is not an overstatement that when it came to decisions about 
local public school the real decision makers were not local officials, but the local 
gentry. 
 
To begin with, defining the so-called gentry in China is worth careful explanation. 196 
The term ‘gentry’ in China refers to people who had obtained their prestigious status 
from success in the civil service examination and who as a result could hold office. 
Their rank could not be inherited. The gentry members,  who can be equated to degree 
                                                 
196 The term ‘gentry’ (士绅 or 缙绅) has no full equivalent in English. Sometimes people translate 士
绅 into ‘elites’, but in most cases, the term ‘gentry’ is used as a widely acceptable translation. Gentry in 
Europe are usually associated with large land-holdings and aristocracy, both of which are inheritable. 
Therefore, the term has a distinctively different meaning in the Chinese context.  
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holders, constitute the most important social elite group in Chinese history, and only 
comprise the top 0.5 per cent of the whole Chinese population (C. Chang, 1955, p. 
102; Ni & Van, 2006). 
 
Surprisingly, few researchers have thought to connect local gentry to modern 
schooling. The few studies that are based on micro-historical evidence vividly 
illustrate how closely members of the local gentry were involved in urging the 
development of modern schooling throughout this period (Chauncey, 1992; Keenan, 
1994; Liao, 1936; McDonald, 1978; Wen, 2002; B. Zhang & Qin, 2001). Owing to 
the inseparable link between the gentry and education, it is difficult to neglect their 
intentions and interests in furthering the agenda of modern education. This section 
surveys the political and economic relevance of the local gentry to gauge their power 
and predict their preferences in the rise of modern education.\ 
 
4.2.1  The structure of local gentry 
In order to understand the interests and preferences of the gentry, we begin by noting 
that the gentry were a far from homogenous group of people, who enjoyed similar 
social prestige and sources of income; on the contrary, its membership can be divided 
into two opposing tiers, with different career paths, economic bases and social status 
(C. Chang, 1955, pp. 6-8; Ho, 1962, pp. 17-41). 
 
The top tier of the gentry included bureaucrats already in office and high (middle) 
degree holders who were qualified for official appointments. To be eligible as an 
official, holders of at least the degree of Jinshi, Juren and Gongsheng could be 
selected for the Imperial Academy as students. According to Graph 3, all the top three 
types of degree holder were higher tier gentry, who were eligible to hold a 
government post.  
 
The lowest tier of gentry consisted of the lowest degree holders called Shengyuan or 
Xiucai who had passed the licensing examination (院考) in a prefectural capital or 
had purchased an equivalent degree. In most cases, success in this level of the Civil 
Service Examination brought only the title of gentleman, exemption from corporal 
punishment and corvée (labour service), special arrangement regarding tax payments
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Figure 4.2: The structure of gentry & levels of the Civil Service Exam 
 
 
         *Source: (C. Chang, 1955, p. 9) 
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and entitlement to wear a scholar’s robes, but not a guarantee of entering the civil 
service and becoming a bureaucrat (C. Chang, 1955, pp. 32-43; Ho, 1962). In fact, 
only less than 3 percent of Shengyuan had the chance of attaining office, leaving most 
holders of their rank gentry ignored by officialdom  (C. Chang, 1955, p. 118). 
 
4.2.2 The long-standing functions of the gentry in local communities 
 
Members of the top tier gentry were only allowed to take official posts outside their 
own home province.197 Lower degree holders (Shengyuan) who were ineligible to 
hold office, usually remained in their home localities, and constituted a large 
proportion of the educated elite class outside the bureaucratic system in rural China.  
 
The importance of the gentry, mainly the lower ranks, in governing local affairs was 
not novel in Chinese history. It is understood to have shaped the political fabric and 
social structure of local society in various forms. On the one hand, regulations forbade 
county-level officials to have come from the locality where they served; therefore, 
they possessed very limited knowledge and information about local conditions. To 
cope with their uphill task, they relied heavily on cooperation and assistance from the 
local elites, including members of the gentry (Qu, 2003, p. 31; Remick, 2004). On the 
other hand, given that direct state control never penetrated beyond county level (K. G. 
Deng, 2011, p. 26; Qu, 2003, p. 5), the daily life of rural people was organised in the 
village as a unit, which was based entirely on a foundation of local gentry. 198 As a 
literate body and social elite, the gentry filled most of the influential and lucrative 
posts, including village heads,199 relief managers, tax agents for the local tax bureau, 
clerks for magistrates and, of course, school managers and teachers (C. Chang, 1962; 
Duara, 1988, p. 159; Wakeman & Grant, 1975, p. 4). Through such activities, they 
provided local communities with their personal leadership, and inspiration, as well as 
their knowledge.  
                                                 
197 This is an edict used by the Qing Court to prevent regional patronage. Usually, the top tier gentry 
would play an influential role in their own hometown only after retiring from their official posts.  
198 As discussed in section 2.2 of Chapter One, a village was not state administrative unit; therefore the 
head of a village was not a state official either. When a village attempted to elect its own head, the 
village council, which normally consisted of the local elites, usually chose a candidate from its own 
circle. Thus, the local administration was largely in the hands of local elites. 
199 Village heads possessed extensive authority ranging from village finance and crop watching to 
village defence.  
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One noteworthy feature is that owing to the influential function of the gentry in local 
management, the state made clear its intention to restrain the power of this elite group 
and to balance the number of bureaucrats from different regions. To this end, a quota 
system was designed and imposed at the first level of the civil service exam for each 
county. 200  Under this system, each county received a quota figure regulating the 
number of candidates who would be allowed to pass the first level of the exam 
(licensing exam), and consequently, the number of lower gentry (lowest degree 
holders) in each county were directly under the control of the Qing Court. 201 This 
quota will be further explored in the empirical strategy of the research below in this 
chapter. 
 
In summary, the vital function served by the gentry in local management has a long 
history, and was further enhanced during the early 20th century due to the political 
confusion and new demands for public services202 created by a wave of urbanisation 
and modernisation.203  
 
4.2.3 Motivation of local gentry in modern education 
 
Given that they served an irreplaceable function in local affairs, what were the 
specific interests of the traditional gentry in the sector of modern primary education?  
 
                                                 
200 There were two kinds of quota. Besides the quota assigned directly to each county, there was 
another, prefectural, quota. The figure was allocated to each prefecture as a whole and could be shared 
between counties, but the prefectural quota was comparatively small.  
201 The quota system for the entry level of exam was assigned to the county as a unit, while the quota 
for the higher level of exam was imposed on the province as a unit.  
202 For instance, the birth of the first municipal government in Shanghai demonstrated clearly that  the  
local elites’ seized power to ensure the increasing public demand for facilities due to urbanization. 
After the first Sino-Japanese war, Shanghai’s local figures started to run the new city council to carry 
out long-standing projects required by this speedily expanding metropolis, such as widening streets and 
building bridges(Ma, 2008). 
203 The increasing activities of local gentry in the public domain were various; here, we mainly 
emphasise their determination and efforts to expand education. Another crucial example of local elites’ 
increasingly important role lay in the lijin tax collection. The collection of this main source of tax 
revenue was quasi-official in practice, and even further empowered the local elite’s legitimacy in local 
public affairs (Yi Xu, 2009).  Since the gentry took extensive responsibility for local management, 
there were even some attempts to institutionalise the role of the gentry into formal politics by absorbing 
gentry members into the local assemblies or establishing an elective Council, which would existed for 
2 years only before being abolished (S. Cheng, 1919, p. 138). For instance, the founding of the county 
assembly, composed of local elites, was originally part of the Qing Court’s preparation for the 
constitution in rural areas. Interrupted by the 1911 Revolution, county assemblies still became the 
principal voice on community matters ranging from annual tax rates to the provision of public goods 
(X. Zhang, 2000, p. 49). 
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1). Social obligation and official-endorsed management  
 
One obvious incentive for the gentry’s being active in promoting education was a 
sense of obligation befitting their social rank. The gentry, with their prestigious status 
from the state-sanctioned examination, had a long history of showing moral 
responsibility in local management. Numerous records document local gentry’s 
superintending public works to maintain bridges, ferries, walls and temples, 
sponsoring and printing local gazetteers, participating in local sacrifices and 
Confucian rituals, and organising relief for refugees (C. Chang, 1955, pp. 51-70; Qu, 
2003, pp. 282-330). In the same vein, the gentry’s active engagement in local 
schooling had long existed, and they provided financial means, personal leadership or 
simply knowledge in the sector of education.204 
 
Moreover, apart from their sense of public obligation as social elites, the gentry’s role 
in the administration of local education was organized as a government-delegated 
authority, which was endorsed, if not encouraged, by the state during the first half of 
the 20th century. Looking at the task of primary education in particular, the Education 
Act 1904 specifically notes that “Local officials may select gentry members … and 
charge them with responsibility for the management of modern educational affairs” 
(F. Wang, 1994). Accordingly, the chief officers and staff of county education 
bureaus were all appointed from the local gentry, and not from state officials 
(Chauncey, 1992; Keenan, 1994, p. 111). 205  On the same lines, the gentry’s 
predominant responsibility in the education sector held good down to the grass-roots 
level (villages and districts). The state specifically outlined three criteria for a director 
of a school district, one being the need to have obtained at least Shengyuan status 
                                                 
204 The most wealthy and powerful gentry families often initiated, managed, and more importantly, 
funded some social organisations to help local young people obtain a better education. For instance, 
Juying hui (聚英会) and Zhuying hui (助英会), as Chinese names, literally indicate that they had the 
function of specifically ‘helping young talent’. Later, in the Republican era, they transformed 
themselves into Education Associations, the most influential local civic organisations, but their 
essential structure and purpose remained.  
205 The chief officers and volunteer officials of the education exhortation bureaus (renamed to county 
educational bureau later) were filled by highly respected local people, gentry members in most cases. 
After 1922, when the Education Bureau replaced the exhortation bureaus, its function in practice did 
not change. The director of the Educational Bureau and four educational committee members were all 
leading gentry as well. Another purely civil organisation emerged, the Educational Administrative 
Committee, comprising nine members; all of whom supposedly served without payment. They 
consulted with the head of the education bureau (Gamble, 1954, p. 189). 
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(Keenan, 1994, p. 126). 206  At village level, all schools had a board which was 
responsible for the primary school’s operations, the members of which, as well as 
other village leaders, also had to be local gentry.  
 
2). Private interests: job markets 
 
Their private economic interests also shaped the traditional gentry’s motivations for 
engaging in public education and other public projects(Wakeman & Grant, 1975, p. 
4). As mentioned, gentry members had very diverse income sources and career paths. 
For the lower tier, whose title led primarily to social status with no assurance of an 
official post, education had long served as one possible job market. Examples of this 
multiplied after the education expansion following the late Qing period, in particular. 
Many gentry members took jobs in supervising the construction of schools, managing 
school operations and teaching (Keenan, 1994, pp. 1-5). Indeed, the local education 
sector constituted a desirable job market and potential source of income for local 
gentry. 
 
The importance of the local education sector as a job market for these traditional 
degree holders was substantially enhanced throughout the early 20th century. Given 
the close link between gentry status and the Civil Service Examination, the 
discontinuation of the exam in 1905 had a devastating effect on their legitimacy as 
social elites (B. Elman, 2000; Esherick, 1990, pp. 294-296). With this system gone, 
the old patronage networks were torn down and replaced by other things  (Keenan, 
1994, pp. 131-132). Eventually, the traditional gentry lost their legitimacy as the elites 
in society, and held no more advantage in many job markets than did the newly 
emerging elites, including new scholars, national capitalists and state technocrats, 
most of whom were equipped with a modern education and were concentrated in the 
big metropolitan centres or treaty ports (Y. Li, 2005, pp. 33-41). More and more posts 
in the public sphere cease to prefer traditional degree holders; on the contrary, a 
modern education background became an advantage.207 For instance, more than half 
                                                 
206The other two criteria were first, that the director should be from the locality; and second, that he 
should have some experience of background working in education.  
207 Modern education became an advantage in the job market during the early 20th century, in particular 
for the public sector. This implies that modern education had become a very important selection 
criterion for the new bureaucrats after the civil service was dismantled.  
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of the cabinet ministers from 1920 to 1928 had received a modern education or had 
even been educated abroad. The impetus to earn a living became increasingly 
important, not to say urgent, for gentry members in a period when their potential job 
market was shrinking. People who had studied abroad dominated the tertiary 
education sector, and secondary schools were full of people who had received at least 
some modern education.208 For traditional gentry members, a job in primary education 
stood as one of the few available routes to career advancement and a secure financial 
future.  
 
In conclusion, by exploring the preferences and intentions of each interest group in 
the local educational circle, we find a paradox: weak local government officials seek 
to collaborate with traditional gentry (lower degree holders) who themselves have 
been rejected by Chinese Imperial officialdom. A further decline in status and earning 
with the abolition of the civil service exam made local gentry particularly proactive in 
the sector of primary education, thanks both to their long-standing public moral 
obligation and the private economic interests associated with the spread of schooling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Table: Education and background of Cabinet Ministers, 1920-28  
Education background number per cent 
Classic Education 52 55.32% 
Modern Education 
 
9 9.57% 
Military Academy Education 14 14.89% 
Educated Abroad  51 54.26% 
  
208  Universities and secondary schools were extraordinarily concentrated in very limited regions, 
therefore controlled by newly emerging elites based in urban centres. For instance, in 1907, among 
1410 counties for 16 provinces, only 231 counties had secondary schools established, and 71.2% of 
which were prefecture seats, implying tremendously high level of urban bias. Similarly, among 1501 
counties, only 242 counties obtained secondary schools in 1916, and the ratio remained as 32.9%.  
Such concentration of higher education institutes in prefecture seats and provincial capitals implies that 
traditional gentry in rural localities had little chance to be included into this new educated elite circle.  
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5. Data  
 
To empirically test the hypothesis outlined above, I assembled a new county-level 
dataset for most of the provinces in China Proper209  so as to explore the spatial 
variations in the diffusion of primary education in China for the period 1907–1933, 
and further pin down what factors accounted for its regional dispersion. Most of the 
dataset relies primarily on digitising contemporary sources, covering about 1,000 
counties, occupying 20% of the whole territory but 80% of the population in the Qing 
period (Cao, 2000).  
 
In order to identify the driving forces of China’s development of schooling in the the 
period of interest, two key variables are examined. One focus of this chapter is to test 
whether the strength of the local social institution, the gentry class, was important in 
deciding modern education. The other is to measure the political stability across 
counties in China. Apart from these two key variables, we also collect rich 
information for measuring primary schooling expansion, together with a great many 
potential indicators of economic development at the county unit level.  In the 
following sections, we define the variables and provide a basic summary of the 
statistics for the empirical analysis.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
209 We exclude Manchuria and Tibet, Xinjiang and Qinghai, other peripheral provinces, both due to the 
inaccessibility OF data and the different schooling systems operating in these regions. Inside China 
Proper,  moreover, we have no data for Sichuan province. 
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Map 4.2: The Geographical Data Covered 
  
Panel A: Data coverage in 1907 Panel B: Data coverage in 1916 
  
  
Panel C: Data coverage in 1930 Panel D: Sample counties  
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5.1 Measuring the rise of primary schooling 
The dependent variables are educational indicators in three benchmark years: 1907, 
1916 and 1932. The educational provision is measured as school density over 10,000 
people and primary education expenditure per capita. The schooling outcome is 
measured as the primary enrolment ratio. For some regions and years, we also 
construct a teacher-student ratio as a proxy for education quality.  
 
1). Primary school density: the number of primary schools normalised by both 
population (per 1,000 people) and land area (per 1,000𝑘𝑚2) to reflect the supply of 
primary schooling. School density is an indicator of schooling accessibility, which is 
an essential predictor of schooling outcomes. It may be particularly important when 
society face sharp contrasts in terms of transportation.  
2). Primary enrolment ratio: this is one of the most standardised measurements of 
schooling outcome.  
3). Primary schooling expenditure per capita: this is a widely used indicator of 
schooling provision, which directly measures the level of investment in maintaining 
and expanding schooling. 
4). Student-teacher ratio: this is a commonly used proxy for education quality, where 
the higher the student-teacher ratio, the lower the quality of schooling. 
 
Our data show that in 1907 there were on average only 1.34 primary schools for every 
10,000 people, resulted in primary enrolment ratios barely standing at 1.9 %. Primary 
schooling experienced such extensive expansion that by 1916 primary school density 
had risen by more than 3 times, reaching a figure of 4.9 primary schools for every 
10000 people; similarly, primary enrolment ratio soared to 9.4%. In 1933, with a 
slightly smaller sample, the primary school density had almost doubled, reaching 8.9, 
while the primary enrolment ratio had risen to 22.7%. 
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Table 4.7: Summary statistics for dependent variables: schooling variables210 
Schooling Variables Obs Means S.D  Min Max 
1907 
     Primary enrolment ratio 1027 1.90% 0.034 0.01% 45.18% 
Primary school density by population 1027 1.34 2.7 0.0003 3.41 
Primary school density by area (1000 𝑘𝑚2) 
1027 0.198 0.446 0.0005 9.17 
1916 
     
Primary enrolment ratio 1066 9.42% 0.0881 0.22% 84.24% 
Primary school density by population (1000 people) 1066 4.9 4.7 0.0074 4.875 
Primary school density by area (1000 𝑘𝑚2) 1066 0.807 1.159 0.0012 23.99 
Primary expenditure per capita 1066 0.086 0.24 0.0012 4.62 
Student-teacher ratio 1066 31.58 102.58 1.18 2541 
1933 
     
Primary enrolment ratio 787 22.65% 0.177 0.29% 84.24% 
Primary school density by population (1000 people) 787 8.9 8.1 0.01 5.29 
Primary school density by area (1000 𝑘𝑚2) 787 1.32 1.18 0.0001 9.95 
Primary expenditure per capita 787 0.38 0.69 0.004 7.6 
*Sources: 
i.1907: 
Ministry of Education(1907), Guangxu Diyici Jiaoyu Tongji Tubiao (The first statistical report on 
Education) 
Population: To construct 1910 county level population, we apply the county-level variation within one 
prefecture based on 1920 data(Stauffer, 1922)  to the 1910 prefectural population data (Cao, 2000; Z. 
Yan, 1955) 
ii.1916:  
National Board of Education (1916), Zhonghua Minguo Jiaoyu Tongji Tubiao (The education statistical 
report for the Republic of China, no. 5); Population: (Stauffer, 1922) 
iii.1933:  
Unlike 1907 and 1916, there is no national yearbook on county-level schooling information nor 
population in 1930s; instead, a number of provinces published government reports on education 
enclosing detailed statistics respectively. We gather 10 provinces that published similar education 
reports in 1930s, covering 787 counties.  
Education Bureau of Fujian Province(1930), Fujiansheng Jiaoyu Tongji (Education reports of Fujian 
province)  
Education Bureau of Guangdong Province(1935), Guangdongsheng ershisan niandu Jiaoyu Gaikuang 
(The education reports of Guangdong Province in 1933) 
Education Bureau of Guangxi Province(1932), Guangxisheng Jiaoyu Tongji (The education reports for 
Guangxi Province) 
Education Bureau of Guizhou Province(1932), Guizhousheng Jiaoyu Tongji (The education reports on 
Guizhou province)  
Education Bureau of Hebei Province, Hebeisheng Gexian Putong Jiaoyu Gailan (The county-level 
reports for general edcuation in Hebei province), 1928 
Education Bureau of Henan Province(1930), Henan jiaoyu yianjian (The education yearbook of Henan 
province) 
Education Bureau of Hunan Province(1931), Hunan quansheng Jiaoyu Tongji (The education reports 
for Hunan province), 
                                                 
210  To avoid the significant influence of major urban centres, we exclude large counties such as 
Shanghai and Canton.  
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Education Bureau of Jiangsu Province (1933), Jiangsu Jiaoyu Gailan (The education reports for 
Jiangsu province) 
Statistic Department of Shanxi Province(1930), Shanxisheng Dishici Jiaoyu Tongji (The tenth 
education report on education in Shanxi province) 
Education Bureau of Hubei Province(1932), Zuijin Hubei Jiaoyu Yilan (The education reports on 
Hubei province) 
 
5.2 Measuring the strength of local gentry 
As discussed earlier, in certain political conditions, the local gentry had an incentive 
to step in and contribute formally or informally to the rise of primary education in 
their own communities. Therefore, one focus of this chapter is to test the role of the 
gentry in explaining the successful spread of primary education.  
The great challenge facing this study is how to quantify the power of the gentry. 
Given the difficulty of measuring the strength across counties of the local elites in the 
early 20th century, this research exploits the size of the gentry population to measure 
their power in different places. As pointed out in section 3.2.2, the degree holders 
constitute the local gentry. Data on the number of different levels of degree holders in 
Qing dynasty is used as a proxy for the strength of the local gentry during the period 
under review. 
 
1). The number of lower tier gentry: 
As noted earlier that the number of Shengyuan, who were the scholars passed the 
first-level exam (licensing exam), was under control by a quota system. 211 The quotas 
on shengyuan are illustrated in Figure 4.3, which shows that the quotas varied widely 
across counties. The different quotas for Shengyuan each time the exam was held 
accumulated throughout the Qing dynasty, leading us to assume that places with 
higher quotas would generate more lower degree holders (Shengyuan).  
 
                                                 
211 The Qing state followed the regulations through from the Ming dynasty to impose a strict quota 
system on the number of candidates who could succeed at every administrative level of the Civil 
Service Examination. The system controlled the distribution across regions of the opportunity to join 
the  gentry. It was used as an institutional means to confine and regulate the size of the population of 
gentry (Bai, 2014; B. Elman, 2000, p. 140). For higher degree candidates, such as Jinshi and Juren, 
who were required to pass the provincial-level exam, the quota was allocated at the provincial level. 
For lower degree holders, the quota system was assigned to prefectural and county levels. One feature 
of the quota system was that regional quotas remained stable through the Qing dynasty; only after the 
Taiping Rebellion, in order to encourage and reward the local contribution to the quelling of the 
rebellion, did a substantial increase occur for many places, notably the Lower Yangzi delta.  
                                                                                                                                    138  
 
The Imperially Established Institutes and Laws of the Great Qing Dynasty  ( 大清会
典) carefully documented the quota system across counties through the Qing period 
(Kun, 1899).  Although the quota system remained stable between 1644 and 1851, 
because of the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), the Qing government 
increased the quotas for many regions in order to strengthen its alliances  among the 
local gentry against rebel forces(C. Chang, 1955, pp. 83-92; Ho, 1962, pp. 181-183; 
Kun, 1899).. After the war, the revised quota assigned in 1873 persisted until the 
abolition of the exam. Figure 4.4 shows that originally the most commonly assigned 
numbers were at first 8, 12, 14 and 20, but that the expansion of quotas after the 
Taiping Rebellion increased the variation between quotas significantly. In this 
chapter, data from both periods are analysed. Our main analysis uses quota figures 
from the latter period, but the results are robust if quotas in the early period are used. 
 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of Shengyuan quota, for both early and late Qing 
 
Sources:  (i). Shengyuan Quota:(Kun, 1899)    (ii). Jinshi: (Jiang, 2007) 
 
According to Table 4.8, the number of gentry occupied only a small proportion of the 
population. The average quota was only 13 per county through the most of the Qing 
period, but, after the quota expansion during the Taiping Rebellion, the average quota 
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increased to 19 per county. Normalized by the 1910 population, on average there were 
only 1.58 Shengyuan over every 10,000 people. 
 
Table 4.8: Summary statistics for the numbers of the gentry 
 Gentry Variables: Obs Means S.D Min Max 
Quota for Shengyuan (lower degree holders) 
     
      Original Shengyuan quota  1499 13.24 6.14 0 32 
       Shengyuan quota in the later period  1499 19.43 13.2 0 74 
Shengyuan quota density in late Qing (per 10000 peope) 1499 1.58 1.66 0 20 
Accumulated number for Jinshi (higher degree holders) 1499 14.22 27.4 0 306 
Jinshi density in late Qing212 1499 0.86 1.3 0 13 
*Source:  Shengyuan: (Kun, 1899);  Jinshi: (Jiang, 2007) 
 
2). The number of top tier gentry 
Jinshi: As displayed in Figure 4.2, Jinshi was highest scholarly rank under the 
traditional education system. Jinshi did not count as local gentry in most cases, but we 
can use the number of higher degree holders as a robustness check. There was no 
quota system imposed on Jinshi numbers at county level; therefore the regional 
variation in numbers is more likely to be a merit-based result. For the top scholars 
under the traditional education system who obtained the title of Jinshi, both the Ming 
and Qing dynasties kept detailed personal records (Jiang, 2007). We collect the 
accumulated numbers at the county unit level of people who attained this rank as a 
measurement of the size of the foremost gentry.    
 
5.3 Measuring political stability 
In order to measure the political stability at the county level, which is the main 
administrative unit that accounted for spread of education across China, we use the 
frequency of turnover of county magistrates. There are many studies on the effect of 
the term limits. Length of term may influence incumbents’ accountability, including 
the tendency to provide public goods in democratic societies(Besley & Case, 1995). 
                                                 
212 The Jinshi density in late Qing is calculated by the accumulated Jinshi numbers through the Qing 
era and then normalised by the population in 1910. 
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Does a leader’s length of stay in societies such as China, without the pressure of local 
elections, impact on his commitment to providing public goods? Even without direct 
evidence for the period under discussion, the literature on communist China after 
1978, when a decentralised and authoritarian political system prevailed, confirms that 
county heads’ tenure has an inverse U-shaped relationship with school infrastructure 
spending, reaching its peak in their third or fourth year in office (Lv & Liu, 2013). 
 
More than 500 surviving county gazetteers were gathered to gain relevant information 
on county magistrates. In order to match the two benchmark years for schooling, we 
used the average length of time that each county magistrate served in office213 for two 
time windows: 1911-1917 and 1917-1933. The average length of time that a 
magistrate remained in office was about 1.22 years for the first period, and 1.13 for 
the second period, suggesting that, if we draw references from contemporary China, 
the average number is far from reaching a tipping point whereby an inverse-U starts to 
fall (Lv & Liu, 2013). 
 
Table 4.9: Summary statistics for the turnover of county magistrates 
 County Magistrate Turnover Obs Means S.D Min Max 
   1911-1916:average tenure in office  592 1.22 0.701 0.29 5 
   1917-1933:average tenure in office  592 1.13 0.806 0.32 8 
*Note: This table relies on information derived from a large collection of Chinese gazetteers. 
 I collected information on 592 counties, the gazetteers of which recorded the names and reshuffle 
times of its magistrates through this period. The list of county gazetteers it can be found in a table in 
the Appendix B.   
 
In theory, one potential weakness in employing figures of magistrate turnover to 
measure political stability is the problem of endogeneity. Is it possible that a 
magistrate who provided better education would stay in office longer because of his 
better performance? This concern is valid in most cases, but cannot be applied in 
China in the historical period under study. The appointment and replacement of 
county magistrates was closely associated with the dynamics of local politics or the 
struggles in the upper levels, but not with individual achievement (Q. Wang, 2000; Y. 
                                                 
213 In order to avoid the problem of counting data in further regression studies, the turnover times of 
county magistrates are converted to figures for average tenure in office. 
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Zhang, 1999).214 In short, given the particular context of the period under discussion, 
it is reasonable to assume that the length of one magistrate in office was not 
endogenously decided by his performance in providing public goods. 
 
5.4 County characteristics 
In order to measure the effect of factors associated with economic development on 
schooling provision and primary enrolment ratios, we need information on the 
regional distribution of economic prosperity across China between the late Qing 
period and the Republican era. Unfortunately, data such as household income, 
industry structure and GDP per capita are not available. As a substitute, a long list of 
alternative proxies for economic development is adopted in this study. 
 
Agricultural production capacity:  
Given that China was an agrarian economy through the first half of the 20th century, 
the strength of the agricultural sector reflected overall economic prosperity. The 
importance of agriculture is enhanced by the fact that land tax was for a very long 
time the main source of tax revenues for the Chinese state. This would suggest that 
the state’s capacity should have been higher in regions with better agricultural 
production. 
 
1). Soil quality and agriculture production:  
Soil quality has long been considered as one partial determinant of a locality’s 
agriculture production. Given the lack of historical data on agricultural production, 
we construct a cross-sectional variation in the suitability of the soil for growing rice 
and wheat in 1960. 215 If we assume that the distribution of soil quality did not change 
systematically over time, it could be a proxy for potential agricultural production 
capacity across counties in the early 20th century. This information comes from the 
Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database compiled by the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO). The database divides the entire globe into 2.2 
million grid cells, with each cell covering around 50 square kilometres. Most Chinese 
                                                 
214For instance, all the counties experienced very frequent turnovers in magistrates around 1927, 
because the Nanjing government, after the success of the northern expedition, tried to integrate the 
various regional powers under its control. 
215 The database provides information on the potential yields of 154 crops in each zone, and I have 
chosen wetland rice and wheat, which have low input levels. 
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counties cover 6 to 98 cells. Map 4.3 illustrates the distribution of suitability for rice 
and wheat, with darker areas more suitable for agricultural production.  
 
2).Fiscal capacity: Land tax quotas in the late Qing period 
To ensure that soil suitability is a sound proxy for historical agricultural development, 
we also, as an alternative measure, exploit land tax quotas, which are closely 
associated with agricultural yields,. The latest systematic surviving records on land 
tax per prefecture through the Qing dynasty were documented in 1820; therefore, this 
measurement loses variation across counties within the same prefecture. 216 
Additionally, this land tax quota remained unchanged for the previous almost 100 
years, implying that it is not  time-sensitive, either, to the changes in agricultural 
production.  
 
Modern industry: 
The effect of modern industry on schooling diffusion requires special attention. 
According to global evidence, manufacturing has created a demand for child labour, 
because the nature of the work does not require high physical capacity. 217 For China 
during the period under discussion, the biggest sector in modern industry was 
manufacturing, and testing whether its presence tended to slow education progress is 
especially important. The ideal measurement of modern industry strength would be 
the exact composition figures of shares of employment in the manufacturing sector 
across counties; however, the relevant data is not available. As a substitute,  the 
cumulative number of domestic modern firms between 1841 and 1915 is adopted as a 
proxy to reflect the strength of modern industry (Y. Chang, 1989).218 Second, aware 
that modern domestic industries were sparsely scattered across China, we construct a 
dummy variable for whether modern industry operated in a given county.  
 
                                                 
216 Furthermore, this tax data does not directly provide actual agricultural productivity, but a quota set 
by the Qing court, which remained the same for almost 100 years. 
217 In early industrialised countries, such as the UK and US, poor children had worked for centuries 
before industrialization, but it profoundly changed the nature of child labour. Following the increasing 
number of modern mills and factories, an untold number of children were hired in factories to prepare 
and spin cotton, flax, wool and silk (Carolyn, 2001; Goldin & Sokoloff, 1982). 
218 There were some strict criteria for defining a modern industrial firm, the main one being that,  
instead of human power, the operations of a firm must be powered by a steam engine or electricity. 
Chang also uses other criteria in terms of size; ( (1) have registered capital of at least 10,000 silver 
yuan, 8 (2) employ at least 30 workers, (3) produce an annual output of at least 50,000 silver yuan in 
value, and (4) have adopted modern (hierarchical) management practices (Y. Chang, 1989). 
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Map 4.3: Soil suitability for major crops 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FAO.(2012), Global Agro-ecological Zones (GAEZ v3.0) 
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Western penetration: 
Western influence penetrated many dimensions of Chinese life from the 1840s 
onwards, and foreign ideals deeply affected the expansion of modern schooling. The 
influence as a whole can be divided into two channels. First, from an ideological 
perspective, the new education system was modelled on the Western practice, which 
was completely different from the traditional Confucian teaching and delegitimised 
the long-standing literati-bureaucrat system in China. More exposure to Western ideas 
may have encouraged people to be more receptive to modern ideas, including a new 
education system. In addition, from a ‘learning by doing’ point of view, missionary 
schooling, as a pioneer in China, was the best model for local governments to follow; 
accordingly, places with more missionary schooling may be expected to provide 
better primary schooling performance.  
 
To model Western penetration, we construct three variables. First, a treaty port 
dummy: port cities that were open to foreign trade under unequal treaties. These cities 
were often equipped with foreign legal institutions and enjoyed more access to foreign 
trade and investment. 219  (treaty port=1, otherwise=0) (Z. Yan, 1955, pp. 42-56). 
Second, we use as indicators the number of communicants per 10,000 people and the 
enrolment ratios for missionary primary schools to capture the penetration of 
missionary work. The third proxy is the distance to its nearest telegraph station. The 
telegraph was first introduced in China in 1871. Until 1911, only 18.76% of the 
counties had an established telegraph station (Bol & Ge, 2007; Da Qing youzheng 
gongshu beiyong yutu (China postal working map) 1907). The telegraph allowed 
outside information and foreign ideas to flow. We use distance to the nearest 
telegraph station as a proxy for the level of access to distant information.  
 
Urbanization:  
Given that many scholars exploit urbanisation as proxy for economic development 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002; Kung & Bai, Forthcoming), even though we 
do not have exact urbanisation data, we construct, according to Rozman’s classic 
                                                 
219 Unequal is a term commonly used by historians to refer to a series of treaties signed by China and 
certain Western powers during the 19th and early 20th centuries after suffering military defeat. 
Following the Nanjing treaty, at least 20 unequal treaties in succession were signed, resulting in more 
ports being designated treaty ports.  
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classification of Chinese cities, a categorical variable for the size of cities as an 
alternative, to capture the level of urbanization. Big cities are defined as those with a 
population of more than 300,000, that of middle cities lies between 70,000 and 
300,000, and that of small cities falls between 30,000 and 70,000 (Rozman, 1973). 
 
Political importance: 
Many writers indicate that the locality’s distance from the political centre influences 
its governance. Counties where the prefectural governments are located in or very 
near the prefectural seat, may be more prosperous, and tend to conform to the 
supervision from upper levels of government. Therefore, we add some 
geographical variables from China’s Historical GIS Data to control for the political 
importance of a given county, including the distance from the prefectural seat, 
distance from the provincial capital, and two dummy variables: coastal and Yangtze 
(Bol & Ge, 2007). 
 
Local protests: 
As discussed in section 4.2.1, the non-obligatory efforts of local government on 
education progress might be incentivised by corruption. Here, we also include one 
measurement on the count of local protests as a proxy for local predatory 
behaviour.220 
 
Demographic controls: 
1) County size  
2) Population density, which is a potential and widely accepted proxy for initial 
economic development.221 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
220 The number of protests comes from data transcribed from newspapers; naturally, the special nature 
of the data source presents quite a high degree of bias, because whether a protest could be reported in 
the newspapers entirely depended on the information transparency in the given locality.  
221  Much of the literature shows that during Qing China, the population density was still closely 
associated with the fertility of soil in its locality, which implies that China still remained an agrarian 
economy, and the development of the agriculture sector held a crucial role.  
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Table 4.10: Statistical summary of control variables 
Variable Definition Data 
Sourc
e 
Ob Mean S.D. 
Agricultural productivity 
  
Soil quality data (rice) 4 1066 1.035 1.22 
Soil quality data (wheat) 4 1066 2.788 1.21 
Agricultural tax quota in Qing dynasty 3 977 24.37 17.01 
Industrial development  
  
Modern firms 1 1066 0.11 0.31 
Modern Industry location 1 1066 0.114 0.318 
Population density 
   
Population density_07 (new policy)  2,3 1025 1.81 2.19 
Population density_16  2,6 1066 1.94 2.29 
Population density_33  2,  620 2.25 2.73 
Urbanization level 
   
Population in 1880 3 1066 22.57 16.44 
Large city (=1, if population >300,000) 5 1066 0.25 0.44 
Medium-sized city (=1, if 70,000<population <300,000) 5 1066 0.56 0.49 
Small city (=1, if 30000<population<70,000) 5 1066 0.13 0.34 
Westernization 
   
Treaty port 7 1066 0.22 0.41 
Christians per capita (over 10,000 people) 6 1066 8.78 17.43 
Missionary primary school enrolment ratio 6 1066 0.21% 0.0053 
Nearest distance to county with telegraph  8 1066 542.9 467.2 
Political geography 
   
Distance to provincial capital 2 1066 46.51 25.57 
Distance to prefectural seat 2 1066 170.26 101.24 
Local protests 
   
Event counts in newspapers before 1912 9 1066 0.32 0.91 
Geographical controls 
  
Coast (= 1, if located on a coastline) 2 1066 0.096 0.29 
Yangtze River (if 1, if located by the Yangtze River)  2 1066 0.043 0.21 
*Sources:  
1. Chang, Y. (1989). “Private Industries in the Late Ch’ing and the Early Republic of China, 1860-
1916”: Bulletin of the Insitute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 18, 315-561.  
2.CHGIS. (2007) Version 4, Harvard Yenching Institute 
3.Zhong, Liangfang. (1981). Zhongguo Lidai Hukou Tiandi Tianfu Tongji (Statistics on China's 
Historical Population, Cultivated land and Land tax). Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Press 
4.FAO.(2012),Global Agro-ecological Zones (GAEZ v3.0) 
5.Rozman, G. (1973). Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan. Princeton University 
Press. 
6.Stauffer (1922), The Christian occupation of China: A General Survey of the Numerical Strength and 
Geographical Distribution of the Christian Forces in China. China Continuation Committee, Shanghai  
7.Yan, Zhongping. (1955). Zhongguo Jindai Jingjishi Tongji Ziliao Xuanji (Selected Statistical 
Materials of Modern China Economic History). Beijing: KeXue Press. 
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8.Statistical department of the Inspectorate general of Customs. (1907). Da Qing youzheng gongshu 
beiyong yutu (China postal working map) 
9.Zhenhe Zhang & Yuanying Ding. (1982) Qingmo Minbian Nianbiao (The History of Civil Conflict 
in the Late Qing) 
 
 
6. Empirical results 
 
Guided by the previous analysis, this section empirically investigates the driving 
forces of mass schooling from two perspectives. First, did the strength of the local 
gentry contribute to the spread of primary education? Second, to what extent did the 
political turmoil mitigate or increase the effect of the local gentry?  
 
6.1 Local gentry and the expansion of schooling 
 
OLS Baseline results: 
Given the difficulty in measuring the variations of the local gentry’s strength at 
county level over time, in this study, the number of local gentry is a cross-sectional 
variable. Therefore, we first examine the cross-sectional correlations as follows:  
 
 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 =  𝛼 + ᵞ ∙  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝜃 + 𝜀𝑖             (4.1) 
 
In Equation 4.1, i represents county;  𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖  is a set of variables capturing 
education development (school density and enrolment ratio);  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 is the variable 
of interest: the number of local gentry (measured by shengyuan quota, Shengyuan 
quota per capita and Jinshi per capita); 𝑋𝑖
′ indicates economic and geographic controls 
included; and, 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
 
6.1.1 Local gentry and primary schooling provision 
Table 4.11 features the influences of local gentry on primary schooling provision, 
which is represented by two different resource input variables, namely primary 
school density and nominal primary education expenditure per capita. The 
baseline results show that there is a significant and positive relationship between the 
quota density of the Shengyuan (lower degree holders) and modern primary school 
provision through the early 20th century. 
                                                                                                                                    148  
 
 
For instance, Columns (1), (3) and (5) show that a county with a higher quota per 
capita in the Qing dynasty enjoyed significantly better primary school density after 
controlling for only certain basic county characteristics, including population density, 
county size and provincial dummies. Adding more control variables to do with county 
economic characteristics and political importance does not alter the conclusion that 
the number of local gentry, as measured by quota density in the Qing era, had the 
effect of significantly increasing primary education provision in the three benchmark 
years. 
 
Concerning magnitude, presented in Column (2), Column (4) and Column (6), the 
effects of gentry are noticeable. In 1907, one standard deviation increase (1.58) in the 
quota density in the Qing raises the number of primary schools for 10,000 people by 
0.91 (1.58*0.58) data points. Given that the mean of primary school density in 1907 
was 1.34, this effect of the gentry quota alone accounts for 68% (0.91/1.34) of the 
average primary school density. Similarly, in 1916, one standard deviation increase in 
quota density is associated with a 23.54% increase in primary school density, when 
evaluated at the mean (1.15/4.9). In addition, the effect accounts for 11% of the 
overall primary school density in 1933 (0.97/8.9). 
 
When employing expenditure per capita as the indicator for primary schooling 
provision, Columns (7) – (10) show results that are consistent with the findings  
above. The nature of the gentry’s effect on primary education expenditure is far from 
trivial. In 1916, the gentry quota density could explain 10% of the expenditure that 
was spent on primary schooling per capita, evaluated at the mean; similarly, the 
gentry’s effect explains 18% of the primary schooling expenditure in 1933.  
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Table 4.11: Correlation between primary schooling provision and gentry 
  Primary school density over 10,000 people  
 
1907 1916 1930 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Local gentry 
0.72 0.58 1.02 0.73 0.75 0.62 
(0.14)*** (0.001)*** (0.2)*** (0.17)*** (0.31)** (0.39)* 
Population 
Density 
0.028 0.014 -0.063 -0.036 -0.57 -0.57 
(0.019) (0.035) (0.036)* (0.05) (0.14)** (0.16)** 
Other 
Controls 
NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 904 904 1066 1066 599 599 
R-squared 0.38 0.43 0.39 0.43 0.58 0.61 
 
    Primary schooling expenditure per capita 
  
1916 1930 
      (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Local gentry  
  0.007 0.0052 0.021 0.039 
  
(0.0018)*** (0.0025)** (0.0076)*** (0.009)*** 
Population 
Density 
  
0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0053 -0.011 
  
(0.0013) (0.0034) (0.0019)*** (0.0024)*** 
Other Controls 
 
NO YES NO YES 
Province FE   YES YES YES YES 
Observations   1066 1066 386 386 
R-squared   0.07 0.11 0.7 0.77 
Note: 
      
(i). In this table, the numbers of local gentry are based on the shenyuan quota density ( normalised by 1907 
population) 
(ii). Control variables include: potential soil quality for rice, late Qing land tax quota, modern industry location 
dummy, treaty port dummy, density of Christians over 10000 people, distance to nearest telegraph station, distance 
to prefectural seat, distance to provincial capital, dummy for Yangtze river, dummy for coastal area. 
(iv). All the standard errors are clustered at county level in parentheses. * significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; 
*** significant at 1% 
 
6.1.2 Local gentry and primary enrolment 
Table 4.12 shifts our attention from the effect of local gentry on primary school 
provision to its effects on enrolment ratios. Consistent with the results on 
educational provision, we find that there is a significant and positive relationship 
between the quota density of lower degree holders and the primary enrolment ratio, 
with few basic controls; adding a list of more control variables on economic 
development does not change the qualitative conclusion. In terms of magnitude, 
Columns (2), (4) and (6) show that one standard deviation increase in quota per capita 
(1.58) in the Qing period for a given county was associated in 1907with a 0.88 
percentage points increase in the primary enrolment ratio (1.58*0.56), and this effect 
accounts for 47% of the average primary enrolment ratios (0.88/1.9) in the same year. 
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The magnitude of the gentry’s impact dropped to 11% in 1916; while for the year 
1933 the gentry effect is no longer significant. 
 
Table 4.12: Correlation between primary schooling level and gentry 
 
Primary enrolment ratio 
 
1907 1916 1930 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Local gentry 
0.0075 0.0056 0.006 0.0046 0.004 0.0043 
(0.0015)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0018)*** (0.002)* (0.005) (0.007) 
Population 
Density 
0.00028 -0.00002 0.0012 -0.00069 -0.008 -0.009 
(0.00029) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 904 904 1140 1140 599 599 
R-squared 0.3 0.39 0.34 0.37 0.52 0.57 
Notes: 
(i). The numbers of local gentry are based on the shenyuan quota density (normalised by the late Qing population) 
(ii). Control variables include: potential soil quality for rice cultivation, late Qing land tax quota, modern industry 
location dummy, treaty port dummy, density of Christians over 10000 people, distance to nearest telegraph station, 
distance to prefectural seat, distance to provincial capital, dummy for Yangtze river, dummy for coastal area. 
(iii). All the standard errors are clustered at county level in parentheses. * significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; 
***   significant at 1% 
 
 
Comparing Tables 4.11 and 4.12, we find that the gentry had a persistent effect on 
primary schooling provision, consistent with the discussions above on the roles of 
different interest groups. But when we examine the gentry’s effect on education 
outcomes, it fades by the 1930s. As discussed, the schooling outcome is decided by 
both demand and supply; more importantly, they interact with each other, making it 
difficult to disentangle the separate effects. When schooling provision increases 
rapidly within a short period as a supply shock, we can assume that the educational 
outcome is largely determined by the factors that influence education supply. This is 
why, in the first few decades after modern schooling was promoted, the role of the 
gentry, which helps explain schooling provision, also explains the enrolment ratio. 
But after almost four decades of public modern primary schooling provision, the 
school density had passed the tipping point where it no longer represented an 
exogenous supply shock. This means that demand side factors, such as economic 
structure, begin to play a stronger role in determining schooling attainment, once the 
primary schooling expansion was self-sustaining.  
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6.1.3 Dynamic effects of local gentry: 
The baseline estimate focuses on the impact of gentry on schooling. If we pool the 
three cross-sections together, we can also examine how the gentry’s effect on 
schooling changed over time. The specification is as follows: 
 
 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 =  𝛼 + ᵞ ∙  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽 ∙  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑟 + 𝛿 ∙  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑟  ×  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝜃 + 𝜀𝑖 (4.2) 
where the year 1907 is left for comparison. 
 
Overall, the results in Table 4.13 also confirm the close correlation between the role 
of the gentry (the Shengyuan quota) and primary schooling development through the 
early 20th century. But the spread of schools per capita and the outcomes are largely 
explained by time dummies. More importantly, the results also show a significant 
difference in the impact of the gentry on schooling variables year by year, and it is 
clear that the impact of the gentry declines markedly over time. Starting with the 
schooling provision, the size of the impact of gentry on school density is around 42% 
in 1907, drops to 12.6% in 1916, and rises to 15.4% in 1933. These results are very 
similar to the baseline estimates in Table 4.11. For schooling outcomes, the size of the 
gentry effect is 23.7% in 1907, and falls again to 5.4% in 1916 then settling at 8.9% in 
1933.  
 
In summary, , the baseline cross-sectional results and pooled estimations both 
show that counties with a higher quota density tend in the early 20th century to have 
both better primary  education provision and better schooling outcomes. Two 
important implications can be drawn from the results. First, regarding education 
provision alone, the gentry mattered more in the early stages, when the primary 
schools were very scarce; once schooling expansion was more self-sustaining, the role 
of the gentry declined. Furthermore, the gentry presented a much stronger effect on 
the schooling provision than on the enrolment ratios, which also corresponds with our 
previous analysis that the gentry actively engaged in the decision making process 
regarding schooling provision; whereas how enthusiastically the populace responded 
to the increasing number of modern primary schools was associated with many other 
factors. 
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Table 4.13: Dynamic effects of local gentry on primary education 
  Primary school density Primary enrolment ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Local gentry 
0.062 0.058 0.0011 0.000089 
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0002)*** 
T_1916 
4.9 4.9 0.095 0.094 
(0.43)*** (0.39)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
T_1933 
10.2 10.5 0.22 0.22 
(0.86)*** (0.8)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** 
Gentry*Year 1916 
-0.059 -0.059 -0.0008 -0.00078 
(0.009)*** (0.0092)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
Gentry*Year 1933 
-0.13 -0.16 -0.0014 -0.0017 
(0.018)*** (0.022)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0005)*** 
Population Density 
-0.28 -0.38 -0.0041 -0.0067 
(0.044)*** (0.063)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0009)*** 
Potential Agriculture Yield  
-0.06 
 
0.0011 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.0043) 
Landtax Quota (Qing)  
0.035 
 
-0.00067 
 
(0.005)*** 
 
(0.00012)*** 
Modern Industry  
0.17 
 
0.016 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.006)** 
Treaty Port  
0.64 
 
0.015 
 
(0.38)** 
 
(0.0053)*** 
Christianity Density  
152.9 
 
2.55 
 
(61.2)** 
 
-1.6 
Distance to Telegraph  
-0.75 
 
-0.007 
 
(0.23)* 
 
(0.0039)** 
Distance to Prefecture-seat  
-0.014 
 
-0.00025 
 
(0.005)** 
 
(0.0001)*** 
Distance to Provincial capital  
0.003 
 
0.00005 
 
(0.001)** 
 
(0.00002)** 
Local Protests  
0.091 
 
-0.0027 
  -0.1   -0.0024 
Geo Control NO YES NO YES 
Province FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2701 2701 2701 2701 
R-squared 0.5 0.54 0.54 0.57 
 Notes: 
i. In this table, the numbers of local gentry were based on the shenyuan quota  
ii. Control variables include: potential soil quality for rice cultivation, late Qing land tax quota, modern 
industry location dummy, treaty port dummy, density of Christians over 10,000 people, distance to 
nearest telegraph station, distance to prefectural seat, distance to provincial capital, dummy for Yangtze 
river, dummy for coastal area. 
iii. All the standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses. * significant at 10 %; ** significant 
at 5 %; *** significant at 1%. 
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6.2 Instrumented evidence: the gentry’s effect on primary schooling 
The persistently close correlation between local gentry and primary schooling 
displayed in the previous section should not be interpreted as causal, for several 
reasons. First, the quota numbers for Shengyuan were not randomly assigned 
across regions. The figure is believed to be closely associated with the size of the 
county and its economic importance (C. Chang, 1955, pp. 77-79); and many 
omitted variables associated with economic prosperity are correlated in history 
with the number of local gentry. For this reason, the gentry’s influence on 
primary schooling captured in the simple OLS estimations could be due to the 
channel of unobserved economic performance, rather than the reasons provided 
in section 3.2. Another potential problem lies in the measurement error in the 
proxy for gentry power. This is because instead of the actual number of gentry 
members in the period we use the quota numbers assigned in the late Qing 
period as a proxy for the local gentry’s power in the Republican era. To address 
these concerns, and to rigorously test the gentry’s causal effect on primary 
education expansion, an instrument variable strategy is applied in this section. 
Such an instrument must be an important factor in accounting for the gentry 
(Shengyuan's quota) number variation, but must have no direct effect on 
economic performance.  
 
Instrument: a sudden change in quota numbers owing to the Taiping Rebellion 
In this section, we employ the sudden increase in regional quotas of lower degree 
holders (Shengyuan) triggered by the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) as an 
instrumental variable for quota density.    
 
The county level quotas for the lowest level scholars (shengyuan) remained very 
stable for most of the time during the Qing period, and the figures increased 
substantially only because of the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion. The magnitude of 
the increase in the quota was associated neither with the original quota number nor the 
level of economic development. According to the Imperially Established Institutes 
and Laws of the Great Qing Dynasty (大清会典), larger quotas were granted to 
disruptive regions as an incentive to extract taxes from localities; or extra quotas were 
allocated as rewards to the hometowns of those magistrates who successfully 
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organised military forces against rebels during the Taiping Rebellion (C. Chang, 
1955, pp. 83-92; Kun, 1899).222  
 
6.2.1 Falsification tests:  
Even though extra quotas were set at times of political disruption rather than as 
economic rewards, the regions most affected during the Taiping Rebellion were 
located in the most prosperous South East of China(P. A. Kuhn, 1978).223 Therefore, 
the exclusion restriction is likely to hold. In order to confirm our instrument variable 
as valid, several falsification tests were performed. To do so, we needed to prove that 
the instrument variable should not affect the indicators of economic development. 
 
Figure 4.4: change of quota vs. economic factors 
 
Note: Y is the residual of regression of the percentage of change of Shengyuan quota in total on all the 
control variables used in the baseline specification. 
                                                 
222 Larger quotas were granted to the hometown of the magistrate instead of the locality of his service, 
which makes the increase in quotas across regions more random.  
223 The Taiping rebellion began in the province of Guangxi, but quickly came to control the prosperous 
coastal provinces of China, including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and part of Anhui, and established the Taiping 
'Heavenly Capital' in the  city of Nanking (P. A. Kuhn, 1978). 
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In Table 4.14, we present the effects of our instrument variable on indicators for  
economic characteristics. The results consistently show that the sudden change in 
quota number was not statistically correlated with these economic variables. 
Furthermore, the effect of a sudden change in quota on the final quota density is 
strongly significant.  
 
Table 4.14: Falsification tests: the effect of instrument on other variables 
  
Quota 
number  
Quota 
density 
Potential 
Agriculture 
Yield 
Landtax 
Quota  
Treaty 
Port 
Modern 
Industry 
Telegraph 
  1907 
Change percent 
10.4 0.78 0.042 0.01 0.76 0.212 0.009 
(0.82)*** (0.08)*** -0.065 -0.32 -0.14 -0.33 -0.026 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 
R-squared 0.66 0.61 0.67 0.52 0.35 0.37 0.32 
 
1916 
Change percent 
10.5 1.32 0.037 -0.0026 -0.21 0.108 0.032 
(1.02)*** (0.06)*** -0.076 -0.003 -0.23 -0.35 -0.028 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1140 1140 1140 1140 1140 1140 1140 
R-squared 0.66 0.49 0.67 0.45 0.35 0.37 0.32 
 
1933 
Change percent 13.27 0.63 0.041 0.0012 0.01 -0.033 0.002 
Controls (2.1)*** (0.13)*** -0.032 -0.002 -0.33 -0.027 -0.003 
Observations 599 599 599 599 599 599 599 
R-squared 0.7 0.67 0.69 0.52 0.3 0.36 0.17 
Note: All the standard errors clustered at county level are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10 %; ** 
significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
The falsification tests displayed in Table 4.14 suggest that the sudden change in 
quotas of Shengyuan owing to the Taiping Rebellion is a plausible instrument for 
quota density. Moreover, by employing this identification strategy, we can establish 
the causal links between the strength of the local gentry and the expansion of primary 
schooling through the early 20th century.  
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6.2.2 The causal effect of the gentry on primary schooling  
To further identify the causal effect of gentry strength on primary schooling, 
Table 4.15 presents the two-stage least-squares estimates. Columns (7)-(12) 
display 2SLS estimates of the coefficient of interest, with and without controls, 
and Columns (1)-(6) present corresponding first stage results. To begin with, 
Columns (1)-(6) display the close first-stage relationship between change of the 
Shengyuan quota and the quota numbers in the late Qing period. The corresponding 
2SLS estimates of the impact of the gentry on school density and enrolment ratios are 
significantly positive across years, which is consistent with our baseline results in the 
previous section. However, unlike the findings in Tables 4.11 and 4.12 that the 
coefficients of the local gentry decrease substantially after adding in the control 
variables, in the IV results, the coefficients stay quite stable after controlling for other 
economic indicators; with the exception of 1933, when the independent variable is 
primary school density. These are encouraging results, implying that the instrumented 
local gentry density remains stable with the inclusion of other potential co-
determinants of primary schooling expansion.  
 
Concerning school provision, first, the IV coefficients for the variable of interest are 
only slightly smaller than the results from baseline regressions. For instance, one 
standard deviation increase in quota density in the Qing period causes primary school 
density to increase by 0.37 data points (1.58*0.24); evaluated at the mean, this effect 
accounts for 29.16% (0.38 /1.3) of overall density in 1907. The effects for 1916 and 
1933 are 15.1% and 6.56% respectively. Comparing these results with those in Table 
4.11 (68% in 1907, 23.54% in 1916, 11% in 1933), the IV estimates suggest the 
possibility that the baseline estimators are subject to an upward bias. 
Table 4.15: Estimation results from IV strategy 
First stage 
 
1907 1916 1930 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Change in quota 
1.46 1.49 0.48 0.39 0.023 0.043 
(0.042)*** (0.036)*** (0.22)*** (0.18)** (0.008)*** (0.009)** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 876 876 909 909 532 532 
R-squared 0.58 0.71 0.56 0.62 0.58 0.64 
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Second stage: the dependent variable is the enrolment ratio 
 
1907 1916 1930 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Local Gentry 
0.0053 0.0061 0.016 0.014 0.098 0.043 
(0.002)** (0.0034)** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.06)* (0.018)** 
Control No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 876 876 909 909 532 532 
R-squared 0.29 0.36 0.29 0.35 0.07 0.54 
  Second stage: the dependent variable is school density over 10,000 
people 
 
1907 1916 1930 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Local Gentry 
0.22 0.24 0.48 0.47 0.34 0.37 
(0.12)* (0.13)* (0.22)** (0.023)** -1.06 (0.19)** 
Control No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 876 876 909 909 532 532 
R-squared 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.58 0.61 
*Note: 
(i). The numbers of local gentry are based on the shenyuan quota, normalised by 1907 population 
(ii). Control variables include: potential soil quality for rice, late Qing land tax quota, modern industry 
location dummy, treaty port dummy, density of Christians over 10000 people, distance to nearest 
telegraph station, distance to prefectural seat, distance to provincial capital, dummy for Yangtze river, 
dummy for coastal area. 
(iii).  All the standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.* significant at 10 %; ** 
significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
When we change our independent variable to the primary enrolment ratio, the 
estimates show consistent results. A standard deviation increase in quota density 
raises primary enrolment ratios by 1.01 percentage points (0.0053*1.58); given that 
the mean of primary enrolment ratio in 1907 is 1.9%, this effect explains 44.07% of 
the primary enrolment ratios in China (0.83/1.9). Consistently, the explanatory effect 
of the gentry’s role on primary enrolment ratios declines to 23.9% in 1916 
(0.014*1.58/0.094), and reaches 30.8% in 1933. Again, comparing these results with 
those in Table 4.12 (46.5% in 1907, 10.6% in 1916; no effect in 1933), it is apparent 
that, for the latter time periods, 1916 and 1933, the IV result is considerably larger 
than the baseline result. This pattern suggests that the bias of OLS estimates is at a 
late stage of educational development when the economic characteristics, which are 
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also correlated with the quota numbers of Shengyuan in the late Qing, had stronger 
effects on the level of schooling.  
 
Table 4.16:  Dynamic effect of the local gentry on primary education 
  Primary School Density Primary Enrolment Ratio 
  OLS IV OLS IV 
Local gentry 
0.062 0.076 0.0011 0.0018 
(0.007)*** (0.022)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0007)*** 
Year 1916 
4.9 4.8 0.095 0.089 
(0.43)*** (0.39)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** 
Year 1933 
10.2 10.5 0.22 0.17 
(0.86)*** (0.8)*** (0.013)*** (0.021)*** 
Gentry*Year 1916 
-0.059 -0.047 -0.0008 -0.0006 
(0.009)*** (0.017)*** (0.0001)*** -0.0004 
Gentry *Year 1933 
-0.13 -0.078 -0.0014 -0.0026 
(0.018)*** (0.034)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0009)*** 
Control NO YES NO YES 
Province FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2701 2701 2701 2701 
R-squared 0.5 0.47 0.54 0.5 
Notes: 
(i). In this table, the numbers of local gentry are based on the shenyuan quota. 
(ii). Control variables include: potential soil quality for rice cultivation, late Qing land tax quota, 
modern industry location dummy, treaty port dummy, density of Christian over 10000 people, distance 
to nearest telegraph station, distance to prefectural seat, distance to provincial capital, dummy for 
Yangtze river, dummy for coastal area. 
(iii). All the standard errors clustered at county level are shown in in parentheses.  
* significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1% 
 
6.2.3 Robustness 
One of the main potential weaknesses of our estimates lies in the crude nature of the 
control variables for economic performance. The validity of our IV results depends on 
the assumption that the changes of quota due to the Taiping Rebellion have no direct 
effect on economic performance. While falsification tests using a list of economic 
indicators support this assumption, many other economic conditions cannot be 
examined, due to the lack of available data. Therefore, in this section, we shrink our 
sample to only one province—Shanxi (94 counties), 224  where detailed relevant 
statistics are available, thanks to several social surveys that were carried out under the 
                                                 
224 Historically, Shanxi was not an educationally advanced province. In terms of Jinshi numbers, those 
who came from Shanxi province account for only 5.46% of the national figure; while a province such 
as  Jiangsu contributed more than 15%.  
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rule of Yan(Shanxisheng Dijiuci Jingji Tongji Zhengji (The eonomic survey of Shanxi 
Province 9th), 1927). These variables include actual agricultural output, living 
expenses, etc. The positive correlation between the Shengyuan quota and primary 
schooling variables stay persistently close after more control variables are added in.  
 
In addition, to minimize measurement error, we employed different indicators as 
proxies for the number of local gentry as a robustness check. For instance, we used 
the absolute quota figure through the late Qing period and the quota number 
normalised by county size; with both indicators providing strikingly similar results, 
showing a significantly positive relationship between the local gentry in the Qing era 
and primary schooling through the Republican era.  
 
Table 4.17: Robustness check using Shanxi Province 
  School Density Expenditure per capita Enrolment Ratio 
  0.19 0.16 0.48 
 
(0.78)** (0.094)* (0.25)** 
Control YES YES YES 
Observations 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.44 0.28 0.27 
Notes: 
(i). In this table, the numbers of local gentry are based on the shenyuan quota density  
(ii). Control variables include: average productivity per mu, average cost of living, late Qing land tax 
quota, modern industry location dummy, treaty port dummy, density of Christian over 10000 people, 
distance to nearest telegraph station, distance to prefectural seat, distance to provincial capital, dummy 
for Yangtze river, dummy for coastal area. 
(iii). All the standard errors clustered at prefecture level are shown in in parentheses.  
* significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1% 
 
6.3 Political instability and the role of the gentry 
Our previous specification only considers the role of local gentry; now, we turn to 
examining whether political stable regions enjoyed better provision of public goods. 
More importantly, we are also interested in testing whether the link between the 
strength of local gentry and schooling development is different for politically stable 
and for chaotic regions.  
 
The main challenge is in constructing a valid measure for the strength of political 
instability in a county. Information on county magistrate turnover is used, and is 
calculated on the average length of a magistrate’s tenure in office for a given county. 
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As such information are not available in all counties’ gazetteers, the sample shrinks 
considerably after adding this variable to our specification. Specification and 
preliminary results: 
 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 ∙ 𝑝𝑖  + ᵞ ∙ 𝐺 + 𝜂 ∙ 𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝐺  +  𝑋𝑖
′𝜃 + 𝜀𝑖n      (4.3) 
In Equation 4.3, i represents county, and 𝑝𝑖 is the key variable of interest, political 
stability; G is the strength of the local gentry during the Qing dynasty; then we also 
include their interaction term, economic and geographic controls 𝑋𝑖
′ and  𝜀𝑖 which is 
the error term. 
 
Table 4.18: Dependent variable: primary enrolment ratios 
  Primary Enrolment Ratio 
 1916 1933 
  OLS IV OLS IV 
Local gentry 0.016 0.058 0.105 0.069 
(0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.032)*** (3.4)* 
Tenure as magistrate 0.11 0.075 0.12 0.058 
(0.006)* (0.029)*** (0.03)*** (0.012)*** 
Gentry *  Magistrates -0.031 -0.029 -0.041 -0.023 
(0.0013)** (0.01)* -0.032 (0.0046)*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE province  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 581 581 462 462 
R-squared 0.45 0.41 0.32 0.34 
 
Primary School Density 
 1916 1933 
 
OLS IV OLS IV 
Local gentry 0.162 0.149 2.14 1.59 
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.93)** (0.067)** 
Tenure as magistrate  0.042 0.103 0.37 0.41 
(0.026)** (0.059)* (0.153)* (0.192)*** 
Gentry * Magistrate -0.017 -0.035 -0.129 -0.146 
(0.009)* (0.002)* (0.077)* (0.084)* 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE province  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 581 581 462 462 
R-squared 0.45 0.41 0.67 0.67 
Notes: 
(i). In this table, the numbers of local gentry are based on the shenyuan quota density, normalised by 
1907 county population  
(ii). Control variables include: potential soil quality for rice cultivation, late Qing land tax quota, 
modern industry location dummy, treaty port dummy, density of Christians over 10000 people, 
distance to nearest telegraph station, distance to prefectural seat, distance to provincial capital, dummy 
for Yangtze river, dummy for coastal area. 
(iii). All the standard errors clustered at county level are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10 %; 
** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1%. 
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The main results are presented in Table 4.17. All estimations include all the control 
variables used in the previous specifications. Simple OLS and IV estimates show that 
the effect of the length of a magistrate’s tenure is positive, and interacting it with 
gentry density results in a significant and positive impact on the primary schooling 
enrolment ratio (0.075 -0.029*1.22=0.039). It confirms the assumption that political 
stability results in higher accountability. For instance, the primary enrolment ratio 
rises by 0.039 data points, when the tenure of a magistrate increases by one year 
(0.075-1.22*0.029). Evaluated at the mean, it accounts for 51.45 % of the enrolment 
ratio in 1916.  
 
In addition, the effect of the density of the local gentry remains positive and 
significant, after interacting with the tenure as magistrate. Moreover, if we calculate 
the coefficient for such density, the result is 0.058-0.029*1.03=0.028. This is an 
encouraging result, which is quite consistent with those in Table 4.15.  
 
The interaction term has a negative coefficient, which means that tenure as magistrate  
has a mitigating effect on the role of the gentry. It appears that the local gentry had a 
smaller impact on promoting primary schooling in counties with a relatively higher 
level of political stability. This negative interaction effect echoes historical narratives, 
whereby local gentry tended to assume local power to administer the provision of 
public goods in regions where formal governance was on the verge of collapse. The 
nature of the mitigating effect of the length of magistrate tenure is not trivial. Our 
calculations show that, evaluated by the mean, each extra year that a magistrate 
served in office mitigated the effect of quota density on primary enrolment ratio by 
37.6 % (0.029*1.22/0.094). In a nutshell, better administrative/ political stability 
brought better mass schooling, and the role of gentry was enlarged in counties with a 
more frequent turnover of magistrates.  
 
6.4 Economic outcomes and schooling development 
Apart from adding the role of the local gentry, this section seeks to provide some 
quantitative clues to the ambiguous relationship between educational development 
and economic prosperity.  
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We include all the control variables 𝑋𝑖
′ and their interactions with time dummies in 
Table 4.17. With all the above combinations, the effect of the local gentry remains 
positive and significant; while the interaction effects with economic factors have quite 
diverse results. 
 
First, population density has a negative association with primary schooling outcomes; 
this negative impact increased over time. It is an unexpected result; if we interpret 
population density as a proxy for commercialisation and urbanisation levels: it implies 
that a higher level of urbanisation did not bring any positive effect on mass education; 
instead, rural and remote regions may have performed better as regards primary 
schooling. Potential agricultural output measured by soil suitability for rice and wheat 
cultivation presents similar positive correlations with primary schooling. These two 
results suggest that in terms of primary education rich agricultural regions rose first.  
 
This conjecture can further confirm the finding that the land tax quota in the late Qing 
period had its own positive influence on primary education. Land taxes had long been 
the chief tax revenue for the Chinese state, suggesting that the land tax quota in the 
late Qing was a good proxy for fiscal capacity, but should also correlate with the 
economic weight of agriculture in each region. Land taxes at first show no significant 
effects on schooling development in 1907, but this changed under the new education 
system for the latter two benchmark years. 
 
Similar advantages in schooling outcomes in rural and economic backward areas have 
been observed in early 19th century Meiji Japan and the USA, but the underlying 
reasons are likely to have been quite different in the Chinese context. The main 
revenue sources for the county budgets were surtaxes on land tax, while the lucrative 
Likin – a tax levied as an internal tariff and also on shops – was in the grip of the 
provincial treasury. The main funding body of primary education was the county 
government, which had no authority to lay hands on the Likin. It meant that highly 
commercialised regions could contribute to provincial treasuries, but not to county 
budgets; on the contrary, regions with a prosperous agriculture sector enabled county 
governments to mobilise more potential tax revenues for primary education.  
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Table 4.19: Economic characteristics and primary enrolment ratios 
  Primary enrolment ratios 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Local gentry 
0.00081 0.00068 0.00082 0.00084 0.0011 0.0013 
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.00177)*** 
Population density 
-0.0033 
     
(0.001)***  
    
Pop_density*Year1916 
0.00058 
     
(0.0009) 
     
Pop_density*Year1933 
-0.0009 
     
(0.00002)***  
    
Soil suitability for rice  
0.0061 
    
 
(0.0019)*** 
    
Rice *Year1916  
-0.0054 
    
 
(0.002)*** 
    
Rice *Year1930  
-0.012 
    
 
(0.007)* 
    
Treaty port   
0.023 
   
  
(0.005)*** 
   
Treatyport * Year1916   
0.001 
   
  
(0.007) 
   
Treatyport * Year1933   
-0.039 
   
  
(0.016)*** 
   
Distance to telegraph    
-0.0157 
  
   
(0.0045)*** 
  
Telegraph* Year 1916    
-0.005 
  
   
(0.007) 
  
Telegraph* Year 1930    
0.057 
  
   
(0.018)*** 
  
Modern Industry      
-0.01 
 
    
(0.005)* 
 
Modern * Year 1916     
0.24 
 
    
(0.008) 
 
Modern * Year 1930     
0.037 
 
    
(0.021)* 
 
Landtax quota in Qing      
0.00003 
     
(0.00018) 
Landtax * Year 1916      
0.00096 
     
(0.00016)*** 
Landtax * Year 1933      
0.0018 
     
(0.00046)*** 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 
R-squared 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.55 
*Note: 
(i). In this table, the numbers of local gentry are based on the shenyuan quota number in the late Qing period   
(ii). All the standard errors clustered at county level are shown in parentheses.  
* significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1%. 
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The effect of the penetration of Western ideas on education development is explored 
through a series of indicators. First, regions with treaty port status tend to have much 
better primary schooling, but over time the advantages of being a treaty port declined. 
This implies that exposure to Western ideas and information was more important for 
the residents’ acceptance of modern schooling during the early phase of development 
than later. Consistent with the results for the treaty ports, we find that greater distance 
to the nearest telegraph station for a given county with less exposure to the outside 
world meant less primary education. The importance of this variable also declined 
through time.  
 
For Christian activities, another proxy for the penetration of Western ideas, when it is 
measured by the ratio of enrolment in missionary primary schools, it shows a 
significant and positive effect on primary schooling expansion; while the number of 
communicants per 10,000 people has no statistical impact on primary schooling. This 
pattern indicates that Christianity mattered mainly through its ‘learning effect’, 
consistent with Kung and Bai’s recent study (Kung & Bai, Forthcoming).  
 
Geographical controls show some interesting results; for instance, distance from the 
regional political centre, say, a prefectural seat, hindered the development of primary 
education.  
 
In sum, owing to the crudeness of the demand-side control variables, it is difficult to 
generalise any conclusive claims, but several points from the above results are worth 
stressing. First, the influence of economic prosperity on the rise of primary schooling 
changed over time. In the early stages, it seems that the factors which affected 
people’s acceptance – for instance, exposure to Western ideas and openness – played 
a more vital role. In contrast, when people began to adapt to the idea of modern 
education, the county’s economic performance, in particular the strength of 
agriculture and fiscal capacity, mattered more. Agricultural regions did not hold any 
disadvantages in terms of primary schooling development; on the contrary, the rich, 
stable and agrarian counties were the front runners in terms of the expansion of 
education. 
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6.5 Alternative influencing mechanisms of the gentry: scholar culture? 
In previous sections, a causal link was established between the quotas (of lower 
degree holders) in the Qing dynasty, and primary schooling development through the 
early 20th century. To interpret the gentry’s effect, our argument is based on two 
factors: first, their long-standing public obligation to provide public goods, and 
second their private interests; the latter hinged on their view of the primary education 
sector as their potential job market. Therefore, it was the object of the local gentry to 
deliberately promote and support the expansion of primary schooling across China, 
when local governments had no capacity or incentive to do so. In summary, when the 
formal administrative capacity collapsed, they as a social elite group assumed power 
and provided informal rules to enforce social policies; for instance, the provision of 
public education. Second, the private interests of the local gentry, both politically and 
economically, were in line with their control of the primary education sector. 
 
However, there are many other possible mechanisms through which the legacy of 
traditional education could have affected modern schooling, the most likely channel 
being clear from a cultural perspective. There are places where people always perform 
better in education, no matter what kind of education, Western or Confucian. Global 
evidence shows that education performance tends to have a high degree of persistence 
across regions and over time. The inertia of educational attainment may be genetic, 
but is more likely to be deeply rooted in culture. In the context of China, through the 
long history of the civil service exam, counties with a higher quota density may have 
generated a higher cultural respect for the value of  education among its people, which 
facilitated the successful spread of modern education. 225  To test whether this 
alternative explanation is valid, we perform two tests on the effect of the ‘scholar 
culture’ on modern schooling expansion.  
 
To begin with, a logistic regression was run to test the effect of quota density on the 
higher level of schooling; namely, secondary education. If the channel of influence of 
                                                 
225 For instance, Wu county (吴县) in the Suzhou prefecture of Jiangsu Province, was famous for its 
literary ethos; it was the place that bred the highest number of Zhuangyuan (scholars who scored 
highest at the highest level of the civil service examination) in Chinese history. Persistently, in our own  
day, Wu county has been the home town of a large number of leading scholars, poets, and social 
scientists, showing the high legacy of its highly scholarly culture.   
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the gentry is a cultural legacy, the effect should not be limited to primary education 
alone. The estimates show that the coefficients are not significant across the three 
benchmark years. Results in Table 4.18 show that the number of local gentry 
specifically contributed to the expansion of primary education, but showed no regard 
for higher levels of schooling. As discussed earlier, since secondary schooling was 
dominated by people with a modern education background, and tertiary schooling was 
mainly a job market for people who had studied abroad the local gentry had limited 
incentive to support secondary schools. 
 
As a further measurement check, we constructed an indicator to proxy the literary 
ethos or what we might refer to as the ‘scholar culture’. As emphasised, regional 
variation in the quota numbers of Shengyuan was not determined by the educational 
performance or the scholar culture under the traditional education system, since it was 
fixed by the Qing court. However, the number of Jinshi (the number of top scholars 
who passed the palace exam) could have reflected the education performance across 
counties within one province, because the quota for Jinshi were allocated at the 
provincial level (C. Chang, 1955, pp. 122-123). Accordingly, we constructed a ratio 
that reflects ‘scholar culture’, which is very similar to a graduation rate. 
 
 𝐽𝑖𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖
 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑦𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑖
            (4.4) 
 
Given the same number of quotas of shengyuan, the number of Jinshi that could be 
cultivated at the county level reflects the education quality in a given county. It is 
reasonable to assume that in regions where education was perceived as more 
honoured and culturally encouraged, its inhabitants tended to have a higher incentives 
to study diligently, thus generating better educational performance.  
 
We use this ratio to measure the cultural valuation of education in a given county. 
Adding it to the baseline specification, the results in Table 4.20 show no significant 
effect on the primary enrolment ratio or primary school density. Both the tests used 
confirm that regions where  the residents used to be ‘good at’ traditional education 
were not necessarily the ones where modern primary schooling was successfully 
diffused. Therefore, the legacy of traditional education cannot present its role in 
promoting modern schooling simply as a matter of cultural persistence.  
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Table 4.20: Alternative influencing mechanism 
  Logit (secondary)   Primary Enrolment Ratio  
  1907 1916 1933   1907 1916 1933 
Local gentry 
0.42 -0.25  -0.18 Scholar 
Culture 
0.00029 -0.00089 -0.00053 
(0.32) (0.19)  (0.21) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.0008) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
FE province  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 904 1066 599 
 
904 1066 599 
       
Notes: 
(i). In this table, the numbers of local gentry are based on the shenyuan quota density( normalised by 
1907 county population). Scholar culture is measured by jinshi/shengyuan quota 
(ii). Control variables include: potential soil quality for rice cultivation, late Qing land tax quota, 
modern industry location dummy, treaty port dummy, density of Christians over 10000 people, 
distance to nearest telegraph station, distance to prefectural seat, distance to provincial capital, dummy 
for Yangtze river, dummy for coastal area. 
(iii). All the standard errors clustered at county level are shown in in parentheses.  
* significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Both the tests used confirm that regions where residents had previously thrived in 
traditional education were not necessarily the ones where modern primary schooling 
was successfully diffused. Thereby, the legacy of traditional education does not 
influence modern schooling simply and solely as a matter of cultural persistence.  
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
Using newly assembled data from archival sources, this chapter unveils the driving 
forces of mass schooling at the local level. Inspired by a rigorous approach to 
identifying causal effects in economics, this chapter adopts an array of empirical 
strategies to pin down the determinants of the mass expansion of schooling.  
 
The dominant finding of this chapter lies in the critical role of one elite group – the  
gentry – on  the expansion of modern education. Early 20th century China was a place 
of political turmoil where formal political institutions failed in many public 
responsibilities, including schooling provision; local elite groups therefore seized the 
power to replace them and became vital decision makers. Given that gentry status was 
obtained via the traditional education system, the importance of the gentry connects 
the legacy of traditional education with modern mass schooling. Regions that had 
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historically advocated education would naturally possess a larger reserve of gentry 
members, which led to better performance in modern education when it was first 
introduced; more importantly, the mechanisms for the gentry’s effect were mainly 
through the gentry’s public and private incentives, rather than the cultural legacy of 
traditional education.  
 
These findings present broad implications beyond the Chinese context. In non-
democratic societies or failing nations, informal institutions can step in and provide 
benevolent governance in the absence of formal institutions. Equally noteworthy, the 
finding that one social elite group contributed substantially to the rise of public mass 
schooling is made in sharp contrast to the early stages of educational development in 
Europe, England in particular, where the landholding elites were seen as the main 
interest group blocking the public provision of education to the populace.   
 
In addition, the roving bandit story is applicable in the Chinese case. Regions with 
higher political stability generating better accountability emerged. Furthermore, the 
negative interaction term between a magistrate’s tenure and the gentry’s strength also 
partially confirms our conjecture that the local gentry tended to wield a stronger 
influence in regions with less stable formal political control (inferred from the more 
frequent turnover of county magistrates).  
 
Finally, this chapter also provides some general clues to the ambiguous relationship 
between educational development and economic factors. First, one noteworthy 
finding is that modern schooling provision was not necessarily better in urban and 
industrial cities; on the contrary, a close negative relationship between population 
density and modern schooling development is observed. Many factors closely 
associated with agricultural production pointed to the possibility that regions with a 
stronger agricultural sector enjoyed better modern primary education, partly because 
the surtaxes on agricultural production were the only tax revenue sources that  county 
governments (the decision-making bodies of primary education) could control. In 
addition, historical arguments related to the importance of exposure to new, possibly 
foreign ideas, are confirmed by our results. Regions with more international trade, 
missionary activities, or better modern communication technologies showed notable 
advantages in the initial stages of educational progress.  
                                                                                                                                    169  
 
 
                                                                                                                                    170  
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis is motivated by the greatest educational movement in Chinese history – 
the transformation from traditional Confucius teaching to modern national education 
at the dawn of the 20th century, which altered the trajectory of Chinese development 
in subsequent decades. The empirical studies of Chinese educational development 
have concentrated heavily on the period after the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949, leaving the origin and the early stages of China’s educational progress 
remarkably under-examined.   
 
So far our understanding of educational development through its early stages has 
remained ambiguous on a number of questions: How much did human capital rise 
after the introduction of the modern education system? Did education progress evenly 
across China? What socio-economic factors can explain the diffusion of the modern 
form of schooling? With new data based on extensive archival material and historical 
government reports, this study is able to provide many quantitative dimensions of the 
rise of schooling in China through the first half of the 20th century for the very first 
time; and also to unravel the explanatory factors in the rise of modern schooling. This 
thesis sets out to answer these questions by surveying the evolution of the education 
system from the late 19th century onward, measuring its progress and the succeeding 
rise of human capital, and finally investigating what factors determined its diffusion. 
 
In this conclusion chapter, the empirical findings of this thesis are summarized, 
followed by a view of the implications that could be drawn from them and, at the end, 
a brief set of suggestions for future research along the same lines.  
 
1. Main findings 
Al through the literature on education, the formation of a national education system is 
widely believed to be promoted only by a strong state. However, the historical course 
of China between the late Qing and the Republican era presents us with an 
exceptionally interesting scenario. As a national salvation, the fact is that a radical 
national education system was initiated by a withering state and largely supported by 
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informal institutions. The formation of the modern education model occurred in China 
when the process of state formation was at its most intensive.  
 
Quantitative dimensions of the rise of schooling  
First and foremost, the results of this thesis map the quantitative dimensions of the 
education development in China through the first half of the 20th century. Between 
1900 and 1949, formal schooling modelled upon Western countries and generously  
largely supported by public contributions, expanded at unprecedented speed.  
 
As measured by the gross enrolment ratio, the primary enrolment ratio soared from 
zero to 27 percent before 1937; even though secondary and tertiary schooling 
experienced less impressive progress, given the absolutely primary importance of 
primary schooling at this stage, it is safe to claim that China‘s population has borne 
the marks of its phenomenal formal educational expansion ever since. To put such 
achievement into perspective, there was a notable catch-up with its developing 
counterparts, such as India and Brazil, from 1900 to 1950. The prominent progress in 
education was not only in terms of quantity, but also in quality. For the very first time, 
young talents were given the chance to access a broader spectrum of knowledge and 
explosive new ideological trends.  
 
Nonetheless, the educational stock plots a scenario that is slightly different. In terms 
of human capital stock, China continued to lag badly behind other major developing 
countries, and the gap endured, if not enlarged, until the 1960s. The average years of 
schooling for the workforce (people 15-64 years old) stood at barely 0.5 in 1920 and 
had risen only slightly to 1.31 in 1950, when only formal education is included. 
Looking at the average years of schooling by birth cohort at age 30, the results present 
a very similar trend: that people born before 1924 (most of whom presumably 
received education during the first half of the 20th century)  enjoyed only a modest 
increase in educational stock, from zero to 1.65 years. On the basis of different data, 
this study argues that the delayed growth in educational attainment may be attributed 
to the fact that a large proportion of Chinese who received education in informal 
traditional schools (Sishu) failed to be counted in most of the calculations when we 
measured the average years of schooling for Chinese people at the time. Apart from 
the aggregate trend, the human capital stock series also present the changing 
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trajectory of the gender gap, as well as the urban-rural inequality for the birth cohorts 
of the 20th century. Apparently, the difference of educational attainment between 
Chinese males and females narrowed considerably over the last century, in particular 
for people born after the 1930s; unfortunately, a similar convergence was not 
witnessed in the urban-rural disparities.  
 
Determinants of mass education expansion  
Apart from the aggregate result, given the sheer size of China and the notable regional 
disparities in economic prosperity, this thesis also presents the geographically uneven 
rise of education across regions. Such diverse educational progress offers us an 
empirical ground for our second finding, which concerns the driving forces in the rise 
of modern schooling, primary education in particular. We claim that mass primary 
schooling regarded as a public good, was largely an outcome of politico-economic 
dynamics but not simply of economic prosperity.  
 
The dominant finding of this thesis lies in the critical role of one elite group – the 
gentry – in securing the provision of modern education in China throughout this 
period. Due to their seizing power at the local level, the local gentry consistently 
encouraged the provision of modern primary education within their localities, not only 
because of their sense of moral obligation, but also to further their own private 
interests in financial gain and preserving the legitimacy of their status in their local 
communities as educated elites. Moreover, the story of the ‘roving bandit’ is also 
applicable to the Chines context, in that it exemplifies the importance of 
administrative/political stability; more importantly, this finding also suggests that the 
gentry’s positive effect on schooling was very much more notable in regions suffering 
higher levels of political instability. Finally, even though no conclusive arguments can 
be drawn about the way in which economic development influences education 
provision, the research makes several noteworthy findings. For one, it is abundantly 
clear that rich rural regions performed perceptibly better in primary education 
provision, partly because land tax surtaxes had been the main revenue source that the 
county government could lay its hands on. Moreover, the factors that may contribute 
to people’s acceptance and tolerance of a new education system, for instance, 
exposure to the influence of the West and openness to modern communication, seem 
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to play much more critical roles in its initial stages, although the positive effect of 
these fades away gradually.   
 
2. Contributions and implications 
To begin with, unlike existing empirical studies on China covering the same period, 
this study compiles a county-level dataset. Substantial historical narratives indicate 
that, due to China’s sheer size and distinctive diverse economic and social conditions, 
using prefectural or even provincial level data to explain socio-economic variations in 
China loses much of the essential dispersion and many important underlying patterns.  
 
In addition, this thesis also contributes two major advances to the literature on 
education development in China. First, its analysis provides considerable 
quantitatively detailed data on the rise of schooling in China, which allow a more 
comprehensive understanding of its progress, and allow us to make international 
comparisons with China regarding education. In addition, this thesis also tackles the 
important question of what determined the rise of modern education. The findings for 
an explanation of the driving forces of this rise are exceptionally important, not only 
because they enrich our understanding of what drove up the education, but also 
because it connects the historical legacy of traditional education with the rise of 
modern schooling. 
 
However, this study is not relevant to Chinese educational progress alone; it also 
provides empirical evidence on the notable importance of the gentry in local 
governance. Despite the large literature claiming the vital role of the local gentry in 
Chinese history, there are very few rigorous studies that examine its direct impact on 
spheres of governance, and even fewer mentioning how the gentry’s role changed in 
the dynamic of the radical social transformation at the dawn of the 20th century, when 
the institution that had granted legitimacy to the gentry as an elite was removed.  
 
Moreover, this thesis has broader general implications that go beyond the Chinese 
context. First, it sheds light on the determinants of education in societies equipped 
with different political institutions and a very backward economy, in the eyes of the  
developed world. The literature targeting the OECE countries emphasises the role of 
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decentralisation and local democracy as main engines for schooling expansion; this 
study adds to these the part played by local administrative stability and the benign 
nature of social elites in explaining schooling outcomes in societies where a 
decentralized structure meets local authoritarian politics. Second, this study makes a 
sharp contrast with the literature that argues that social elites always formed the main 
interest groups that sets out to block public schooling to the masses (as it did in many 
European countries). Finally, because mass education can be seen as one of the most 
widely influential public goods, this study may apply to the much broader question of 
understanding the provision of public goods in the developing word. Our main finding 
– the beneficent role of a certain elite group – adds evidence to a recently growing 
body of literature stressing the importance of informal institutions enforced by social 
groups in providing public goods in non-democratic societies.  
 
3. Future research  
Looking ahead, this thesis leaves many questions unanswered. One particular research 
puzzle I would like to purse is to examine why regions with higher primary enrolment 
ratios were not necessarily those with better performance in terms of secondary 
schooling. The general pattern of educational development around the globe follows 
the natural order: primary schooling rises first, then secondary schooling, and finally 
tertiary education. However, in societies where a certain set-up of political economy 
allows elites to capture public resources, the limited resources for education tend to be 
funnelled towards secondary and tertiary schooling catering to the middle or upper 
class, even when primary education has not yet permeated everywhere a mong the 
masses (Chaudhary, 2009; Chaudhary et al., 2012). This biased progress in education 
would harm the effective allocation of educational resources, so what kind of 
provincial political economy shaped the mis-allocation of insufficient educational 
resources in China?  
 
In addition, following the same lines as this thesis, another research project could be 
further developed. There is an increasing literature arguing the persistence of social 
institutions and its effect on long-term economic developments. China’s educational 
development would be a good testing ground to examine whether the inertia hinging 
on social institutions was cut away by changes in the political system. In my PhD 
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thesis, as mentioned, we find that places which outperformed in Confucius teaching 
were also the ones at an advantage when it came to developing modern 
schooling. Naturally, the next step would be to test whether this regional pattern held 
good through the communist era.   
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Appendix A: 
 
Table: Enrolment level by schooling level: from 1900 to 2009 
Year 
Population 
(10000 persons) 
Primary  Secondary Tertiary 
1907 41597 1198455 31682 46110 
1908 41830 1380940 36364 45258 
1909 42064 1591210 40468 44401 
1910 42300 1833498 44345 43539 
1911 42766 2112677 48223 41836 
1912 43238 2795475 52100 40114 
1913 43714 3485807 57980 38373 
1914 44196 3912727 67254 32079 
1915 44683 4140066 69770 25242 
1916 45175 3843454 60924 19241 
1917 45673 4425420 89332 22207 
1918 46177 5013815 117740 25205 
1919 46686 5608638 114151 28237 
1920 47200 6210007 110563 31301 
1921 47367 6405554 106974 32298 
1922 47535 6601802 103385 33298 
1923 47704 6924113 112249 34302 
1924 47873 7247571 121114 35309 
1925 48043 7572177 129978 36320 
1926 48213 7897930 149552 32825 
1927 48384 8224831 169126 29318 
1928 48555 8552880 188700 25798 
1929 48727 8882077 248668 29123 
1930 48900 10943979 396948 37566 
1931 49264 11720596 401772 44167 
1932 49631 12225066 409586 42710 
1933 50000 12584479 415948 42936 
1934 50264 13188133 401449 41768 
1935 50529 15110199 438113 41128 
1936 50796 18364956 482522 41923 
1937 51064 12847914 309563 31188 
1938 51334 12281857 409448 36180 
1939 51605 12669976 423916 44422 
1940 51877 15545857 438384 52376 
1941 52151 15058051 452853 59457 
1942 52426 17721105 467321 64097 
1943 52703 18602259 481789 73669 
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1944 52981 17221814 496257 78909 
1945 53261 18655651 510726 83498 
1946 53542 20089488 525194 129336 
1947 53824 21523326 772796 155036 
1948 54109 22957163 1020398 123495 
1949 54167 24391000 1039000 117000 
1950 55196 28924000 1305000 137000 
1951 56300 43154000 1568000 153000 
1952 57482 51100000 2490000 191000 
1953 58796 51775333 3583110 223000 
1954 60266 52450667 4073233 258800 
1955 61465 53126000 3900000 288000 
1956 62828 58704500 5522204 349552 
1957 64853 64283000 6281000 441000 
1958 65994 65274200 7666919 622756 
1959 67207 66265400 8289811 815982 
1960 66207 67256600 7776297 656686 
1961 65859 68247800 7597595 601251 
1962 67295 69239000 7528000 830000 
1963 69172 71575000 7616000 750000 
1964 70499 92945000 8541000 685000 
1965 72538 116209000 9338000 674000 
1966 74542 103417000 12498000 534000 
1967 76368 102443000 12237000 409000 
1968 78534 100363000 13923000 259000 
1969 80671 100668000 20215000 109000 
1970 82992 105280000 26419000 48000 
1971 85229 112112000 31276000 83000 
1972 87177 125492000 35825000 194000 
1973 89211 135704000 34465000 314000 
1974 90859 144814000 36503000 430000 
1975 92420 150941000 44661000 501000 
1976 93717 150055000 58365000 565000 
1977 94974 146176000 67799000 625000 
1978 96259 146240000 65483000 856000 
1979 97542 146629000 59050000 1020000 
1980 98705 146270000 55081000 1144000 
1981 100072 143328000 48596000 1279000 
1982 101654 139720000 45285000 1154000 
1983 103008 135780000 43978000 1207000 
1984 104357 135571000 45542000 1396000 
1985 105851 133702000 47060000 1703000 
1986 107507 131825000 48899000 1880000 
1987 109300 128359000 49481000 1959000 
1988 111026 125358000 47615000 2066000 
1989 112704 123731000 45540000 2082000 
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1990 114333 122414000 45860000 2063000 
1991 115823 121642000            46835000         2044000 
1992 117171 122013000             47708000         2184000 
1993 118517 124212000              47391000         2536000 
1994 119850 128226000 49817000 2799000 
1995 121121 131952000 53710000 2906000 
1996 123626 136150000 57397000 3021000 
1997 124761 139954000 60179000 3174000 
1998 125786 139538000 63010000 3409000 
1999 126743 135480000 67713000 4134000 
2000 127627 130132500 73689100 5560900 
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Appendix B:  
 
Table: List of county gazetteers for county magistrate’s turnover 
 
province county county_ch province county county_ch 
Anhui Susong Xian 宿松县 Fujian Lianjiang 
Xian 
连江县 
Anhui Taihu Xian 太湖县 Fujian Luoyuan Xian 罗源县 
Anhui Tongcheng 
Xian 
桐城县 Fujian Min Xian 闽县 
Anhui W gjiang 
Xian 
望江县 Fujian Minqing Xian 闽清县 
Anhui Dongliu Xian 东流县 Fujian Jian'an Xian 建安县 
Anhui Guichi Xian 贵池县 Fujian Pucheng Xian 浦城县 
Anhui Qingyang 
Xian 
青阳县 Fujian Songxi Xian 松溪县 
Anhui Quanjiao Xian 全椒县 Fujian Zhenghe Xian 政和县 
Anhui Fengtai Xian 凤台县 Fujian Zhangping 
Xian 
漳平县 
Anhui Fengyang 
Xian 
凤阳县 Fujian Anxi Xian 安溪县 
Anhui Shou Zhou 寿州 Fujian Guangze Xian 光泽县 
Anhui Su Zhou 宿州 Fujian Taining Xian 泰宁县 
Anhui Guangde 
Zhou 
广德州 Fujian Changting 
Xian 
长汀县 
Anhui Hanshan Xian 含山县 Fujian Guihua Xian 归化县 
Anhui He Zhou 和州 Fujian Liancheng 
Xian 
连城县 
Anhui Xi Xian 歙县 Fujian Q ngliu Xian 清流县 
Anhui Xiuning Xian 休宁县 Fujian Shanghang 
Xian 
上杭县 
Anhui Yi Xian 黟县 Fujian Wuping Xian 武平县 
Anhui Huoshan Xian 霍山县 Fujian Yongding 
Xian 
永定县 
Anhui Lujiang Xian 庐江县 Fujian Putian Xian 莆田县 
Anhui Shucheng 
Xian 
舒城县 Fujian Xianyou Xian 仙游县 
Anhui Wuwei Zhou 无为州 Fujian Jianle Xian 将乐县 
Anhui Jing Xian 泾县 Fujian Nanping Xian 南平县 
Anhui Nanling Xian 南陵县 Fujian Sha Xian 沙县 
Anhui Xuancheng 
Xian 
宣城县 Fujian Shunchang 
Xian 
顺昌县 
Anhui Si Zhou 泗州 Fujian Yong'an Xian 永安县 
Anhui Tianchang 
Xian 
天长县 Fujian Youxi Xian 尤溪县 
Anhui Dangtu Xian 当涂县 Fujian Datian Xian 大田县 
Anhui Fanchang 
Xian 
繁昌县 Fujian Dehua Xian 德化县 
Anhui Wuhu Xian 芜湖县 Fujian Yongchun 
Zhou 
永春州 
Anhui Bo Zhou 亳州 Fujian Haicheng 
Xian 
海澄县 
Anhui Fuyang Xian 阜阳县 Fujian Longxi Xian 龙溪县 
Anhui Huoqiu Xian 霍丘县 Fujian Zhangpu Xian 漳浦县 
Anhui Taihe Xian 太和县 Fujian Zhao'an Xian 诏安县 
Anhui Woyang Xian 涡阳县 Fujian Nanjing Xian 南靖县 
Anhui Jianping Xian 建平县 Fujian Houguan 
Xian 
侯官县 
Fujian Fu'an Xian 福安县 Fujian N nghua Xian 宁化县 
Fujian Fuding Xian 福鼎县 Fujian Nan'an Xian 南安县 
Fujian Ningde Xian 宁德县 Fujian Tong'an Xian 同安县 
Fujian Changle Xian 长乐县 Fujian Yongfu Xian 永福县 
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Fujian Fuqing Xian 福清县 Fujian Jian'ou Xian 建安县 
Fujian Gutian Xian 古田县 Fujian Zhao'an Xian 诏安县 
Fujian Yunxiao Ting 云霄厅 Guizhou Puding Xian 普定县 
Fujian Pingtan Xian 平潭县 Guizhou Qianxi Zhou 黔西州 
Guangdong Chaoyang 
Xian 
潮阳县 Guizhou Taigong Ting 台拱厅 
Guangdong Dapu Xian 大埔县 Guizhou Qingping 
Xian 
清平县 
Guangdong Huaxian Xian 花县 Guizhou Q ngxi Xian 青溪县 
Guangdong Longmen 
Xian 
龙门县 Guizhou Qingzhen 
Xian 
清镇县 
Guangdong Q ngyuan 
Xian 
清远县 Guizhou Renhuai Xian 仁怀县 
Guangdong gshan 
Xian 
香山县 Guizhou Shibing Xian 施秉县 
Guangdong nhui Xian 新会县 Guizhou Shiqian Fu 石阡府 
Guangdong Boluo Xian 博罗县 Guizhou Shuicheng 
Ting 
水城厅 
Guangdong Haifeng Xian 海丰县 Guizhou S ' an Fu 思南府 
Guangdong Heping Xian 和平县 Guizhou Sizhou Fu 思州府 
Guangdong Dan Zhou 儋州 Guizhou Suiyang Xian 绥阳县 
Guangdong Gan'en Xian 感恩县 Henan Shenqiu Xian 沈丘县 
Guangdong Lechang Xian 乐昌县 Henan Taikang Xian 太康县 
Guangdong Renhua Xian 仁化县 Henan Guang Zhou 光州 
Guangdong Wengyuan 
Xian 
翁源县 Henan Guangshan 
Xian 
光山县 
Guangdong Deqing Zhou 德庆州 Henan Sh gcheng 
Xian 
商城县 
Guangdong Enping Xian 恩平县 Henan Cheng Xian 柘城县 
Guangdong Gaoyao Xian 高要县 Henan Luyi Xian 鹿邑县 
Guangdong Kaiping Xian 开平县 Henan Xiayi Xian 夏邑县 
Guangdong Yangshan 
Xian 
阳山县 Henan Yucheng 
Xian 
虞城县 
Guangdong ning Xian 西宁县 Henan Me gjin Xian 孟津县 
Guangdong Sanshui Xian 三水县 Henan Henei Xian 河内县 
Guangdong Hui Zhou 归善县 Henan Wuzhi Xian 武陟县 
Guangdong Hua Xian 花县 Henan Weishi Xian 尉氏县 
Guangdong Chixi Xian 赤溪县 Henan Zhongmou 
Xian 
中牟县 
Guangdong Nan'ao Ting 南澳厅 Henan Nanzhao Xian 南召县 
Guizhou Xingyi Xian 兴义县 Henan Tongbai Xian 桐柏县 
Guizhou Shiqian Fu 石阡府 Henan Ruyang Xian 汝阳县 
Guizhou Leishan Xian 丹江厅 Henan Shangcai 
Xian 
上蔡县 
Guizhou Nanlong Xian 兴义县 Henan Suiping Xian 遂平县 
Guizhou Shuicheng 
Xian 
水城厅 Henan Xincai Xian 新蔡县 
Guizhou Ziyun Xian 归化厅 Henan Fengqiu Xian 封丘县 
Guizhou Liping Xian 黎平府 Henan Hua Xian 滑县 
Guizhou Guanling Xian 永宁州 Henan Jun Xian 浚县 
Guizhou Jianhe Xian 清江厅 Henan Yancheng 
Xian 
郾城县 
Guizhou Zhenfeng 
Xian 
贞丰州 Henan Ruyang Xian 汝阳县 
Guizhou Huishui Xian 定香州 Henan Guang Zhou 光州 
Guizhou Majiang Xian 麻哈州 Henan Henei Xian 河内县 
Guizhou Dujiang Xian 都江厅 Henan Ruicheng 
Xian 
虞城县 
Guizhou Xifeng Xian 修文县 Henan Yanling Xian 鄢陵县 
Hubei Jingshan Xian 京山县 Hubei Laifeng Xian 来凤县 
Hubei Yingcheng 
Xian 
应城县 Hubei Donghu Xian 东湖县 
Hubei Y ngshan 
Xian 
应山县 Hubei Gucheng 
Xian 
谷城县 
Hubei Yunmeng 
Xian 
云梦县 Hubei Jiangxia Xian 江夏县 
Hubei Hanchuan 
Xian 
汉川县 Hubei Huanggang 
Xian 
黄冈县 
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Hubei Hanyang Xian 汉阳县 Hubei Changle Xian 长乐县 
Hubei Huangpi Xian 黄陂县 Hubei Huangma 
Xian 
黄安县 
Hubei Guangji Xian 广济县 Hubei Hefeng Xian 鹤峰州 
Hubei Huang'an 
Xian 
黄安县 Hubei Hanyang xian 汉阳县 
Hubei Luotian Xian 罗田县 Hubei Zigui Xian 归州 
Hubei Macheng Xian 麻城县 Hunan Anren Xian 安仁县 
Hubei Dangyang 
Xian 
当阳县 Jiangsu Jingjiang 
Xian 
靖江县 
Hubei Yuan'an Xian 远安县 Jiangsu Funing Xian 阜宁县 
Hubei Jiangling Xian 江陵县 Jiangsu Jurong Xian 句容县 
Hubei Jianli Xian 监利县 Jiangsu Liuhe Xian 六合县 
Hubei Shishou Xian 石首县 Jiangsu Chuansha 
Ting 
川沙厅 
Hubei Songzi Xian 松滋县 Jiangsu Fe xian 
Xian 
奉贤县 
Hubei Yidu Xian 宜都县 Jiangsu Jinshan Xian 金山县 
Hubei Jianshi Xian 建始县 Jiangsu Lou Xian 娄县 
Hubei Lichuan Xian 利川县 Jiangsu Nanhui Xian 南汇县 
Hubei Xianfeng Xian 咸丰县 Jiangsu Qingpu Xian 青浦县 
Hubei Chongyang 
Xian 
崇阳县 Jiangsu Zhaowen 
Xian 
昭文县 
Hubei Jiayu Xian 嘉鱼县 Jiangsu Baoshan Xian 宝山县 
Hubei Puqi Xian 蒲圻县 Jiangsu Chongming 
Xian 
崇明县 
Hubei Tongcheng 
Xian 
通城县 Jiangsu Jiading Xian 嘉定县 
Hubei Tongshan 
Xian 
通山县 Jiangsu Rugao Xian 如皋县 
Hubei ngguo Zhou 兴国州 Jiangsu Pei Xian 沛县 
Hubei Nanzhang 
Xian 
南漳县 Jiangsu Pi Zhou 邳州 
Hubei gyang 
Xian 
襄阳县 Jiangsu Xiao Xian 萧县 
Hubei Y cheng Xian 宜城县 Jiangsu Tai Zhou 泰州 
Hubei Zaoyang Xian 枣阳县 Jiangsu Dantu Xian 丹徒县 
Hubei Changle Xian 长乐县 Jiangsu Lishui Xian 溧水县 
Hubei Changyang 
Xian 
长阳县 Jiangsu Zhaowen 
Xian 
昭文县 
Hubei Donghu Xian 东湖县 Jiangsu Lou Xian 娄县 
Hubei Baokang Xian 保康县 Jiangxi Leping Xian 乐平县 
Hubei Fang Xian 房县 Shaanxi Changwu 
Xian 
长武县 
Hubei Yun Xian 郧县 Shaanxi Chunhua 
Xian 
淳化县 
Hubei Yunxi Xian 郧西县 Shaanxi Sanshui Xian 三水县 
Hubei Zhushan Xian 竹山县 Shaanxi Baoji Xian 宝鸡县 
Hubei Zhuxi Xian 竹溪县 Shaanxi Fufeng Xian 扶风县 
Hubei Xuan'en Xian 宣恩县 Shaanxi Linyou Xian 麟游县 
Hubei Xingguo Zhou 兴国州 Shaanxi Long Zhou 陇州 
Shaanxi Mei Xian 郿县 Shaanxi Baihe Xian 白河县 
Shaanxi Qishan Xian 岐山县 Shaanxi Hanyin Ting 汉阴厅 
Shaanxi Fu Zhou 鄜州 Shaanxi Shiquan Xian 石泉县 
Shaanxi Zhongbu Xian 中部县 Shaanxi Xunyang 
Xian 
洵阳县 
Shaanxi Chenggu Xian 城固县 Shaanxi Anding Xian 安定县 
Shaanxi Dingyuan 
Ting 
定远厅 Shaanxi Ansai Xian 安塞县 
Shaanxi Fe  Xian 凤县 Shaanxi Ganquan 
Xian 
甘泉县 
Shaanxi Fuoping Ting 佛坪厅 Shaanxi Jingbian Xian 靖边县 
Shaanxi Nanzheng 
Xian 
南郑县 Shaanxi Yanchang 
Xian 
延长县 
Shaanxi xiang Xian 西乡县 Shaanxi Yanchuan 
Xian 
延川县 
Shaanxi Yang Xian 洋县 Shaanxi Fugu Xian 府谷县 
Shaanxi Qian Zhou 乾州 Shaanxi Huaiyuan 
Xian 
怀远县 
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Shaanxi Wugong Xian 武功县 Shaanxi Jia Zhou 葭州 
Shaanxi Shang Zhou 商州 Shaanxi Shenmu Xian 神木县 
Shaanxi Shangnan 
Xian 
商南县 Shaanxi Yulin Xian 榆林县 
Shaanxi Sh yang 
Xian 
山阳县 Shaanxi Luonan Xian 洛南县 
Shaanxi Zhe 'an Xian 镇安县 Shaanxi Huaiyuan 
Xian 
怀远县 
Shaanxi Mizhi Xian 米脂县 Shaanxi Bao'an Xian 保安县 
Shaanxi Suide Zhou 绥德州 Shaanxi Xianning 
Xian 
咸宁县 
Shaanxi Wubao Xian 吴堡县 Shaanxi Yao Zhou 耀州 
Shaanxi Baishui Xian 白水县 Shaanxi Zhongbu 
Xian 
中部县 
Shaanxi Chengcheng 
Xian 
澄城县 Shaanxi Q yang 
Xian 
汧阳县 
Shaanxi Dali Xian 大荔县 Shaanxi Liuba Ting 留坝厅 
Shaanxi Hancheng 
Xian 
韩城县 Shaanxi Ningshan 
Ting 
宁陕厅 
Shaanxi Heyang Xian 郃阳县 Shaanxi Xiaoyi Ting 孝义厅 
Shaanxi Hua Zhou 华州 Shaanxi Bin Zhou 邠州 
Shaanxi Huayin Xian 华阴县 Shaanxi Dingyuan 
Ting 
定远厅 
Shaanxi Pucheng Xian 蒲城县 Shaanxi La 'ao Xian 蓝田县 
Shaanxi Jingyang Xian 泾阳县 Shaanxi Bin Xian 邠州 
Shaanxi Lantian Xian 蓝田县 Shaanxi Ningqiang 
Xian 
宁羌州 
Shaanxi Lintong Xian 临潼县 Shandong Cao Xian 曹县 
Shaanxi Ningshan 
Ting 
宁陕厅 Shandong Juye Xian 巨野县 
Shaanxi ongguan 
Xian 
同官县 Shandong Huang Xian 黄县 
Shaanxi Weinan Xian 渭南县 Shandong Ninghai Zhou 宁海州 
Shaanxi Xianning Xian 咸宁县 Shandong Penglai Xian 蓬莱县 
Shaanxi Xianyang 
Xian 
咸阳县 Shandong Chiping Xian 茌平县 
Shaanxi oyi Ting 孝义厅 Shandong Guan Xian 冠县 
Shaanxi Xingping 
Xian 
兴平县 Shandong Guantao Xian 馆陶县 
Shaanxi Yao Zhou 耀州 Shandong Qingping 
Xian 
清平县 
Shaanxi Zhouzhi Xian 盩厔县 Shandong Gaomi Xian 高密县 
Shaanxi Ankang Xian 安康县 Shandong Changqing 
Xian 
长清县 
Shandong Jiyang Xian 济阳县 Shanxi Changzi Xian 长子县 
Shandong Licheng Xian 历城县 Shanxi Changzi Xian 长子县 
Shandong Xincheng 
Xian 
新城县 Shanxi Dingxiang 
Xian 
定襄县 
Shandong Zh gqiu 
Xian 
章丘县 Shanxi Fenxi Xian 汾西县 
Shandong Zichuan Xian 淄川县 Shanxi Fenyang Xian 汾阳县 
Shandong Jining Zhou 济宁州 Shanxi Gaoping Xian 高平县 
Shandong Xiajin Xian 夏津县 Shanxi Guangling 
Xian 
广灵县 
Shandong Boshan Xian 博山县 Shanxi Guo Xian 崞县 
Shandong Changle Xian 昌乐县 Shanxi Hejin Xian 河津县 
Shandong Shouguang 
Xian 
寿光县 Shanxi Hequ Xian 河曲县 
Shandong Pingyin Xian 平阴县 Shanxi Heshun Xian 和顺县 
Shandong Tai'an Xian 泰安县 Shanxi Hongdong 
Xian 
洪洞县 
Shandong Haifeng Xian 海丰县 Shanxi Hongdong 
Xian 
洪洞县 
Shandong Huimin Xian 惠民县 Shanxi Huairen Xian 怀仁县 
Shandong Qingcheng 
Xian 
青城县 Shanxi Huguan Xian 壶关县 
Shandong Sh ghe Xian 商河县 Shanxi Hunyuan 
Zhou 
浑源州 
Shandong Yangxin Xian 阳信县 Shanxi Hu  Zhou 霍州 
Shandong Zhanhua Xian 霑化县 Shanxi Ji Zhou 吉州 
Shandong Qufu Xian 曲阜县 Shanxi Jiang Xian 绛县 
Shandong Yishui Xian 沂水县 Shanxi Jiang Zhou 绛州 
                                                                                                                                    194  
 
Shandong Le'an Xian 乐安县 Shanxi Jiaocheng 
Xian 
交城县 
Shandong Ninghai Zhou 宁海州 Shanxi Jie Zhou 解州 
Shandong Xincheng 
Xian 
新城县 Shanxi Jiexiu Xian 介休县 
Shandong Haiyang Xian 海阳县 Shanxi Jingle Xian 静乐县 
Shandong Le'an Xian 乐安县 Shanxi Jishan Xian 稷山县 
Shandong Fan Xian 范县 Shanxi Kelan Zhou 岢岚州 
Shandong Zhanhua Xian 霑化县 Shanxi Lan Xian 岚县 
Shandong Wuli Xian 海丰县 Shanxi Liao Zhou 辽州 
Shandong Linqu Xian 临邑县 Shanxi Licheng Xian 黎城县 
Shandong Renping Xian 茌平县 Shanxi Lin Xian 临县 
Zhejiang Anji Xian 安吉县 Shanxi Linfen Xian 临汾县 
Zhejiang Deqing Xian 德清县 Shanxi Lingchuan 
Xian 
陵川县 
Zhejiang Yongkang 
Xian 
永康县 Shanxi Lingqiu Xian 灵丘县 
Zhejiang Fenghua Xian 奉化县 Shanxi Lingshi Xian 灵石县 
Zhejiang Qin Xian 鄞县 Shanxi Linjin Xian 临晋县 
Zhejiang Changshan 
Xian 
常山县 Shanxi Lucheng Xian 潞城县 
Zhejiang Jiangshan 
Xian 
江山县 Shanxi Ningwu Xian 宁武县 
Zhejiang Sh gyu Xian 上虞县 Shanxi Ningxiang 
Xian 
宁乡县 
Zhejiang Sheng Xian 嵊县 Shanxi Pia guan 
Xian 
偏关县 
Zhejiang Xinchang 
Xian 
新昌县 Shanxi Pingding 
Zhou 
平定州 
Zhejiang ju Xian 仙居县 Shanxi Pinglu Xian 平鲁县 
Shanxi Anyi Xian 安邑县 Shanxi Pinglu Xian 平陆县 
Shanxi Pingyao Xian 平遥县 Shanxi Yongning 
Zhou 
永宁州 
Shanxi Pu Xian 蒲县 Shanxi Youyu Xian 右玉县 
Shanxi Qi Xian 祁县 Shanxi Yu Xian 盂县 
Shanxi Qin Zhou 沁州 Zhili Qingyuan 
Xian 
清苑县 
Shanxi Qinshui Xian 沁水县 Zhili Dongming 
Xian 
东明县 
Shanxi Qinyuan Xian 沁源县 Zhili Hejian Xian 河间县 
Shanxi Quwo Xian 曲沃县 Zhili Jiaohe Xian 交河县 
Shanxi Ronghe Xian 荣河县 Zhili Jing Zhou 景州 
Shanxi Ruicheng 
Xian 
芮城县 Zhili Wuqiao Xian 吴桥县 
Shanxi Ruicheng 
Xian 
芮城县 Zhili Xian Xian 献县 
Shanxi Sh yin Xian 山阴县 Zhili Wuyi Xian 武邑县 
Shanxi Shenchi Xian 神池县 Zhili Xingtai Xian 邢台县 
Shanxi Shilou Xian 石楼县 Zhili Ba Zhou 霸州 
Shanxi Shouyang 
Xian 
寿阳县 Zhili Sanhe Xian 三河县 
Shanxi Shuo Zhou 朔州 Zhili Cang Zhou 沧州 
Shanxi Taiping Xian 太平县 Zhili Nanpi Xian 南皮县 
Shanxi Taiyuan Xian 太原县 Zhili Yanshan Xian 盐山县 
Shanxi Tianzhen Xian 天镇县 Zhili Chicheng 
Xian 
赤城县 
Shanxi Tunliu Xian 屯留县 Zhili W quan 
Xian 
万全县 
Shanxi Wanquan 
Xian 
万泉县 Zhili Funing Xian 抚宁县 
Shanxi We shui Xian 文水县 Zhili Jingxing Xian 井陉县 
Shanxi Wenxi Xian 闻喜县 Zhili Yutian Xian 玉田县 
Shanxi Wutai Xian 五台县 Zhili Dongming 
Xian 
东明县 
Shanxi Wuxiang Xian 武乡县 Zhili Xian 献县 
Shanxi Wuzhai Xian 五寨县 Zhili Ding Zhou 定州 
Shanxi Xi Zhou 隰州 Zhili Jingxing Xian 井陉县 
Shanxi Xia Xian 夏县 Zhili Xingtang 
Xian 
行唐县 
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Shanxi Xiangling 
Xian 
襄陵县 Zhili Longguan 
Xian 
龙门县 
Shanxi gning 
Xian 
乡宁县 Zhili D ng Zhou 定州 
Shanxi gyuan 
Xian 
襄垣县 Zhili Dingxing 
Xian 
定兴县 
Shanxi oyi Xian 孝义县 Zhili Dong'an Xian 东安县 
Shanxi Xing Xian 兴县 Zhili Dongguang 
Xian 
东光县 
Shanxi Xugou Xian 徐沟县 Zhili Dongming 
Xian 
东明县 
Shanxi Yangcheng 
Xian 
阳城县 Zhili Fangshan 
Xian 
房山县 
Shanxi Yanggao Xian 阳高县 Zhili Feixiang Xian 肥乡县 
Shanxi Yangqu Xian 阳曲县 Zhili Fengning 
Ting 
丰宁县 
Shanxi Yi Zhou 沂州 Zhili Fe run Xian 丰润县 
Shanxi Yicheng Xian 翼城县 Zhili Fengshui 
Jindi 
风水禁地 
Shanxi Ying Zhou 应州 Zhili Fucheng Xian 阜城县 
Shanxi Yishi Xian 猗氏县 Zhili Funing Xian 抚宁县 
Shanxi Yonghe Xian 永和县 Zhili Fuping Xian 阜平县 
Shanxi Yongji Xian 永济县 Zhili Fuxin Xian 阜新县 
Zhili Gaocheng 
Xian 
藁城县 Zhili Hengshui 
Xian 
衡水县 
Zhili Gaoyang Xian 高阳县 Zhili Huai'an Xian 怀安县 
Zhili Gaoyi Xian 高邑县 Zhili Huailai Xian 怀来县 
Zhili Gu'an Xian 固安县 Zhili Huairou Xian 怀柔县 
Zhili Guangchang 
Xian 
广昌县 Zhili Huolu Xian 获鹿县 
Zhili Guangping 
Xian 
广平县 Zhili Ji Zhou 冀州 
Zhili Guangzong 
Xian 
广宗县 Zhili Ji Zhou 蓟州 
Zhili Gucheng Xian 故城县 Zhili Jianchang 
Xian 
建昌县 
Zhili Handan Xian 邯郸县 Zhili Jianping Xian 建平县 
Zhili Hangtang 
Xian 
行唐县 Zhili Jiaohe Xian 交河县 
Zhili Hejian Xian 河间县 Zhili Jin Zhou 晋州 
   
Zhili Jing Zhou 景州 
 
*Note: all the gazetteers are gathered from  Bodleian Book Storage Facility in 
Swindon, Oxford university 
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Appendix C: 
Sample page for The Imperially Established Institutes and Laws of the Great Qing 
Dynasty  ( 大清会典) 
 
 
 
